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I. Chapter One: Introduction 
As Gal Batsri, NFVF1 council member and entertainment lawyer with Webber Wentzel 
Bowens, put it recently: 
"Outside Hollywood without government intervention a local film industry won't be able to get 
off the ground. It's a simple precondition that government has to come on board to develop a 
viable fihn industry that is seen as an investment brand.,,2 
In 1993 at the peak of a dispute between a large number of taxpayers and the South African 
Inland Revenue one could read in the ''Taxpayer'' (a specialist journal on South African Tax 
Law): 
"Unfortunately quite a number of professionals have gone beyond advice and been active in the 
marketing of schemes [film schemes - supplied by the author].,,3 The same goes for Germany 
in the last two years4. 
These statements illustrate the dilemma of what can be called "indirect film promotion". This 
Thesis is concerned primarily with public indirect promotion of film production in the Republic 
of South Africa (RSA) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) by income tax incentives. 
By comparing the income tax allowances and deductions for private investors in film 
production funds in Germany and in South Africa, the author aims to show how the 
governments of these two countries are taxing private individuals who invest in film funds, ie 
what incentives are offered to such venturesome investors. The tax incentives examined here 
provide the taxpayer with a deferment of his tax payments. By making the comparison the 
I "National Film and Video Foundation". 
2 Quoted from Andrew Worsdale, in: ZAia)Play, August 23,2001. 
3 Taxpayer, March, 1993, p 50. 
4 Cf Henning Kruse, "Goldgraberstimmung bei Filmfonds zieht "schwarze Schafe" an - Fehlende Kenntnisse 
kOIUlten zu hOsen Oberraschungen fur Anleger fuhren - Experten: Nicht von Hochglanzprospelcten blenden 
lassen" in: Die Welt am Sonntag, Finanzen, Finanzen, dated 271il of July 2001. 
6 
author intends examine what role a domestic film fund can playas an instrument for financing 
domesticS and export films and how the government can promote film production in this way. 
Also examined are the present practices of the Inland Revenue towards film funds, that is to 
say, how the tax authorities actually deal with film funds in their instruments. Over and above 
that, however, as an academic approach, practice notes by South Afiican and 
"Anwendungserlasse" by German tax authorities respectively, as well as the courts decisions 
are discussed from a perspective of a coherent income tax system. Especially the current 
"Anwendungserlasse" and the "Ubergangsregelungen" of the German ministry of finance are 
closely examined which are giving grounds for serious negative consequences for German film 
funds6 . As a consequence, this work should not be used in isolation as an investor's guide. 
Unfortunately due to temporal requirements for submission of this Thesis the author was not 
able to consider the interpretation note of the South African Inland Revenue on s24F7 of the 
Income Tax Act which is expected to be released in the beginning of 2003 and the draft of a 
supplementary decree on the BMF-decree dated 24.10.20008. 
In both countries film funds are not only tax saving schemes for investors but also work as a 
vehicle for the transfer of private money to film producers. The role of film funds in financing a 
film project can range from the sole financier of a film to one source of finance in the amount 
of about 20 % of the budget9 along side other typical modes of finance such as pre-sales, 
5 "Domestic" here means a film which is produced and sold in the same country. In South Africa "domestic" 
can be seen as an antonym to "export film" as defined in s24F of the Income Tax Act and the amendment bill 
thereof). 
6 Cf Leo Fischer, "Oem Steuerspannodell Filmfonds droht das Aus", in: Die Welt am Sonntag, Finanzen, 
Finanzen, dated 22nd of April 2002; Leo Fischer, ,,Endzeitstimmung erfasst Steuer sparende Anlagefonnen", 
ibid, dated 12th of November 2002; Katja Tamchina, "Eichel-Erlass gefl1hrdet TV-Produktionen", ibid, dated 
25th of May 2002; Leo Fischer, ,,zukunft der Filmfonds liegt im Dunkeln", ibid, dated 3rd of August 2002. 
7 All sections without description or with the one "of the Act" (in headlines) are such sections of the Income 
Tax Act No 58 of 1962 as amended and up to and including Act 60 of 2001. 
8 As the author was informed on the 9. of December 2002 by the German ministry of finance, Mr. Hensel, the 
discussion on the draft (!) of a supplement decree on the BMF-decree dated 24.10.2000, BStBl. 12001, 780, is 
still going on. An interims arrangement will be released before a new decree. 
9 The amount of an average budget of a South African cinema feature film for local release with local finance is 
about Rand 3 million to 12 million; for such film for export the budget can go up to Rand 15 million. The 
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public funding, bank loans etc .. It is necessary to mention at this stage that the funds, especially 
the German funds, are used to transfer domestic moneys to foreign film industries, such as 
Hollywood. These funds nevertheless should be considered as investors and the domestic 
industry is always a partner to them as long as they meet sound standards of commercial film 
production 10. 
Standards of commercial film production contain the range of factors including: 
• A serious and reliable producer who can provide stable business alliances and contacts. 
• An international and multi-media exploitable film, whose potential will be proofed best 
by pre-sales, a reputable distributor and other reliable financial sources and collaterals. 
• A business plan, which characterizes the participating artists but also the legal and 
financial consultants, which shows a realistic evaluation of the market, secures 
controlling like "in time in budget" production, the cash-flow situation and finally is 
flexible enough to bear unforeseen incidents. 
• A convincing marketing plan about the exploitation of the rights in the territories and 
merchandising to secure the return on the investment. 
• A chain of title regarding all underlying works like the screenplay etc, provided by the 
producer, to prevent later problems but also to make sure that the fund can acquire the 
rights. 
Note that "commercial" does not mean that the film is oflow cultural or artistic value. 10 to 15 
% of the demand in the world market refers to so called "art films". There are funds in 
Germany investing in such films, tool 1 . 
The above mentioned list shows all the requirements a producer has to meet to get a bank loan 
in the US 12. But in most cases the bank loan is more expensive than the fund money even 
corresponding numbers for Gennan films are about Euro 1 to 5 million. 
10 Cf Hubert et. alt., in: Cashing In. As the author experienced it at the conference on film financing on the 
occasion of the Sithengi Film Festival 2002 in Cape Town, this is also true of the South African funds . E.g. 
Uwe Boll, producer and director, produces his films with the money from his own fund "Dritte Boll Kino 
Beteiligungs GmbH & Co. KG", cf Ulrich Reitz, "Der Zorro der Filmbranche - Filmemacher Uwe Boll 
finanziert seine Streifen tiber eigene Fonds", in: Die Welt am Sonntag, Finanzen, Finanzen, dated 21st of 
October 2001 . 
II CfDr. Kitzler, TransFilm Berlin, in: Cashing In, p 47. 
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though some funds demand a share of profit equalling their share of the production costs, a top 
recoupment-position, their operating costs to be paid and sometimes collaterals for their first 
or second instalment (the latter is true at least for German funds and bank: loans). 
Since the finance structure of a film production varies from project to project each producer 
has to check individually if the fund is a proper financier from his perspective and not least of 
all almost every parameter in a financing scheme is a matter of negotiation between the 
producer and his partner. 
The experiences of the early 90s in South Africa and the present situation in Germany reveals 
how governments are struggling with the dilemma of promoting the film sector on the one 
hand and preventing tax evasion on the other hand. This thesis aims to show how the 
governments in both countries are faring in this regard at present and what they are offering to 
investors in film production funds. 
As already indicated, the approach here is a comparative one. The international setting of film 
financing and the fact that film production funds in Germany and South Africa are structured in 
a strikingly similar fashion (as en commandite partnerships) makes film funds very suitable for 
the purpose of a comparative thesis. Accordingly only film production funds are chosen as the 
object of this research 13. In order to give a full picture of what the deductions and allowances 
mean to the taxpayer, an introduction and explanation of the taxable income in both income tax 
systems is given (the reader may allow the author a short excursus to a problem which arises 
with partnerships in the newly incorporated residence-based system of taxation in South 
Africa). In order to avoid repetitions and to draw a clear picture of the similarities and 
differences between the tax incentives for a German investor in a German film production fund 
and the ones of a South African investor in a South African fund, the author will limit the 
12 Cf Josh Kramer, An introduction to film financing published in "produced by" under 
http://ww\. •. producersguild.orglproducedbv/filtnfinancing.htm 1 
13 Another reason to choose production film funds is the fact that in Germany due to the straight-line 
depreciation leasing funds are not attractive enough for investors (Cf Hans-Joachim Beck, Presiding Judge at 
the Fiscal Court Berlin, in: Die Welt am Sonntag - online, Immobilien, Recht & Steuern, dated 11th of July 
2000). 
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comparison to the results found in the conclusions of the two parts of this thesis. The detailed 
differences and similarities are to be found in the corresponding chapters of the said parts. 
ll. Chapter Two: Deductions and Allowances for film owners in the Republic of South 
Africa (RSA) 
1. The type of company of a film production fund in the RSA 
According to s24F(I) a film owner is a person who owns a film, whether solely or jointly14. 
Despite or because of the fact that the partnership does not exist as a legal entity, which means 
it does not form a persona distinct from its members, legal assets like intellectual property 
rights in a film can be held by the partners in joint and undivided shares15. But even if there is 
no persona constituted by the en commandite partnership in corporate law, in tax law the 
partnership can do so with regard to the "film owner". The ruling of s24H(2) shows this 
different approach in tax law by attributing a legal quality of a partnership to a single partner. 
Hence there is more than a "questionable need,,16 for this provision, but a clarifying purposel7 . 
Consequently the "film owner" under s24F(1) also includes a partner in an en commandite 
partnership18 which is of some importance, because investors as limited or commanditarian 
partners of the fund have a great interest to hold a copyright ownership in the film in order to 
secure the benefit of the applicable allowances in the Income Tax Act, ie s24F19. But not only 
for this reason the en commandite partnership is the suitable business entity for a film fund20 . 
Moreover it allows to limit the liability of the investors as commanditarian partners to the 
creditors of the partnership, provided they are not disclosed to the creditors and the debts were 
14 S24F(I) of the Income Tax Act No 58 of 1962 (as amended up to and including Act 60 of2001) 
15 Sacks v CIR 1946 AD 31, 13 SATe 343; Strydom v Pro tea Eisendomsagente 1979 (2) SA 206 (T), P 209; 
Silke, Vol. 2, § 11.4. 
16 CfMeyerowitz, §16.78. 
17 Silke, Vol. 2, § ll.4B. 
18 Meyerowitz, § 12.209. 
19 The Law of South Africa, Vol. 8 Part 2, par425, p249. 
20 If the fund is formed for the production of only one certain film, one speaks of a particular partnership 
10 
incurred in the name of the partnership and with its authoriti1. These partners may not 
represent the partnership and do not participate actively in the business affairs of the 
partnership. They are also not liable to the creditors of the partnership and to the disclosed 
partners only to the extent of the capital they agreed to contribute or actually contributed22. 
But on the other hand they cannot claim back any capital contributed or share of the 
partnership profits in competition with the creditors of the partnership23. Therefore the 
disclosed or managing partner is fully liable to third parties for the partnership debts24. Since a 
company can also become a partner in a partnership with natural persons25 and it is generally 
only liable to its creditors for its own debts (the company is a juristic person), it is suitable to 
act as the disclosed or managing partner of the en commandite partnership as a film fund. In an 
"industry otherwise characterised by notorious uncertainty and instability,,26 this limitation of 
liability of the investor is obviously as strong as the one of getting access to the advantages of 
s24F. 
2. The determination of the taxable income of the investor 
The "taxable income" is already the outcome of a calculation that includes the central concern 
of this thesis: the deductions and allowances. However these issues can not be examined 
divorced from the context of their direct effect: the taxable income. To find it there is to be 
determined the "gross income" of a taxpayer according to s 127. From this the "exempt income" 
according to s10 is to be subtracted28 . The result is called the "income". From this "income" 
21 Dorsten, J L van, chapter 4.1, p 332. 
22 Dorsten, J L van, ibid. 
23 Venter v Naude NO 1951 (1) SA 156, P 163. 
24 Dorsten, J L van, ibid. 
25 S4 Leather Co (Ply) Ltd v Main Clothing Manufacturers (Ply) Ltd. 1958 2 SA 118 (0) 119; CIR v Epstein 
19543 SA 689 (A) 700. 
26 CfThe Law of South Africa, Vol. 8 Part 2, par 424, P 248. 
27 sl, "gross income". 
28 The only exemption of interest is sI0(1)(zG) read with s24F. But a closer look at this sections, especially the 
cross reference between them which excludes any scheme of subsidies not mentioned in s24F shows that there 
is no exempt income available for film producers. This interpretation also meets the statement of Eddie Mbalo 
(CEO of the National Film And Video Foundation (NFVF), explained at a conference on film financing on the 
occasion of the 2002 Sithengi Film Festival in Cape Town), that in South Africa there are no subsidies for film 
producers available at present. Not even any funding by the NFVF. 
11 
again the general and special "deductions" are subtracted and finally the ''taxable capital gains" 
according to s26A are added. The result then is called the ''taxable income,,29. It has to be 
noted however, that the taxable income (including the gross income) is basically an artificial 
concept and can differ materially from the amount of the income calculated according to 
accounting principles30. It also refers time wise only to the year of assessment, called the "tax 
year", which is for a natural person a period of twelve months from first of March of one year 
to the last day of February of the following year3l . 
Regarding the tax returns, under s66(15) persons carrying on any business in partnership shall 
make a joint return as partners and each of the partners shall be separately and individually 
liable for the rendering of it. But still, as s77(7) stipulates, separate assessments shall be made 
upon each partner. 
2.1 Gross income, sl of the Act 
In fact the income of a film owner who is an investor in films and a natural private person can 
be derived from all kinds of sources. Not least of all from the business of the fund itself as 
dividends equal to the share of the partner. Only the abstract definition given by the Income 
Tax Act under s 1 is suitable to embrace all possible sources of income. Accordingly the taxable 
income consists of the 
1. total amount 
2. in cash or otherwise 
3. received by or accrued to, or in favour of, a person 
4. from anywhere in the case of a person who is a resident (2.2.1.1) 
5. from a South African source (or deemed source) in the case ofa non-resident (2.2.2.2) 
6. other than receipts or accruals of a capital nature. 
All these provisions have to be met cumulatively in order to speak of income in a legal sense 
and to make deductions thereof. 
29 Huxham/Haupt, chapter 1. 3.1, P 4. 
30 Silke, Vol. 1, § 1.11 . 
31 Silke, Vol. 1, § 1.16. 
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Since the deductions are the central issue here, there shall be no further examinations made on 
the income. Only two elements of the gross income are of special interest for funds in regard to 
the partnership nature of the funds and their investors contributing to it: 
2.1.1 The provision "from anywhere in the case of a person who is a resident" of sl of 
the Act 
The residence-based (or world wide) system of taxation was newly incorporated in the Income 
Tax Act for the years of assessment commencing on or after 1 January 2001. Now there is a 
mixed residence/ source basis of tax in this country. Before that time a source basis of tax was 
applied. The latter is still existing by being component of the new system. In view of that there 
are no further explanations to be made regarding the past. 
A natural person is basically deemed to be a resident when he or she 
1. is ordinarily resident or 
2. if not so, is physically present in the Republic for certain periods32 
2.1.1.1 The "ordinary resident" 
S 1 does not give a clear definition of what is meant by a ,,resident'<33 and there is no further 
definition within the Act of what is meant by "ordinarily resident,<34 Basically the question 
whether a person is resident or not is merely one of face 5 and the term has no special or 
technical meaning36. Nevertheless the courts have already defined the term. In the words of 
Schreiner JA in Cohen's case37: 
" .. . his [a man] ordinary residence would be the country to which he would 
naturally and as a matter of course return from his wanderings~ as contrasted with 
other lands it might be called his usual or principal residence and it would be 
32 sl(a). 
33 s1. 
34 sl(a)(i) "resident". 
35 Silke, Vol. 1, § 5.2A. 
36 Silke, Vo1. 1 § 5.2A. 
37 CIR v Cohen 1946 AD 174, 13 SATe 362. 
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described more aptly than other countries as his real home. If this suggested 
meaning were given to "ordinarily" it would not, I think, be logically permissible 
to hold that a person could not be "ordinarily resident" in more than one country 
at the same time ... " 
The onus is resting on the taxpayer regarding the location of his real home. This onus of 
establishing that he is not ordinarily resident in the Republic, can only be discharged by the 
taxpayer when his mode of life is such that it cannot be said that he has something like a real 
home anywhere38 . But even besides establishing a real home in South Africa a person can be 
deemed as resident by physical presence in the Republic of South Africa: 
2.1.1.2 The physical presence test 
According to the detailed regulation under sl ,,resident" (a)(ii)39, a person can become taxable 
as a resident only in the forth tax year (year of assessment) when the named requirements of 
the definition are fulfilled. If he misses out being present for more than 91 days in any of the 
three years as a consecutive period or in the year of assessment, the chain is broken and the 
non-resident has avoided to become a resident. A person ceases to be a resident when 
satisfying the provisions under sl(a)(BtO, which does not release a person from residency for 
ever, but makes it necessary to restart the aforementioned cycle of becoming a resident. 
2.1.2 The provision "from a South African source (or deemed source) in the case of a 
non-resident" of sl of the Act 
While ,,residency" is more or less described in the Act, there is no definition of the term 
"source". Centlivres CJ, in the majority judgement of the Appellate Division in CIR v 
Epstein41 , pointed out that the legislature was probably aware of the difficulty in defining the 
words "source within the Republic" and consequently gave no definition. The courts have to 
decide on the particular facts of each case whether income has or has not been received from a 
38 Meyerowitz, § 5.17. 
39 sl(a)(ii) "resident" . 
40 sl(a)(B) "resident". 
41 CIR v Epstein 1954 (3) SA 689 (A), 19 SATe 221 at 231. 
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source within the Republic. Still there has been generated some kinds of tests, considerations 
or factors by the courts in regard to the source of income. There are mainly two factors: 
1. the originating cause or causa causans of the income, ie what gives rise to the 
income; and 
2. the location of the originating cause 
As Watermeyer CJ turned it in CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltef2 with regard to the 
originating cause: 
" . .. the source of receipts, received as income, is not the quarter whence they 
come, but the originating cause of their being received as income, and that this 
originating cause is the work which the taxpayer does to earn them, the quid pro 
quo which he gives in return for which he receives them. The work that he does 
may be a business which he carries on, or an enterprise which he undertakes, or an 
activity in which he is engages and it may take the form of personal exertion, 
mental or physical, or it may take the form of employment of capital either by 
using it to earn income or by letting its use to someone else. Often the work is a 
combination of these." 
As far as the location of the originating cause is concerned Centlivres CJ in the above 
mentioned case CIR v Epstein43 interestingly held, obiter, that when there is a partnership the 
members of which carry on their business activities in two different countries, the income of 
the partnership is derived from two sources. When one of the partners carries on his business 
activities within the Republic his income from the partnership is derived from a source within 
the Republic, while the income of the other partner is derived from a source outside of the 
Republic. The income of the former partner is the quid pro quo for the services he renders to 
the partnership in the Republic44 . The above mentioned cases and others45 applied what has 
42 CIR v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd 1946 AD 441 at 449-50, 14 SATe l. 
43 UThe Law of South Africa, Vol. 8 Part 2, par 424, p 221. 
44 Silke, Vol. 1, § 5.11. 
45 Millin v CIR 1928 AD 207, 3 SATe 170; Rhodesia Metals Ltd (in Liquidation) v CoT 1938 AD 282, 9 
SATe 363 and 1940 AD 432, 11 SATe 244; CIR v Black 1957 (3) SA 536 (A), 1957 Taxpayer 172, 21 SATe 
226. 
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been called the "activities test". The deficits of this test become obvious by the following 
subsumption: 
Inferred from these explanations, if an investor and partner gave money to the film fund in 
form of a South African en commandite partnership, the answer to the question where his 
income from this investment will be taxed would depend where the partner carries on his 
business activities. The "activity" of an investor is giving money to work with, ie letting the use 
of his capital to the fund. To locate this kind of activity there is only one place possible: the 
place from which the investor pays his money. If he did not pay his money, ie render his 
services to the fund, from South Africa he would not receive his income from a South African 
source. This result shows, "that it would be wrong to assume that this test can always be 
resorted to',46. 
The fact that the investors are only contributing money to the fund compared to what the fund 
is doing with this money shows that one can not talk of a business activity of the single 
investor without looking to what the fund does. It is the fund, ie its management, that decides 
in which film project the money will be invested and it is only the successful use of the 
investment by the fund management that actually gives rise to the shared profit in the hands of 
the partners. The investment itself is only precondition of any business activity of the fund and 
it is by nature not of any use to describe a business at all . The actual business of the partner is 
therefore the one of the fund . S24H(2) supports this argument by its mere language: 
''where any trade or business is carried on in partnership, each member of such 
partnership shall .. . be deemed for the purposes of this Act to be carrying on such 
trade or business". 
There is no reason discernible that the "purposes of this Act" are not including the 
determination of the source ofincome47 
Consequently, if the fund is a South African partnership with its management located in South 
Africa, the causa causans of each share of profit is the business of the fund operating in South 
46 Meyerowitz, § 7.9. 
47 The mentioned problem shows another need for this provision; cf footnote 3. 
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Africa. The income arising from the fund in the hands of each partner is therefore from a South 
African source. This is also in accordance with the findings of Schreiner JA dissenting in CIR v 
Epstein48 where was held by him49 : 
"1. Since a business may be carried on through partners or other agents, the place 
where the taxpayer's income originates is not where he personally exerts himself, 
assuming that he does so, but where the business profits are realised." 
Finally it can be said that the "activity test" with respect to film funds as en commandite 
partnerships is not a proper means to determine the source of income arising from the fund in 
the hands of each partner; especially not as long as the crucial "activity" is deemed to be the 
one of the limited partner and not the one of the partnership or the general partner respectively. 
It has to be borne in mind however that non-residents can escape South African tax by means 
of a double taxation agreement like the one between South Africa and Germany. An 
international investment however is not subject to this thesis. 
3. Deductions and allowances for the investor 
Having established the investor's income by determining his gross income and then deducting 
all exempt income, the next step in the calculation of taxable income is to deduct all amounts 
allowed as tax deductions in terms of the Act. All deductions are deductible from any income 
of the taxpayer subject to taxso. S24H(5) provides in subsection (a) that any income which has 
been received by or accrued to the partners in common, ie to the partnership, is deemed to 
accrue to the partners in their profit-sharing ration on the same date on which it is received by 
or accrues to the partnership. According to subsectioIl (b) expenses and allowances relating to 
such amounts are also deemed to be those of the individual partners51 . This is one of the 
48 1954 (3) SA 689 (A), 19 SATe 221. 
49 CIR v Epstein in: Income Tax, eases & Materials, EmslieJDavisIHuttonJOlivier, 3rd ed. April 2001, 
Taxpayer, p 118, chapter 4.5. 
50 SRI v Olifantsrivierse Ko-op Wynkelders 1976 (3) SA 261 (A), 1976 Taxpayer 229,38 SATe 79 as cited in 
Meyerowitz, § 11.2. 
51 Cf s24H. Before s24H was in force it was common cause that in principle the partner was entitled to deduct 
his share of the loss from his personal income (Sacks v CIR 1946 AD 31; Burgess v CIR 1993 (4) SA 161 (A), 
55 SATe 185, 1993 Taxpayer 153). 
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central incentives for a private investor to spend money on films: he can reduce the amount of 
his taxable income derived from his actual profession or other sources by the said deductions. 
The Income Tax Act offers, or rather offered, a film owner three deductions: 
1. the ,,film allowance" 
2. the "print cost" and 
3. the ,,marketing expenditure". 
All of these terms are defined in s24F(I) aside from other terms used within the section52 . It 
needs mentioning already at this stage that the marketing allowance of s24F and sllbis is no 
longer available in respect of marketing expenditure incurred after 31 March 199253 . However 
for recent and future film production not only the film allowance and the print costs are of real 
interest, but also the deduction of the advertising expenses under the general deduction 
formula as "expenditure incurred for purposes of trade". If the amendment of s24F becomes 
the law, a new marketing allowance will be available. All this is dealt ·with in details at a later 
stage. Before examining the special deductions for film owners, the relationship between these 
special deductions and general deductions has to be clarified. 
3.1 General, special and double deductions, s23B of the Act 
The main or general deductions are laid down in sI1(a) and (b) and relate to the deduction of 
expenditure incurred in the course of trade from income derived from trade54 . The special, 
specific or particular deductions are contained in s11(c) - (x) to s19 mainly, but also in s24F. 
The general deductions relate to special deductions as follows: 
S23B55 introduced into the Income Tax Act in 1991 56 prohibits an expense from being claimed 
under more than one section of the Income Tax Act, and prevents allowances on an asset from 
being claimed under more than one section or provision, if there is no deduction or allowance 
specifically and expressly granted in addition to a deduction under some other section. 
52 s24F(1) . 
53 As sllhis(9) provides. 
54 Meyerowitz, § 11. 2. 
55 s23B. 
S6 With retrospective effect to 1 July 1962. 
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Subsection (3) of s23B rules that where an amount may be deducted under a specific provision 
just as well as under the general sll(a) or (b) provision the taxpayer is bound to deduct it 
under the specific provision, ie only the special deduction is applicable. And if in addition to 
that, the specific provision imposes a limitation on the deduction the non-deductible excess 
may not be deducted under sll(a)S7 (but may be carried forward to the next year of assessment 
under s24F(7». 
Subsection (3) of s23B came into operation as from the commencement of years of assessment 
ending on or after 1 January 199058. In the explanatory memorandum to the Income Tax Bill it 
was held, that it was never the intention of the legislature and has never been allowed in 
practice to claim the excess not allowed to deduct under the specific provision to be deducted 
under the general provisions ofsll (a) or (b)59. 
Subsection (3) reads as follows: 
''No deduction shall be allowed under sII(a) or (b) in respect of any expenditure 
or loss of a type for which a deduction or allowance may be granted under any 
other provision of this Act, notwithstanding that such other provision may impose 
any limitation on the amount of such deduction or allowance." 
Before subsection (3) of s23B was added, the Appellate Division found in the instructive case 
L. Feldman Ltd v Secretary for Inland Revenue, 1969 (3) S.A. 424 (A.D.) on the general 
issue of the relationship between ,,general" and "special" deductions, that the general deduction 
under s11(a) was applicable aside from the special deduction under sll(m), as it was then. 
Having the situation where any comparable language to subsection (3) was missing, the court 
held: 
"It is not readily apparent why the Legislature should have desired and intended to 
cut down, in relations to payments by employers to their former employees or the 
latter's dependants, the generality of sec. 11 (a) . Had the Legislature indeed so 
intended, as is now contended by the Secretary, it would have been a relatively 
simple matter to have expressed that intention by unequivocal language. That is 
57 HuxhamI Haupt, 17.2.11, p313; s23B. 
58 Explanatory Memorandum to the Income Tax Bill as cited in: Taxpayer November 1994, p205pp, 205 . 
59 Loc cit 
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certainly not done by the wording of sec. 11 (m); and, in the absence of any 
clearly expressed intention in that behalf, the Court should not, in my opinion, 
readily construe sec. 11 (m) as wholly excluding, in relation to the field which it 
covers, the operation of sec. 11 (a).'.60 
What the court did in this case was finding an answer from the construction of the provisions 
themselves not by giving a general answer that covers all cases. Obviously the named 
amendment negated this approach to the relationship of the general formula in section 1 1 (a) or 
(b) to (all) other provisions of the Act61 . In general terms, it results from the amendment what 
can be called ,Jegal security" or "certainty of justice", but the price to pay for this is a fine 
tuning to the application of the law to do justice to each single case which again can only be 
provided by the judicature. 
The introduction of s23B(3) has experienced some profound criticism. It was shown by the 
above mentioned case that it was not "never the intention of the legislature,,62 to allow the 
excess not so claimable under such specific provision to be claimed in terms of the general 
deduction formula. There was apparently just no ruling of this problem. The amendment was 
looked upon as ,Jll-conceived,«i3 and the following illustrative example was given64: 
"If one assumes that a taxpayeracquires a copyright for the purpose of resale its 
value, if held and not disposed of at the end of the tax year, must be included in 
his income, but he cannot deduct the purchase price except to the extent and 
subject of all the conditions of section 11 (gA)" . 
Consequently it was held that section 23B as it stood meant that where two or more provisions 
of the Act were applicable to expenditure or the allowance claimed the taxpayer was entitled to 
claim it under only one, but under anyone of them best suited to him. Behind this reasoning 
60 L. Feldman Ltd. v Secretary for Inland Revenue, 1969 (3) S.A 424 (AD.) as cited in: Taxpayer August 
1969, p145pp, p1471l48. 
61 Sl1(b) was meanwhile deleted by sI5(b) of Act 59 of 2000. 
62 Explanatory Memorandum to the Income Tax Bill as cited in: Taxpayer November 1994, p205pp, 205. 
63 Taxpayer November 1994, p205pp, 206. 
64 Loc cit. 
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stands the opinion that the only purpose of section 23B was to prevent a double deduction of 
the same amount65 . 
Now s23B obviously puts up a hierarchy regarding deductions. This is admittedly something 
different from what the heading of s23B indicates. 
The language of s24F(2)(b) clearly rules that regarding the ,,film allowance" consisting of the 
"production cost" and "post-production cost" of a film (as defined in subsection (1) of s24F), 
this allowance shall be in lieu of any deduction66 or allowance in respect of such production 
cost or post-production cost which may otherwise be allowable in tenns of the provisions of 
this Act67 . Thus the legislature did not raise any doubt about its intention. 
3.2. The "film allowance" 
The film allowance as the characteristic of s24F was introduced into the Income Tax Act in 
198768 to react to some ,,innovative financing of expenditure relating to the production, 
marketing and distribution of films,d)9. In general tenns this ,,film allowance" excluded the 
possibility of deducting production expenditure incurred under sl1(a) or depreciation in tenns 
of s 11 (e) and finally repealed the marketing allowance of s 11 bis which then depended upon the 
amount deducted under sll and s17 (repealed by now) in respect of marketing expenditure70 . 
The fonner allowance under sllbis ranged from 75% to 100% of the marketing expenditure 
and the wear and tear provisions of slICe) allowed the costs of the film to be written off over 
three years in the percentage of 70:20: 1071 . As mentioned above, after the repeal of sllbis 
65 Loc cit. 
66 The words "in lieu of any deduction" mean that this exclusion applies only to the production and post-
production cost and no other costs like print or marketing costs; cf Juta's Income Tax, Vol. One, Notes, p 24F-
8. 
67 s24F(2)(b). 
68 With effect from the conunencement of years of assessment ended or ending on or after 7 April 1987, but not 
in respect of a film acquired under written agreement formally and finally signed by every party before that 
date. 
69 Taxpayer September 1987, p170 pp, 170. 
70 Taxpayer September 1987, p170 pp, 170, 173 . 
71 Taxpayer April 1987, 61 pp, P 61. 
21 
(marketing expenditure), the marketing expenditure is currently deductible under sll(a) as 
"expenditure incurred for the purpose of trade". The deduction of the marketing expenditure 
was just recently brought back to s24F in a latest amendment bill 2002. This deduction and the 
amendment is dealt with in detail below. 
3.2.1 The investor as a film owner 
As a first prerequisite of s24F the investor and partner of the fund must become the film 
owner. To become a film owner the partner must own the copyright on the film to be 
produced. In respect of a cinematograph film the Copyright Act No. 98 of 1978 the "author" 
of a film does not mean that the film owner in spe has to be the person through whose 
technical skills and ability the film is achieved. In the setting of the commercial exploitation of 
the film it is crucial that the 'author' of the film undertakes the arrangements necessary for the 
making of the film72. Even if the partnership commissions another producer and pays for it or 
agrees to pay for it in money, the partners of it can become film owners. As section 21(1)(c) of 
the Copyright Act of 1978 provides, the copyright vests in the person commissioning the film. 
This legal situation makes it quite easy for the fund in South Africa to meet the precondition to 
be the film owner. The fund does not even has to have a partner (general or limited) who has 
certain special knowledge of film production. 
3.2.2 The "at-risk" rules and their background 
The introduction of the two at-risk rules in s24F73 is the first time that such provision has been 
introduced into the Income Tax Act. The ,,Margo Commission" recommended that such a 
clause be introduced as a general provision into South African tax law, so that deductible 
losses from an activity be limited to the amount which the taxpayer has at risk in the activity74 . 
As set out in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Income Tax Bill, 198775, 
"the purpose of the provision regarding "at risk" is to prevent the deduction from 
income of expenditure which although incurred, does not have to be paid unless 
72 CfCopeling, Copyright, P 27; see section I(I)(d) of the Copyright Act No. 98 of 1978 as amended 
73 These rules are dealt with below in detail. 
74 CfTaxpayer September 1987, pI7Opp, pIn. 
75 Explanatory Memorandum of the Income Tax Bill, 1987, WP3- '87, pI I (e) 
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mcome IS derived, and to achieve a measure of matching mcome and 
expenditure. " 
What stands behind the words "expenditure which although incurred, does not have to be paid 
unless income is derived" is a certain kind of loan, called "non-recourse loan". This term has 
become notorious in connection with film financing: 
3.2.3 The British case Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Limited v Stokes (Inspector of Taxes) 
The facts 76 of the British case Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Limited v Stokes (Inspector of Taxes) 
(1992) 2 WLR 469 (HL) are representing the pattern ofa widespread scheme of film financing, 
also applied in South Africa: 
The taxpayer was a company which became partner in two limited partnerships which had been 
set up to finance the production of two films. The company had been encouraged to become 
partner as a result of first year tax allowances in respect of capital expenditure incurred in the 
acquisition of master negatives of the film. It became the limited partner within the 
partnerships. The films were acquired by the partnerships which utilised its own funds to pay 
for approximately twenty-five per cent of the purchase price and borrowed the balance from 
the production company (referred to as "lender") repayable with interest out of the receipts 
from the films 77. Another company was founded which became general partner within the 
partnerships and was as a wholly owned subsidiary of the production company. The loans freed 
the partnership and all the partners from any liability to repay the loan (so called "non-recourse 
loans,,78). The net receipts out of the sale of the films by two distributors which were also 
wholly owned subsidiaries of the production company were to be split twenty-five per cent to 
the partners and seventy-five per cent to the lender until such time as the lender had been 
repaid his loan (which amounted to seventy-five per cent of the partnership capital), the lender 
was to receive a hundred per cent of the partnership profits. Thereafter the profits were to be 
16 As cited from: Taxpayer November 1991, 208pp, P 208. 
11 The money borrowed from the production company originally stems from a bank loan in favour of the 
production company on the basis of a "revolving loan credit" in the amount of $ 11 million. 
18 As Millet J turns it in Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Limited v Stokes (Inspector o/Taxes) 1989 1 WLR 1222, P 
1227 D: " .. they [the non-recourse loans - added by the author] were repayable exclusively out of the receipts of 
the film without recourse to Victory Partnership or its general or limited partners or their other assets." 
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divided on the basis of twenty-five per cent to the lender. It was also agreed to make any 
further loans to the partnership of amounts needed to complete the film should it overrun its 
budget. The effect of the agreements which had been entered into was that the partners were 
able to claim tax. deductions of four times (!) the amount of the capital which they injected into 
the partnership. The partners did not involve themselves in any way with the films79 but 
appointed agents to act exclusively for them in distributing and exploiting the film. On 
completion of production both films ran over the estimated budgets and neither proved to be 
financially successful. 
3.2.4 The situation in South Mrica before 1987 
Before the introduction of s24F South African investors were attracted to film schemes 
revolving around the write-off of the cost of the film under s 11 ( e) and the . marketing 
expenditure allowance under sIl(bis). They were assured of recouping their outlays (and even 
more, as mentioned above) because of tax. savings (about R 3,5 for every Rand invested) 
flowing from the combined operation of the named provisions. Just as in the schemes dealt 
with in the English case, the South African investor had no liability beyond the amount paid in 
and were able to claim tax losses far in excess of their equity contribution. The amount 
invested by the South African investors was only a small part of the total costs, and covered 
about half of the costs of the production. The balance of the costs, including marketing 
expenditure, was financed by off-shore loans to the partnership procured by the overseas 
distributor who guaranteed a minimum gross receipts sufficient to cover the loans and who 
ultimately took the risk of their repayment, but reduced his risk in the whole venture by the 
amount invested by the partnership80. Another effect of those schemes was that the taxpayer 
had in addition to his tax savings the chance to earn money if the film turned out to be a 
success and recouped. This was the only moment when South Africa began to benefit from 
foreign currency81. In South Africa there were not less than 38000 taxpayers involved in these 
79 The general partner, a subsidiary of the production firm and lender, alone had the conduct and management 
of the business of the partnership, cf Millet J in: Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Limited v Stokes (Inspector of 
Taxes) 1989 1 WLR 1222, p1226 H. 
80 Taxpayer April 1987, 61pp, p62. 
81 Taxpayer, Ibid . 
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kind of schemes until 1992. An estimated number of more than 100 000 assessments had to be 
completed at the end of 199282. 
3.2.5 The settlement conference of 1993 
In 1993 according to The Budget Review83 assessments in respect of film schemes were 
outstanding in most cases since 1986, not least of all because the Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue was still awaiting judgement from Special Income Tax Court of Appeal on tax 
deductions for film schemes. Judgement then has been given in favour of the Commissioner84 . 
Nevertheless after being announced in a press release concerning the named schemes an 
amendment was introduced to the Income Tax Act in 199385 . The provision of s61 introduced 
by this amendment empowered the Minister of Finance to make regulations authorising the 
Commissioner to enter into agreements with taxpayers for the settlement of disputes arising 
out of the legitimacy of tax avoidance schemes in general86 . The Minister made use of it and 
the Commissioner made a form available to all taxpayers in which they could apply for a 
settlement providing an assessment final and conclusive in respect of any year of assessment87 
S61 had only permitted an agreement to be entered into before 1 March 199488. 
3.3 The film allowance in detail as it stands now 
The ,,film allowance" is defined under s24F(2)(a) read with subsection (3). It consists of the 
"production cost" and "post-production cost", the latter terms are defined under s24F(1)89 
This allowance refers to a film as defined in s24F(1)90. 
82 Taxpayer April 1990, 65pp, P 66; Taxpayer November 1992, 207pp, P 207; Taxpayer November 1991, 
208pp, p208. 
83 As cited from: Taxpayer March 1993, 49pp, p49. 
84 Taxpayer March 1993, 49pp, P 49. According to Silke, Vol. 3, §19.26, P 19-51, the judgement itself was 
never reported. 
85 S61 of the Income Tax Act 113 of 1993. 
86 Clegg & Stretch, § 26.7; for the detailed regulations set out by the Commissioner on the basis of s61, resp the 
Minister's regulation see: Taxpayer November 1993, 202pp 
87 Taxpayer November 1993, 202pp, 202; Clegg & Stretch, § 26.7. 
88 Ibid 
89 s24F(1) "production cost", "post-production cost". 
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3.3.1 The scale of the production cost 
In a list of definitions § 24 F( 1) sets out the scale of the "production cost", ie which positions 
are included in that term, as follows: 
"prod uction cost", in relation to a film, means the total expenditure incurred by a 
film owner in respect of the acquisition or production of such film, excluding the 
expenditure incurred in the erection, construction of any buildings or other 
structures or works of a permanent nature, but including, without in any way 
limiting the scope of this definition -
(a) any remuneration, salary, legal, accounting or other fee, commission or 
other amount, paid or payable to any person for the purposes of or in 
connection with the production of the film; 
(b) the cost of acquiring the story rights, script, screen play, copyright or 
other rights in relation to the film; 
( c) insurance premiums in respect of insurance against injury or death of 
persons, or loss or damage to property employed or used, as the case 
may be, in the production of the film; 
(d) premiums or commission payable in order to secure a guarantee that the 
cost of the film will not exceed a specified amount; 
( e) interest, finance charges and raising fees incurred for the purposes of or 
in connection with the production of the film; 
(f) the cost of acquiring or creating music, sound and other effects which 
will form part of the film; 
(g) any allowance which but for the provisions of this section would be 
allowed under s lICe) or (0) or s 12C in respect of any machinery, 
implements, utensils or articles used in the production of a film: Provided 
that-
1. any such allowance shall be deemed to be an amount of 
expenditure incurred. 
2. an amount equal to the total amount of any such allowance which 
may be granted in respect of any year of assessment divided by 
90 s24F(1) "mm". 
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the number of days in that year shall be deemed to have been 
incurred on each day of that year~ 
3. such expenditure shall be deemed to have been incurred in the 
country in which the asset in respect of which the allowance may 
be granted was acquired~ and 
4. no deduction or allowance shall be granted in respect of the cost 
of acquisition of any such machinery, implements, utensils or 
articles otherwise than as provided in this paragraph or paragraph 
(h)~ and 
(h) expenditure incurred in respect of-
(i) the purchase, hire or construction of sets, and 
(ii) the hire of any machinery, implements, utensils or articles used in 
the production of the film, 
but excluding any such expenditure incurred after the completion date 
and any expenditure incurred in the marketing or promotion of, or 
soliciting of orders for, the film~" 
As s24F(1)(a) "production cost" provides, so called "soft costs" of the fund like commissions 
for the finding of equity, outside capital or the concept and fees for auditing and counselling 
are included in the production cost. The words "in connection with" within subsection (l)(a) 
of the definition of "production cost" mean that a direct causal link (to the production) must 
exist, although this may be indirect91 . 
It needs mentioning in this context that "post-production cost" expressis verbis does not 
include "print cost,,92. Finally, as mentioned above, the amount of this allowance is in lieu of 
any deduction or allowance in respect of such production cost or post-production cost which 
may otherwise be allowable in terms of the provisions of this Act93 . 
91 Juta's Income Tax, Vol. One, 24F-7, 2000. 
92 s24F(1) "post-production cost". 
93 Cffn 66. 
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3.3.2 The quantum of the film aUowance as such 
The film allowance as such is according to s24F(2)(a) to be determined under s24F(3l4 . This 
subsection sets out the amount of allowance that may be granted on anyone film, not 
necessarily an "export film". Its quantum is the sum of the production costs and any post-
production costs of the film incurred during the year of assessment in which the completion 
date9S of the film falls (s24F(3)(a», plus any post-production costs in respect of the film 
incurred in any subsequent year of assessment (s24F(3 )(b», plus the certain amount of any film 
allowance disallowed in the preceding year of assessment (s24F(3)(b), s24F(4»%. It follows 
from this, that the film owner can immediately deduct the production costs in the year in which 
he completes the film. Ifhe incurs post-production costs in that year, he can deduct them as he 
incurs them97 . 
3.3.2.1 The "annual cap" ofs24F(2b), s24F(4) and s24F(8) of the Act 
The annual cap98 refers to any single film as the allowance does to its costs. The latter may not 
exceed the sum of the production and post-production cost of the film paid by the film owner 
plus the total of the film allowances the film has already generated in preceding years of 
assessment, s24f(2)(b) read with s24F(4)(a). 
3.3.2.2 The (first) "at-risk" rule of s24F( 4) read with s24F(8) of the Act 
If the film owner has used a loan or credit for the payment or financing of the whole or any 
portion of the above mentioned costs and a portion of the loan or credit is still owed by him on 
the last day of the year of assessment, the first "at-risk" rule as set out in s24F(8) read with 
94 Effective as from the commencement of years of assessment ended or ending on or after 15 May 1989 and 
applies to any film whose production commenced on or after that date. 
95 s24F(l) "completion date" 
96 Silke, Vol. 2, § 8.54AA, p8-119; The Law of South Africa, Butterworths Durban 2001, Vol. 8 Part 2, par 428 
p251. A certain amount of expenditure may not be allowed to be deducted due to the application of the "at risk" 
rules in s24F which are dealt with below. 
97 Silke, Vol. 2, § 8.54AA, P 8-119 
98 This striking term is used by Silke, Vol. 2 § 8.54AA, p8-119 (it is not used by the law); Silke also talks of a 
"film-Iifetime cap" determined by the total production and post-production costs, ibid 
28 
s24F(4) applies. The consequence of this will be, if the film owner has already paid the named 
costs but is not deemed to be "at risk" with a loan or credit used for the payments according to 
subsection (8) of s24F, he will only enjoy the deduction of the money paid by him up to the 
amount he is deemed to be at risk with the loan or credit on the last day of the year of 
assessment. According to s24F(8) the film owner is deemed to be "at-risk" to the extent the 
payment incurred by him would result in an "economic loss" due to no income from the 
exploitation of the film in future years99. 
If the film owner wants to deduct an amount not yet paid by him, he can only do so to an 
extent to which he is deemed to be at risk on the last day of the year of assessment under the 
provisions of subsection (8) of s24F, s24F( 4)(b). This is the case only, if the debts incurred by 
him "would result in an economic loss to him were no income to be received by or accrue to 
him in future years from the exploitation by him of the film", s24F(8). 
In both cases, where the film owner either has already paid (and used a loan or credit to 
finance the payment) or has incurred debts for the named costs he only enjoys the deduction in 
the amount of these costs, if he would suffer an "economic loss" by not recouping these costs 
from the film. 
There are two approaches to determine the "economic loss": 
3.3.2.2.1 The "worse-ofT financially" test 
It is contended that the legal hypothesise that the film owner will suffer an economic loss is to 
be verified by a "worse-off financially" test 100. In case the film owner is "worse off 
financially"IOI if the film does not recoup, he will be deemed at risk in relation to the 
expenditure to the extent that he is financially worse-off 102. This test is taken from the case 
Refrigerated Trucking (Pty) Ltd v Zive 1996 2 SA 361 (T) where the court had to decide 
99 s24F(8) 
100 The Law of South Africa, Vol. 8 Part 2, Butterworths, Durban 2001, para 429, p252 . 
101 Cf Refrigerated Trucking (Ply) Ltd v Zive 19962 SA 361 (T) cited from: The Law of South Africa, Vol. 8 
Part 2, para 429, p252. 
102 The Law of South Africa, Vol. 8 Part 2, para 429, p252 
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whether a third party had to indemnify the defendant for the total amount of the judgement to 
be entered against it or only 50 % thereof The third party was an insurance company liable 
beside the defendant to the plaintiff The third party limited its liability towards its policy holder 
in its general terms to the amount of its rateable proportion if there was any other insurance 
covering the same liability. Hartzenberg J held on the question if there was an insurable interest 
for the insured or not, as follows 103 : 
"An insurable interest must be the economic interest of the insured. It can range 
from the full value of the property (in the case of the owner) to a very small 
percentage thereof (where in the case of destruction the insured stands to lose a 
small percentage of the value of the property)." 
Some lines further down he held lo4 : 
"It seems that in our law of indemnity Insurance an insurable interest is an 
economic interest which relates to the risk which a person runs in respect of a 
thing which, if damaged or destroyed, will cause him to suffer an economic loss 
or, in respect of an event, which if it happens will likewise cause him to suffer an 
economic loss. It does not matter whether he personally has rights in respect of 
that article, or whether the event happens to him personally, or whether the rights 
are those of someone to whom he stands in such a relationship that, despite the 
fact that he has no personal right in respect of the article, or that the event does 
not affect him personally, he will nevertheless be worse off if the object is 
damaged or destroyed, or the event happens." 
It is contended that the film owner is only deemed to be "at-risk" where no income will be 
received by or accrue to him in future years from the "exportation" (which probably should be 
"exploitation") of the ( export) film 105 This means even in the case where the film does recoup 
only a small part of the expenditure, the film owner would not be "at-risk" because more than 
"no income" is received by him. This rigid rule is in contradiction to the rule from the case the 
authors are referring to. As Hartzenberg J explains, as cited above, that an economic interest 
103 Refrigerated Trucking (Ply) Ltd v Zive 19% 2 SA 361 (T), 372 A 
104 Refrigerated Trucking (Ply) Ltd v Zive 19962 SA 361 (T), 372 F-H 
105 efThe Law of South Africa, Vol. 8 Part 2, para 429, p252 
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(and in consequence of which the economic loss suffered by the loss of the property) can also 
be a very small percentage of the value of the lost property. Applied to the "at-risk" rule of 
s24F a small recoupment just partly covering the expenditure of the film owner would mean an 
economic loss to him and consequently he would be ''worse-off financially". It is doubtful, 
whether this approach does justice to the meaning and purpose of the at-risk rule. 
3.3.2.2.2 The "absolute liability" test 
Another test to proof if the film owner is at risk or not in the meaning of s24F is to ask, if the 
film owner is absolute liable for the expenditure incurred as production or postproduction cost. 
An "absolute liability" for this purpose means that this liability will not be waived or otherwise 
expunged if, for instance, certain minimum sales targets are not met 106. In other words there 
must be an unconditional liability for the full amount of expenditure incurred. This test seems 
to have the advantage that one only has to look at the contracts and agreements of the film 
owner to find, if he is at risk or not. To illustrate this test a suitable example is given by the 
legislature 107: 
"should the film owner be granted such a loan [as set out in subsection (8) of 
s24F] subject to the condition that he could be called upon to repay the loan only 
out of themcome derived from the film, he would not be at risk in respect of the 
relevant expenditure." 
That it is far more difficult to answer this question, shows the following example given by 
Clegg and Stretch/os: If an actual liability is covered by a sales agreement, in tenus of which a 
distributor will pay an amount in excess of the liability, the film owner will be at risk in respect 
of the liability, if an economic loss will be sustained where the distributor fails to comply with 
the sales agreement. The fact that the banks as lenders are very carefully checking a sales 
agreement before they accept it as a collateral, and even then not discounting it, if the 
106 Clegg & Stretch, § 23 .2, P 23-7. 
107 Explanatory Memorandum of the Income Tax Bill, 1987, W.P3- '87, pI 1 (e) 
108 Clegg & Stretch, ibid 
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distributor is not trustable or "bankable" enough, shows how much a film owner is at risk in 
respect of any payment expecting from a distributor109. 
The above mentioned test have to be seen in the light of vexed issues in practice, eg, if the film 
owner who procures some form of insurance in respect of the return on his investment may 
rely on the film allowance. Typical of film production is to contract to obtain a revenue 
shortfall guaranteellO . The insurers of such insurances are underwriting the difference or 
shortfall or any part of the shortfall between what an investor invests in a film product and 
returns received from exploitation. There are two forms of this kind of insurance 111: 
1. It can be a "guarantee policy" provided for in terms of the Short-term Insurance Act 
according to sl of the Short-term Insurance Act No. 53 of 1998. In special terms 
regarding a film production this guarantee may be used to guarantee the debt of the 
distributor who provides a minimum revenue guarantee as part of the grant of rights in 
consideration for the right to distribute the film. It covers the minimum revenues 
guaranteed or part thereof in the event of default by the distributor as an existing 
debtorll2. 
2. In most cases it is a form of professional indemnity, in terms of which a distributor or 
sales agent makes a sales forecast in respect of a film project prior to production or 
completion of the film and the insurer underwrites the distributor's or sales agent's 
professional judgement and commercial assessment of the exploitation potential of the 
film. This form of the guarantee gives the investor the possibility to insure the returns 
on the film and cover the shortfall, or part thereof, between the initial investment and 
the return 113 . 
Both kinds of insurance policies contain conditions which the insured is required to fulfill 
before a claim will be entertained by the insurance company. How problematic these conditions 
are shows the fact that insurers, reinsurers, banks and production companies are battling out 
109 Josh Kramer, An introduction to film financing published in "produced by" under 
http://www.producersguild.orglproducedby/filmfinancing.html 
110 Ibid. 




the question in the courts who of them will finally bear the costs of some films failing in the 
1990S114. Consequently the insured always runs the risk of the insurance company refusing the 
claim and in consequence of which can be deemed to be at risk under s24F; at least until he has 
fulfilled the conditions of the insurance115 . The Government in its recommendation to 
Parliament regarding the introduction of s24F exempted recognised insurers under an 
insurance policy relating to the completion of the film and effected at ann's length from the 
consequences of the then recommended and later introduced at-risk rule1l6. Another 
unanswered question is, how the tax and revenue authorities would look upon an economic 
loss in fonn of a diminution of a producer's reputation, ie an indirect monetary loss. It is held 
that the loss has to be quantifiable and directly flow from the lack of income generated from 
the exploitation of the filmll7. The wide tenn of an "economic loss" does actually not give 
grounds for such an interpretation. In contrast to that vague tenn the fact that a limited partner 
of an en commandite only is liable up to the amount of what he has contributed to the 
partnership, gives a clear answer to the maximum amount of the economic loss of such partner. 
Finally, irrespective of the named insurances and sales agreements, there is no doubt that the 
film owner can not be considered at-risk in case of the above mentioned "non-recourse 
loans". 118 
3.4 The "marketing expenditure" and the "print cost" 
As mentioned above the marketing allowance under s24F(7), (8) and (9)(b) is not available 
anymore for marketing expenditure incurred after 31 March 1992. The reason why it is still 
dealt with here is the provisions of s24F(10) and (11), which give this allowance a further 
reaching application: The Commissioner shall under s24F(lO) and (11) make a revised 
114Cf Freshfield Bruckhaus Deringer, March 2002: Film Financing. Who bears the risk?; published under 
www.freshfields.com/practice/finance/publicationslpdfsl2860 .pdf 
115 CfThe Law of South Africa, Vol. 8 Part 2, para 430, p253 
11 6 CfTaxpayer April 1987, 61pp, P 61. 
117 ]uta's Income Tax, Vol. One, Notes, "economic loss", p 24F-8. 
lIB Interestingly Millet J in Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Limited v Stokes (Inspector a/Taxes) 1989 1 WLR 1222, 
1230 A, states: "The non-recourse nature of the borrowing and the use ofa limited partnership (either of which 
would have been sufficient without the other) provided a desirable degree of protection for the participants but 
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assessment, if the prerequisites of these subsections are satisfied 1 19. But also the exclusion from 
the at-risk rules of certain insurance contracts by the former sIIbis(3A) gives an impetus to the 
interpretation of the said rules in s24F. 
Whether the marketing expenditure could be deducted or not was to be tested in three steps as 
follows 120 : 
1. It has to qualify and be deductible under sIl(a) read with 23(g) (the general deduction 
formula), 
2. it has to qualify under slIbis and finally 
3. take the hurdle of s24F(7). 
Silke refers in this test only to the marketing expenditure in the sense of s24F121 . But it can be 
grammatically derived from the wording of s24F(7), that the relative pronoun «which" not only 
refers to the marketing expenditure, but also to the print cost 122. S24F(7) reads as follows: 
''The amount of any print cost or any marketing expenditure contemplated in 
section 11 bis which may be allowed under section 11 shall not in aggregate 
exceed the total of - ... " 
Systematically the provisions of s24F are located after the general deduction provisions of s 11 
and as in respect of the explicit reference in s24F to s 11 it can be held that the provisions of 
both sections have to be met cumulative. The wide meaning of the terms "expenditure"l23 and 
''losses'' in the sense ofsl1(a) indicates once more the inclusion of the "print cost" under s24F 
to the regime of the said section. Therefore it is held here that the print costs has to qualify 
were not necessary to the securing of the tax advantages sought to be obtained." This - nota bene - refers to the 
English legal situation in 1989. 
119 s24F(IO) and (11); the revised assessments are not dealt with here in detail. 
120 Silke, Vol.2, § 8.54.AA, p8-122. 
121 Silke, Vol. 2, § 8.54AA, P 8-122. 
122 ""which", a pronoun. used in any grammatical relation except that of a possessive; used especially in 
reference to animals, inanimate objects, groups or ideas (bonds which represents the debt - G.B. Robinson)" -
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionnary, Electronic Edition, Version 1.5, 1994 
l23Cf as Meyerowitz, § 11.32, turns it: "The expenditure may take any form which has a value in money or 
money's worth". 
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under sl1 just as the marketing expenditure under s24F had to and still has under sl1(a) as 
"expenditure incurred for purposes of trade". For purposes of explaining the effect of the case 
law on a film fund it is suitable to start with the provisions of s24F and s 11 his. 
There is no dissent here however from the assertion '24 that the numerical limitation by the 
words of s24F(7): "as does not exceed the amount oj such marketing expenditure ", is only 
referred to the marketing expenditure and not to the aggregate of the marketing expenditure 
and the print cost. Thus there is no numerical limitation on the print costs. 
3.4.1 The (second) "at-risk" rule of s24F(7) read with s24F(8) of the Act 
The at-risk rule referred to here in connection with the print costs and marketing expenditure 
can be called the "second" at-risk rule of s24F. It is operating the same as the first at-risk rule 
discussed in detail above '25 . The only difference to the first at-risk rule is that it refers to print 
costs and marketing expenditure. 
3.4.2 The independent cap126 of s24F(7) of the Act on the amount of the "print cost" 
(and the "marketing expenditure") 
The print cost as defined in s24F(1) includes any expenditure incurred by the film owner in the 
making of copies of the filml27. Even though they incur in the post-production process, they 
are not included in "post-production cost" under s24F(I). This is due to the nature of these 
costs as an outstanding budget item 128. 
Section 24F(7) of the Act provides that print cost or marketing expenditure may be deducted 
in the year in which they were incurred, subject to a maximum allowance calculated according 
124 Cf Juta's Income Tax, Volume One, Notes on s24F, subsection (7), p 24F-8. 
125 Cf II., 3.2.2, page 22. 
126 As Silke, Vol. 2, § 8.54AA, P 8-120, appropriately summarizes s24F(7). 
127 s24F(1) "print cost" 
128 Cf Bastian Cleve, Investoren, Anlage Nr. 5, p 239. The given example shows a calculation of the break even 
point of a typical US major studio production, where the production cost are estimated US $ 50 million plus 
another US $ 27 million P&A (print and advertising expenditure) for the US market and the rest of the world. 
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to a formula set out in the said section. The formula provides that the deduction cannot exceed 
the total of: 
the amount of the print costs or marketing expenditure which have been paid by the film owner 
(provided that where a loan or credit has been used by the film owner for the payment or 
financing of any portion of the print cost, and any portion of the loan or credit is owed by the 
film owner on the last day of the year of assessment, the amount allowed falls to be reduced by 
any portion of the loan or credit in respect of which the film owner is not at risk on the last day 
of the year of assessment), 129 and 
the amount of any print cost or marketing expenditure which has not been paid by the film 
owner and for which he is deemed to be at risk under s24F(b) on the last day of the year of 
assessment. Print costs or marketing expenditure not allowable in terms of section 24F(7) of 
the Act must be carried forward and are then deemed to be print costs or marketing 
expenditure incurred in the succeeding year of assessment. 
However in respect of the marketing expenditure this cap only can refer to the expenditure 
deductible under s24F, ie the marketing expenditure for a South African export film read with 
sff his until 1992. It would not be covered anymore by the wording of s24F to expand the cap 
on marketing expenditure to the deduction of advertising expenditure under the general 
deduction formula as "expenditure incurred for purposes of trade". As a fact it can be recorded 
that with abolishing the marketing expenditure for export films in s24F an even more attractive 
deduction under the general deduction formula for advertising expenditure was opened up. 
This will be changing again, if the amendment bill will become promulgated law. The cap of 
s24F(7) then will apply to the new marketing allowance for "export films" as defined in the bill. 
3.4.2.1 The limitation of s24F(9)(a) of the Act on the amount of the "marketing 
expenditure" 
Until 31 March 1992 there was no allowance in respect of marketing expenditure granted 
under s24F(9)(a), if the film was not qualifying as a South African export film in the year of 
assessment. The film qualifies as an export film under s24F(1) only, if a certain percentage of 
129 s24F(7)(a). Cf S24F(4), in relation to the production and post-production costs of a film. 
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its costs are paid, incurred or payable in the Republic of South Africa13o. If the film had 
qualified for certain former subsidies as described in subsection (a), the marketing allowance 
was not granted at all. 
3.4.2.2 The limitation of s24F(9)(b) of the Act on the amount of the "marketing 
expenditure" 
S24F(9)(b)l3l Hmited the total amount of the marketing allowance as set out in sllbis(4)132. A 
formula is given in the said section which reads as follows: 
Y;:: (2,5 x A) - B ; 
''Y'' represents the amount to be determined ; 
"A" represents the sum of the amount of the production and post-production costs incurred in 
the current and any previous years of assessment and which may be taken into account in the 
calculation of the film allowance, to the extent that these costs were incurred and paid or are 
payable in the Republic; and 
''B'' represents the sum of the production and post-production costs described above to the 
extent that these were incurred outside the Republic. 
3.4.2.3 Qualification of the marketing cost under slIbis of the Act 
Due to its limited application until 1992 no detailed examination of s II bis shall be made here. 
But even if the marketing allowance is not available anymore for recent and future film 
productions, there were problems occurring in the past which are still of interest when 
examining the taxation of the film owner. Sllbis(3A) contained an at-risk rule which in broad 
terms provides, that an exporter was deemed to be at risk to the extent that the payment of the 
amount owed in respect of any loan or credit would, having regard to any transaction, 
130 s24F(I) "South African export film"- with detailed particulars. 
131 s24F(9). 
132 With effect as from the commencement of years of assessment ended or ending on or after 23 February 
1988, and applies in respect of any film acquired by a film owner otherwise than under a written agreement 
formally and finally signed by every party to it before that date. 
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understanding or scheme entered into by him, result in an economic loss to him, where no 
income received by him in future years. A bona fide contract of insurance concluded at arm's 
length with an insurer in the ordinary course of the insurer's business was expressly excluded in 
this provision from the named transactions. S24F does not provide this exclusion and the 
problems arising from this are discussed above. The annulment of s 11 bis also in connection 
with s24F later than 1992 indicates that the legislature intended to give a wide range to the at-
risk rules in s24F. Nevertheless, as shown above, it is possible to avoid the negative 
repercussions of the at-risk rules in s24F; eg by standard insurance contracts in the ordinary 
course of the insurer's business. 
For the sake of completeness, it needs to be mentioned that in the period between 9 March 
1989 and 31 March 1993 the allowance may not has exceeded 20 % of the export turnover 
which accrued to the exporter within this period 133 . 
3.5 The general deduction formula, ssl1, l1(a), 23(g) of the Act 
As mentioned above, for explanatory purposes this test is only mentioned at this stage and 
refers to the deduction of the print costs (as explained above) and advertising expenditure as 
"expenditure incurred for purposes of trade". Due to the high budget of these costs, the --
deductibility of the expenditure of which is a crucial point134. In numerous cases the courts 
found that sll(a), also referred to as "the positive test" and s23(g), correspondingly referred to 
as "the negative test", have to be read together when one considers whether an amount is 
capable of deduction135 . The general introduction to s11 prefacing s11(a) again can be said to 
be a component of the latter section. It reads as follows 136: 
133 As sllhis(3B)(b) provided. 
134 Cffn 128. 
135 Port Elizabeth Electric Tral7TWoy Co Ltd v CIR 1936 CPD 241 , 8 SATC 13 at 16; Sub-Nigel Ltd v CIR 1948 
(4) SA 580 (A), 15 SATC 381 at 389; ITC 1058 (1963) 26H SATC 305 at 307; CIR v Nemojim Pty {Ltd} 1983 
(4) SA 935 (A), 45 SATC 241 at 245-5 ; CIR v De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 286 (T), 46 SATC 47 
at 53 . 
136 s1l. 
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"For the purpose of determining the taxable income derived by any person from 
carrying on any trade, there shall be allowed as deductions from income of such 
person so derived - . .. " 
The general deduction formula derived from the preamble ofsl1, ssll(a) and 23(g) can 
be regarded as to consist of the following elements: 
1. The expenditure and losses 
2. must be actually incurred 
3. during the year of assessment 
4. in the production of income: 
5. They must not constitute expenditure and losses of a capital nature, and 
6. if they are claimed as a deduction against income derived from trade, they must 
either in part or in full, constitute moneys that are laid out or expended for the 
purpose of trade. 
The last requirement is the most problematic in respect of the investment of a private person in 
films (via a partnership) and the tax incentives thereof This trade requirement has traditionally 
been applied as set out in s23(g) without reference to sl1(a) with "good reason: s23(g) was 
the more onerous provision, and there was consequence of which no need to examine the trade 
requirement embodied in sI1(a) separately. A taxpayer passing the test of s23(g) 
simultaneously passed the test ofs11(a),,137. Thus this requirement has to be satisfied before an 
amount qualifies as a deduction in terms of ssll(a), 23(g), 24F138. S23(g) containing the said 
requirement reads as follows: 
''No deductions shaH in any case be made in respect of the following matters, 
namely-
any moneys claimed as a deduction from income derived from trade, to the extent 
to which such moneys were not laid out or expended for the purpose of trade;" 
131 Emslie/Davis/HuttoniOlivier, 9.1, p 406. 
138 It has to be mentioned that there are special provisions providing that one or the other need not apply, eg 
s ll(n). 
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It needs mentioning that prior to its amendment in 1992, s23(g) prohibited the deduction of 
expenditure which was not laid out wholly or exclusively for the purpose of trade139. Now 
s23(g) prohibits only moneys as a deduction from income derived from trade, to the extent to 
which such moneys were not laid out or expended for the purposes of tradel40 . Obviously for 
many years the negative test was much more restrictive than it presently is. Nevertheless even 
now the taxpayer does not want to lose a part of the possible deductions and thus the question, 
whether the expenditure was for the purpose of trade is still crucial. Besides this, the inter-
relationship between sll(a) and s23(g) was not affected by the amendment. 
The term 'trade' is defined in sl and includes in general every profession, trade, business, 
employment, calling, occupation or venture, including the letting of any property and the use 
of, or the grant of permission to use any patent, or any design, or trade mark, or any copyright, 
or any other property which is of similar nature141 . As sl shows the term 'trade' is given a very 
•• > 
wide meaning and the principle that this definition should be given a wide interpretation was 
described as being well established in Burgess v CIR'42 and it was pointed out that this 
definition is not necessarily exhaustive. 
In respect of a film fund investing into film production as a "a highly speculative adventure, 
conditioned in its form and motivated by the desire to secure a tax advantage,,143 the said 
requirement becomes a crucial issue. For a latest interpretation of the ''trade requirement" in 
respect of the print costs and the advertising expenditure of a film fund the following cases 
may deliver some indication of how the judicature will treat these expenditures; especially in 
139 The judgements cited above in connection with s23(g) are all referring to the old version of the section 
which was obviously very strict and therefore harder to satisfy. Not to mention that the old version as an all-or-
nothing rule got much more attention by the courts and was the crucial hurdle to take. 
140 s23(g). 
141 sl "trade". 
142 1993 (4) SA 161 (A), 55 SATC 185pp, P 196 and 197. Dowling J inITC 770 (1953) 19 SATC 216pp, p217 
as cited in Burgess v CIR said dealing with a similar definiton of trade that it was "obviously intended to 
embrace every profitable activity and ... 1 think should be given the widest possible interpretation". 
143 As Millet J turns it in: Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Limited v Stokes (Inspector a/Taxes) 1989 1 WLR 1222, 
1243 F-G. 
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case the film turns out as a complete financial failure which happens to 50 % of all films 
produced in the US with a budget between 25 and 60 million US $144: 
3.5.1 De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd v em 1986 (1) SA 8 (ADi45 
Corbett JA delivering the courts judgement of this case held that "of course, the attainment of 
a profit is not necessarily the hallmark of a trading transaction"l46 and furthermore " the 
absence of a profit does not necessarily exclude a trartsaction from being part of the taxpayers 
trade; artd correspondingly moneys laid out in a non-profitable transaction may nevertheless be 
wholly or exclusively expended for the purpose of trade within the terms of s23(g) . .. ,,147. But 
'were a trader normally carrying on business by buying goods and selling them at a profit then 
as a general rule a transaction entered into for the purpose of not making a profit, or in fact 
registering a loss must in order to satisfy s23(g), be shown to have been so connected with the 
pursuit of the taxpayer's trade, eg on ground of commercial expediency or indirect facilitation 
of the trade, as to justify the conclusion that, despite the lack of profit motive, the monies paid 
out under the transaction were wholly and exclusively expended for the purpose of trade. 
Generally, unless the facts speak for themselves, this will call for art explanation from the 
taxpayer,,148. 
This test was held to be an objective one149. So, if a film production that has prospects of 
success due to a professional production artd distribution of the film, this would deliver facts 
speaking for a trade according to the film business. As the last cited sentence of the judgement 
indicates the Revenue is entitled to analyse the motive or intention of the taxpayer where the 
set of transactions entered into between the parties are such that they raise questions as to their 
true nature. This remedy of the Revenue under s 1 03 arising from such transactions is dealt 
with below. 
144 Cf Cleve, Batian! Cleve, Investoren, Einfiihrung, p 13. Films with budgets over US $50 million are doomed 
to success because of their tremendous advertising budgets. 
145Taxpayer 1986, 8; Emslie et al., Income Tax, p414pp 
146De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1986 (1) SA 8 (A) in: Emslie et. aI., p 415. 
147De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1986 (1) SA 8 (AD) in: Taxpayer January 1986, 8pp, p9 -Editorial Note 
148Ibid . 
149Taxpayer 1991, 208pp, P 210; Emslie et. al., p 414. 
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3.5.2 Solaglass Finance Company (Pty) Ltd v cm 1991 (2) SA 257 (A)lso 
Botha JA held in this case that " ... the distinction between "motive" and "purpose" in this 
context [ie the meaning of the words "exclusively laid out or expended for the purpose of 
trade" - comment supplied] seems to me to be a nebulous one: it may sometimes be found to 
be helpful, but at other times it may be conducive more to confusion than to clarity ... In general 
one can say no more than that the issue is to be resolved by examining the particular facts of 
each individual case."lSl 
In this judgement the court does not want to commit itself to any single criterion for the trade 
requirement like the objective purpose, the result, effect or object of the transaction or the 
subjective motive for so entering into the respective transaction. If eg accountants show 
practices on behalf of the taxpayer that indicate that there is no future recovering of the outlay 
expected, such behaviour according to the above mentioned judgement can easily thwart a 
claim for deductionsls2. Thus this judgement provides quite some insecurity for the film owner 
regarding the tax deductibility of his expenses. It may be useful to give justice to any specific 
case but on the other hand it invalidates or even abolishes legal security for any investor in any 
risky venture comparable to film productions. 
3.6 The trade requirement under s23(g) of the Act and tbe "test of normality" under 
sl03 of the Act 
Another obstacle the taxpayer might have to overcome is s103(1)153 which gives the 
Commissioner remedies against the avoidance of tax at which it is directed. In order to apply 
sl03(1), the Commissioner must be satisfied with the cumulative fulfilment of the following 
four prerequisitesls4: 
1. A "transaction, operation or scheme" as been entered into or carried out, sl03(1). 
150 Taxpayer 1991, 5. 
151 Solaglass Finance Company (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1991 (2) SA 257 (A), P 281. 
152 This example was given with regard to pre-section 24F film partnerships in: Taxpayer Aptil 1990, 65pp, P 
68. 
153 5 103(1). 
154 Silke, Vol. 3, § 19.2, P 19-4, 19-5. 
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2. The transaction entered into or carried out had the effect of avoiding or postponing 
liability for the payment of any tax, duty or levy imposed by the Act or any previous 
Income Tax Act or of reducing the amount of such liability, sI03(1)(a). 
3. The circumstances under which the transaction was entered into or carried out must be 
like -
(a) in the case of a transaction in the context of business, was entered into or 
carried out in a manner that would not normally be employed for bona fide 
business purposes, other than the obtaining of a tax benefit, sI03(1)(bXi)(aa)~ 
and 
in the case of any other transaction was entered into or carried out in a manner 
that would not normally be employed in the entering or carrying our of a 
transaction of the nature of the transaction in question, s103(1)(b)(i)(bb); or 
(b) the transaction created rights or obligations that would not normally be 
created between persons dealing at arm's length und a transaction of the nature 
of the transaction in question, sI03(1)(b)(ii) . 
It has to be mentioned however, that any decision of the Commissioner under the said section 
is subject to objection and appeal by the taxpayer, as provided under sI03(4), and if the 
taxpayer can show that anyone of the circumstances named above is not of application, his 
liability for tax may not be determined under sI03(1)155. 
Subject to the application of sI03(1) is the so called '<test of normality". This test is no 
universally applicable test and there is only one partiCular type of transaction expressly 
assumed to be abnormal, namely the one example given in sI03(3)156. Nevertheless there are a 
couple of cases which had been discussed in relation to partnerships investing in film 
production. Aside from the two cases mentioned and discussed above (So/aglass Finance 
Company (Pty) Ltd v CIR and De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CIR) the cases ITC 1496157, 
155 Silke, Vol. 3, § 19.2, P 19-3. 
156 Silke, Vol. 3, § 19.13, 19-28-14; s103 . 
157 53 SATe 229 - so called "plantation-case". 
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Hicklin v CIR158 and CIR v LOUW159 have to be reviewed in the context of the funds and were 
applied to the said type of partnerships 160. 
3.6.1 ITC 1496161 - the so called "plantation case" 
In this case the taxpayer purportedly entered into a farming partnership as part of a "plantation 
scheme". The central idea of the scheme was that interest due over a lengthy period lying in the 
future could, by being settled immediately by way of promissory notes, be deducted 
immediately. The court did not tolerate this in favour of the taxpayer. Another incentive of the 
scheme was the hope it held out that each participant would benefit by claiming a deduction a 
proportionate share of a management fee that was payable in advance for the management of 
the farming activities necessary to the operation of the scheme. To succeed with this claim, the 
taxpayer had to show that it was a partner in a farming venture. The question was whether the 
transaction was entered into or carried out in an abnormal manner. 
Melamet J considered the partnership to be an "investment vehicle" and the investors were held 
to "camouflaging themselves as partners,,162 On the grounds of the timing, the extent of the 
deductions claimed and the deferment of the receipt of taxable income that the scheme 
promised, the sole purpose of the scheme was considered to avoid or postpone taxation. The 
Commissioner was therefore held to be fully justified in applying s103(1) 163. 
There are two arguments to question this approach in respect of film funds: Provided that like 
in the Ensign Tankers case the general partner of the partnership is a professional film 
producer, there is no camouflage at least regarding this partner. And the second one 
(connected to the first) is that, if one treats a partnership for a number of purposes as a 
separate legal entity, eg in matters of practice and procedure164 or in rule 14 of the Uniform 
158 1980 (1) SA481 (A). 
159 1983 (3) SA 551 (A). 
160 Taxpayer 1990, 65pp and November 1992, 207pp 
161 Loc cit. 
162 53 SATC 229,250-251. 
163 As summarised by Silke, Vol. 3, § 19.12C, P 19-28. 
164 Cf Standard Bank o/SA Limited v Lombard and another 1977 (2) SA 808, P 813; 
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Rules of the Provincial and Local Divisions of the Supreme Court and Magistrates' Court 
Rules 40 and 54, this indicates that one has to look at the partnership as a whole to determine, 
if it is trading or not and not to the individual motives of the partners themselves; especially not 
only to those motives of the limited partners. In addition to that, if a film fund is structured like 
in the Ensign Tankers case containing a general partner as an original and experienced film 
producer and the transactions are of merchantable quality, it should be without difficulty for 
the taxpayer to proof that the transactions are not in an "abnormal manner". Furthermore due 
to the nature of the general partner, his motive can not be deemed to be of pure tax: avoiding 
nature. 
In the face of these arguments the approach ofMelamet J in the mentioned case can be looked 
upon with justification as a "fundamental flaw,,165 compared to the one in the British case 
EnSign Tankers (Leasing) Limited v Stokes (Inspector of Taxes) 166: 
3.6.2 Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Limited v Stokes (Inspector of Taxes) 
This case the facts of which has been mentioned aboveJ67 received great attention in 'The 
Taxpayer' journal. It shows how the English judicature deals with film funds and its 
investments. The case went through all instances in England. At the beginning stands the 
judgement delivered by the Chancery Division of the United Kingdom168, then a judgement 
followed on appeal by the Court of Appeal169, in which the matter was referred back to the 
Revenue before it was brought before the House of Lords l70 where it received its final 
judgement delivered on 12 March 1992. The main judgement delivered by Lord Templeman 
turned on two issues, namely, the entitlement of the partnership to deduct $ 14 million and the 
question of whether the partnership was engaged in trading in the form of production and 
distribution of the film. 
Du Toil en andere v Barclays Nasionale Bank 8pk 1985 (1) SA 563 (A), P 575. 
165 Taxpayer 1992, 207pp, P 210. 
166 Finally decided by the House of Lords, 1992 WLR 469 (HL). 
167 CfII. 3.2 .3., page 23 . 
168 Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Limited v Stokes (Inspector a/Taxes) 1989 1 WLR 1222. 
169 Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Limited v Stokes (Inspector a/Taxes) 1991 STC 136 (CA). 
170 Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Limited v Stokes 1992 WLR 469 (HL). 
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"". It [the actual loss] was what it purported to be, a loss sustained in a highly 
speculative adventure, conditioned in its fonn and motivated by the desire to 
secure a tax advantage but on commercial tenns and in the nature of trade". 
The Court of Appeal held that l75 
''the question whether a transaction is a trading transaction will be answered by 
looking objectively at what was done in order to see if it is similar to transactions 
of the same nature in the commercial world and carried out in a similar way ... it 
is established that a transaction which has all the features of a trade must also have 
a commercial purpose." 
With this finding the Court of Appeal decided to remit the case to the Commissioners and 
confinned Millet J findings in the first instance. Interestingly the Court did that by following 
the criticism by British tax commentators. One of whom submitted that the only distinction the 
Court [the Chancery Division as the first instance] was required to draw was that between the 
purpose or motive of the taxpayer in investing with others and the purpose of that group or 
partnership or company engaging in the relevant activityl76. (Obviously the criticism referred to 
the approach not to the result.) It was further submitted that only in case the partnership was a 
mere sham there would have been no basis for a distinction between the purpose of the 
taxpayer and that of the partnership 177. In this case the Court of Appeal found that where there 
is some uncertainty to the purpose of the transaction the objective intention of the taxpayer can 
become relevant in determination thereof. In such case the intention could well be decisive1n 
The House of Lords delivered the final judgement on the said case, ie on the question whether 
the partnership was engaged in trading. Lord Templeman delivering the judgement found that 
the production and exploitation of a film was a trading activity and the expenditure of capital 
for the purpose of a commercial film was a trading purpose. He further found that a trading 
transaction could plainly be identified in the case, that it was not a sham and the expenditure 
175 Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Limited v Stokes (Inspector a/Taxes) 1991 STC 136 (CA), P 144. 
176 Shrubsall 1990 British Tax Review 52. 
171 Loc. cit.. 
178 Taxpayer 1991, 208pp, P 209. 
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incurred by the taxpayer was real and not magical 179. He did that on the basis of his 
interpretation of the relevant s41 (1) of the Finance Act of 1971 (a British statute) finding that 
this section was not concerned with the purpose of the transaction but with the one of the 
expenditure 180, which was, as mentioned above, not a magical expenditure. 181 
Here the courts indicated that there is a chance for the objective intention of the taxpayer to 
become decisive. But, and this is of vital interest for any film fund, if the fund in form of a 
partnership is dealing in transactions of a merchantable quality as customary in the film 
business, there is no reason to look at the intention of the taxpayer at all. 
It was found rightly on the grounds of this judgement that the taxpayer in South Africa had 
nothing to fear in respect of his expected deductions with regard to "a Revenue attack on the 
basis of s 103(1 ),,182. Regarding the prohibition of deductions in determination of income under 
s23(g) it was found that there was not much difference between the approach of Corbett JA in 
De Beers Holdings (PIT) Ltd v CIR183 and that of Millet J in the said case. In South Africa a 
taxpayer who could show that a partnership of which he was a partner was engaged, 
objectively considered, in a commercial activity of producing the film with a view of making a 
profit would be able to discharge the onus of proving that he was trading184. 
3.6.3 Hicklin v CIRI85 
The case dealt with a sale of a dormant company to a dividend-stripping company. The idea of 
the sale was to use the dividend-stripper to take over the dormant company, declare the 
distributable reserves as a dividend and deregister the company thereafter. Because the 
179 Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Limited v Stokes 1992 WLR 469 (HL), P 490, p487. 
180 Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Limited v Stokes 1992 WLR 469 (HL), p487. 
181 Interestingly Lord Templeman held the transaction of the partnership to be a joint venture and not a loan. 
Consequently each partner was precluded from claiming that he incurred expenditure beyond the quantum of 
his contribution to the partnership 
182 Taxpayer 1990, 65pp, P 69. 
183 De Beers Holdings (PTY) Ltd v CIR 1986 (1) SA 8 (A); Taxpayer, 1986, p 8; cflI. 3.5.1, page 42. 
184 Taxpayer 1990, 65pp, p68. 
185 1980 (1) SA481 (A). 
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dividend-stripper was a company, and therefore not liable for tax on the dividend, the 
Secretary applied sI03(1) and taxed the shareholders of the former dormant company (one was 
"Hicklin") on the dividend, as if they had liquidated or deregistered the company themselves. 
The shareholders were not able to discharge the onus of showing that tax avoidance was not 
one of the main purposes of the sale. However the agreement between the sellers and the 
dividend-stripper was an arm's length transaction in which each party was striving to obtain the 
maximum possible advantage for itself. For this reason the court felt that the abnormality 
requirement was not satisfied and therefore sl 03(1) not applicable. 186 
Here again the court indicates that, if there are transactions comparable to ones or itself being 
at arm's length, the abnormality requirement of sI03(1) is not satisfied. In case of a film 
production the taxpayer would always be able to proof that he expected a profit from the 
exploitation of the film as long as he can provide evidence showing he was engaged in a 
professional and legitimate production. 
3.6.4 eIR v LOUW187 
The court in this case had to apply sI03(1) to two schemes, as it found on the facts of the case. 
One was the incorporation of a company to accrue to it the salary and drawings from a 
partnership in order to take it later from the company by way of loan and salary. Thereby the 
tax was reduced because the company was tax on a lower rate than the individuals as partners 
of the partnership. Here, in line with the decision in SIR v Geustyn, Forsyth & Jouberr88 where 
the facts were similar, the court held that the incorporation in itself was not an abnormal 
transaction. More interesting though in regard to film schemes including the above mentioned 
non-recourse loans is the courts finding on the loans the company made to its directors (the 
than partners of the ex partnership). The company did neither ensure the repayment of the 
loans nor ask for security thereof. The court considered this loans as abnormal and only 
constituted for tax avoiding effects and consequently applied sI03(3) to the scheme of the 
loans. 
186 It needs mentioning here, that in SIR v Geustyn, Forsyth & Joubert (1971 AD) 33 SATe 113 the court held 
that all four of the main criteria listed in section 103(1) must apply before the section can be applied. 
187 1983 (3) SA 551 (A). 
188 Loc cit. 
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The court findings in this case also alleviate the ones of Melamet J in ITC 1946. Here the court 
determined the nature of the transaction by looking at the transaction itself Regarding the 
loans, s24F provides all tests. There is no room for this case to be applied to film funds after 
the introduction of s24F. Any film fund though preceding the application of s24F wou1d be in 
danger of an attack by Revenue on the grounds of s 1 03(1), if not, like the British courts, the 
South African would determine the non-recourse loan agreement as a joint venture. The latter 
is not very likely as the judgment given by E M Grosskopf JA in Burgess v CIR indicates: 
3.6.5 Burgess v cm189 
Of all the cases mentioned here, this case is the applicable to the taxation of a film investor. 
The question in issue in the Appellate Division was whether the deduction of interest claimed 
by the appellant was permissible in terms of the general deduction formula laid down in sll(a) 
and the first main issue on appeal was whether the Special Court had been correct in its view 
that appellant had not shown that the expenditure had been incurred in the production of 
income derived by him from "carrying on any trade" within the meaning of s 11 (a). 190 
The facts in broad terms were as follows: 
The taxpayer was approached by an insurance broker who advised him that "over a year period 
we could make you a considerable amount of money" and that all the taxpayer had to do was 
to put up a guarantee of R 425 000. The essence of the scheme was that money would be 
borrowed from a bank and invested for a short period of one or two years in assets such as 
shares which were expected to appreciate in value. The investment would be made, not by 
purchasing the assets themselves, but by entering into a single-premium pure endowment 
policy. The insurance company would then manage the money contributed by the investors by 
way of premiums in the most advantageous way. At the end of the period the assets would be 
realised, the bank repaid, and the balance pocketed. This type of investment normally carried 
189 1993 (4) SA 161 (A), 55 SATe 185. 
190 Even though the court expressly points out that it is not dealing "with an attack by the Commissioner on an 
alleged tax avoidance scheme in terms ofs103 of the Act" (Burgess v CIR 1993 SATC 55, 185pp, p 193) this 
case is discussed here because it easily could have become a question of the application of sl 03( 1). Otherwise 
the Court did not have to exclude it so clearly. It may also called to mind that in the same year the settlement 
conference regarding film schemes took place. 
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the risk that the assets might not perform as expected, leaving the investor with no profit and 
an obligation to repay the loan. In the said scheme this risk was reduced by some more 
complex legal devices. Interestingly according to the film funds the transactions were to be 
entered into not by the individual investor, but by an en commandite partnership of which the 
taxpayer and the initiator of the scheme would be the members. The investor would be the 
limited partner, who would not be liable for debts of the partnership except to the extent of the 
bank guarantee referred to. The promoters of the scheme also considered that it held certain 
tax advantages. The interest payable to the bank by the partnership would be tax deductible, 
they considered, and as the liability for such interest would be incurred during the first year, 
even though it was only payable annually in arrears, and no taxable gain would arise before the 
end of the first year, the timing difference between the incurral of the interest expense and the 
accrual of the gain on the insurance policy would give rise to a deferment of liability for 
income tax. 
The court held by EM Grosskopf JA191 : 
1. The argument on behalf of the Commissioner that the scheme was nothing more than a 
tax engineering device and for this reason did not amount to the carrying on of a trade 
was rejected. Each part of the scheme was designed for a commercial purpose and 
could not be described as artificial. There was an expected benefit in the form of a tax 
deferment, but this arose from the nature of the transaction and was not contrived in an 
artificial way. 
2. The proposition that the purpose of securing a fiscal advantage amounted to a non-
trade purpose was unsound in law, even if the facts supported it (which they did not). 
3. If a taxpayer pursued a course of conduct which, standing on its own, constituted the 
carrying on of a trade, he would not have ceased carrying on a trade merely because 
one of his purposes, or even his main purpose, in doing what he did was to obtain some 
tax advantage. If he carried on a trade, his motive for doing so was irrelevant. The 
position might be different if a transaction was so affected or inspired by fiscal 
considerations that the shape and character of the transaction was no longer that of a 
trading transaction. The shape and character of the transaction on the facts of the 
present case were inspired entirely by commercial considerations. 
191 As cited from Burgess v CIR in: EmslieiHutton/Davis/Olivier, § 9.2, P 435 . 
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4. The argument on behalf of the Commissioner that the transaction amounted to an 
investment and not the carrying of a trade was also rejected. It was a speculative 
enterprise par excellence and could properly be described as a ''venture'' as envisaged 
in the definition of ' 'trade". 
5 . . .. 7 . ... 
As the above mentioned facts of this case show, there is only one fundamental (if at all) 
difference in the facts between Burgess v CIR and Ensign Tankers v Stokes and this is the 
"non· recourse loans" in the latter case. EM Grosskopf JA distinguishes the two cases on the 
grounds that they are "not the same type"l92. What is meant by this is most likely the "non· 
recourse loans". No coincidence that the House of Lords qualified the transactions including 
the "non-recourse loans" within the film scheme as a joint venture193. But still Grosskopf JA 
refers to Lord Goff s statement, that "unacceptable tax avoidance typically involves the 
creation of artificial structures, by which, as though by wave of a magic wand, the taxpayer 
conjures out of the air a loss, or a gain, or expenditure, or whatever it may be, which otherwise 
would never have existed,,194. He hereby approves the objective approach to the trade 
requirement detennined by ''the course of conduct which, standing on its own, constitutes the 
carrying on of a trade"195. Apart from these "non-recourse loans" which are not permissible 
anymore under s24F, as shown above, the court at this point clearly states and thereby 
approves the approach in De Beers Holding'96 that the appearance of the transaction itself is 
decisive in the first place. Only if it is "so affected or inspired by fiscal considerations that the 
shape and character of the transaction is no longer that of a trading transaction", the motives of 
the taxpayer can become relevantl97. Another aspect of the case worth noticing is that by this 
judgement another one by Melamet J was overruled. This might also invalidate the approach in 
the "plantation case" with regard to film schemes. Again it can be concluded from this case 
that a film fund and therefore each single partner has nothing to fear regarding the tax: 
advantages if there is a financing of a legitimate film production and exploitation, even the film 
192 Burgess v CIR 55 SATC 185, 193. 
193 See fn 181. 
194 Ibid .. 
195 Cfthe ratio decidendi in 3. above. 
196 Loc cit. 
197 Burgess v CIR 55 SATC 185, 194 with reference to the British case FA & AB Ltd v Lupton (inspector of 
Taxes) [1972] AC 634, 647 G. 
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turns out to be a financial failure . Regarding point 4. mentioned above, the judgement confirms 
the wide definition of trade, which unproblematicly includes the production and exploitation of 
films l98 . 
3.7 Advertising and print costs (P&A) and the provision "in the production of income", 
sl1(a) of the Act 
The expression "in the production of income" in sl1(a) has been interpreted by the courts in 
Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Co Ltd v CIRl99 where Watermeyer AJP, as he then was, 
held20o : 
"The purpose of the act entailing expenditure must be looked at. If it is performed 
for the purpose of earning income then the expenditure attendant upon it is 
deductible[ .. . ] 
[ ... ] what attendant expenses can be deducted? How closely must they be linked 
to the business operations? Here, in my opinion, all expenses attached to the 
performance of a business operation bona fide performed for the purposes of 
earning income are deductible whether such expenses are necessary for its 
performance or attached to it by chance or bona fide incurred for the more 
efficient performance of such operation, provided they are so closely connected 
with it that they may be regarded201 as part of the cost performing it." 
The UK Film Distribution Guide202 gives the answer to the question how close the advertising 
expenditure is connected to the performance of the income from a film: 
"The creative process of planning and executing a film marketing campaign, 
designing the posters and placing the advertisements, can have a huge impact on 
how a film performs. The film marketing task is essentially to build visibility, 
awareness and interest in a new release, peaking at its opening weekend 
198 Cfll. 3.5, page 4l. 
199 Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Co Ltd v CIR 8 SATC 13 . 
200 Ibid., at p16. 
201 "may be regarded" can be considered to be "can properly or reasonably be regarded" , cf CIR v Genn 1955 
(3) SA 293 (A). 
202 httpwww.launchingfilms.comluk jilm _distribution pde/ 
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(Friday/Saturday/Sunday). After this, a combination of word-of-mouth and further 
promotion will sustain the film ('give it legs') during its theatrical run, which 
normally lasts up to four months, although usually most of its money is taken early 
in the run. 
Blockbusters with top stars need heavy marketing spends to back up their wide 
releases. As advertising costs soar, and the market gets more crowded, marketing 
decisions become crucial. Whilst inspired marketing cannot save a film for which 
the public has no appetite, a fine film can be lost in the melee if it is not clearly, 
distinctly promoted. 
The best form of publicity is word of mouth - a positive talking point among the 
core target audience which ideally expands, via personal recommendations, to 
other groups. Distributors hire external research companies to track levels of 
awareness week by week as a film's release date approaches. With a month to go 
there may be very low awareness: each film is effectively a new product launch, 
often completed within just a few intense weeks. Distributors are competing for a 
significant share of voice not just against all other distributors but also against 
other leisure activities, trying to entice the same audience." 
The printing of the copies of the master copy is the conditio sine qua non for any release of a 
film. Thus it is obvious that the costs thereof are the basis of the income from the film; such 
expenses are more than linked to the business operations. Another citation from the UK Film 
Distribution Guide will illustrate this argumene03: 
"A wide release, 'at cinemas everywhere', may in practice open at 300 or more 
sites UK-wide, sometimes playing at two or more screens per cinema. This helps 
to accommodate mass audiences who, motivated by the distributor's campaign, 
are eager to see a big new film as early as possible. Distributors pay the print 
duplication costs: one 35mm print ofa two-hour film costs approximately £1,000, 
so the print cost alone of wide releases is substantial. In due course, digital 
projection may reduce the physical print cost; digital systems are presently on trial 
in a small number of UK cinemas. 
203 www.launchingfilms.comJuk_film_ distribution ~idel 
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Different films are naturally handled in different ways. An 'art house' release may 
consist of a dozen prints or fewer, booked initially into selected screens in London 
(which, with the largest population, accounts for about 26% of all annual UK 
cinema visits) and some university towns, before hopefully touring more widely 
over the weeks and months to follow." 
Finally it needs mentioning that "income" here means income as defined in s 1 and the 
deduction must not be prohibited by s23(t), ie the amounts received or accrued the expenses 
refer to must constitute income under the term defined in s 1. 
As the example given above reveals, an 'art house' release does not require too many copies 
for its distribution, because it serves a different market and a different audience than a 
'blockbuster film'. According to this, if too many copies are made just to inflate the budget for 
purposes of deduction the expenses are not incurred "in the production of income". In such 
case it will be difficult for the fund to prove that the expenses were bona fide incurred for the 
more efficient performance of such operation, ie selling an 'art house' film. 
3.8 Advertising and print costs (P&A) and the provision "not of a capital nature", sl1(a) 
of the Act 
There was also no definition laid down in the Income Tax Act regarding the expression "not of 
a capital nature". However Watermeyer CJ provided the "pre-eminent and principal test,,204 in 
New State Areas Ltd v Clko5 which was deemed to "hold good in most cases,,206. This test 
focuses on the question whether the expenditure or loss should properly be regarded as part of 
the cost of performing the income-earning operations, then it is of revenue nature (and 
deductible), or as part of the cost of establishing, enhancing or adding to the income-earning 
structure or plant or machinery, in which case it is of a capital nature and not deductible207 
204 As EmslielDavisIHuttoniOlivier, 8.1, p 349 characterize it. 
205 New State Areas Ltd v CIR 1946 AD 610, approved in numerous cases since, cf Meyerowitz § 11.48, P 11-
19. 
206 Meyerowitz, § 11.48, pll-18 . 
201 EmslielDavisIHuttoniOlivier, 8.1, p 349. 
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There are two subsidiary tests which are only used in case the named test proves equivQcafo8. 
As Watermeyer CJ held in New State Areas Ltd v CIlfo9: 
"[ ... ]The expenditure of a capital nature, the deduction of which is prohibited 
under sll(2), is expenditure of a fixed capital nature [emphasis supplied], not 
expenditure of a floating capital nature, because expenditure which constitutes the 
use of floating capital for the purpose of earning a profit, such as the purchase 
price of stock in trade, must necessarily be deducted from the proceeds of the sale 
of stock in trade in order to arrive at the taxable income derived by the taxpayer 
from that trade. The problem which arises when deductions are claimed is 
therefore usually whether the expenditure in question should properly be regarded 
as part of the cost of performing the income-earning operations or as part of the 
cost of establishing or improving or adding to the income-earning plant or 
machinery. [ . .. ]" 
One could say, regarding the print cost, that the copies of the master negative constitute the 
income-earning plant or machinery or structure of the film owner. It is the copies which go to 
the cinemas, in many cases not only once on the release of the film but a second or third time 
as the classics prove it. The consequence would be that the deduction of the print cost already 
fails at the stage of the general deduction formula, because the expenditure for the copies 
would have to be regarded as of capital nature. This approach however does not take into 
consideration that the fixed capital is the film as such, only embodied in the master negative. 
The making of the copies and the expenditure for it is nothing but making the film marketable. 
The print cost are incurred by the film owner for no other reason than converting the film as 
fixed capital in floating capital. With the film only being fixed on the master negative it could 
not be used for the purpose of earning a profit. Finally it can be said that providing copies of 
the master negative the cost incurred for it is the not only part but the major part of the cost of 
performing the income-earning operations of the film owner. The budget of the print cost 
substantiates this interpretation. 
208 EmslielDavisIHuttonlOlivier, 8.1 , p 350. 
209 14 SATe 155; 1946 AD 610, P 6191620. 
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Nothing else can be said about the advertising expenditure. This expenditure is exclusively 
linked to each screening of the film and its effect is gone once the screening took place. An 
advertisement is not establishing a source of new income like it is the nature of a fixed asset. 
An advertising measure is exhausted in the moment it is done. Therefore cost incurred for it 
can not be regarded as part of the income-earning structure, machinery or plant. 
4. The limitation of the deduction by s24H(3) read with (4) of the Act 
The heart of s24H lies in subsection (3?10 which - notwithstanding anything to the contrary in 
this Act other than s 11 bis - restricts any allowance or deduction which a limited partner may 
claim to the amount of his contribution to the partnership or for which he is or may be held 
liable to creditors, plus any income received by him from the partnership. But like in s24F(7) 
provides, any allowance or deduction disallowed under s24H(3) shall be carried forward and is 
deemed to be an allowance or deduction the taxpayer is entitled to in the following year of 
assessment, s24 H( 4). 
5. The limitation of the deduction by s23H(1) of the Act 
S23H is operative in respect of expenditure incurred on or after the 23 . of February 2000211 
and in respect of a film fund, it only affects advertising expenditure as being deductible under 
sll(a). Even though the author found by interpretation of the wording of s24F that the 
deduction of the print costs also has to pass the test of the general deduction formula, it is not 
contradictious to limit the field of application of s23H to the deduction of the advertising 
expenditure. Section 23H(1) was introduced into the Income Tax Act to give the Revenue 
another instrument to combat certain tax avoidance schemes212. For the same purpose s24F 
was introduced to the Act. Since s24F specifically deals with the print costs it would be going 
to far beyond the wording of s23H if one would extend the field of application of this section 
to the print costs already dealt with in and covered by s24F. 
S23H( 1) reads as follows: 
210 s24H. 
211 According to the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 30 of 2000, sec 31(2). 
212 Meyerowitz, § 1 1.23 A, P 11-8. 
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1) Where any person has during any year of assessment actually incurred 
any expenditure (other than expenditure incurred in respect of the 
acquisition of any trading stock)--
a) which is allowable as a deduction in terms of the provisions of 
section 11(a), (c) or (d) or section 28(2)(a) and (c); and 
b) in respect of-
i) goods or semces, all of which will not be supplied or 
rendered to such person, during such year of assessment; 
or 
ii) any other benefit, the period to which the expenditure 
relates extends beyond such year as assessment; 
the amount of the expenditure which shall be allowable as a deduction in 
terms of such section in the said year and any subsequent year of 
assessment, shall be limited to, in the case of expenditure incurred in 
respect of--
goods to be supplied, so much of the expenditure as relates to the goods 
actually supplied to such person in such year of assessment; or 
services to be rendered, an amount which bears to the total amount of 
such expenditure the same ratio as the number of months in such year 
during which such services are rendered bears to the total number of 
months during which such services will be rendered; or 
iii) any other benefit to which such expenditure relates, an 
amount which bears to the total amount of such 
expenditure the same ratio as the number of months in 
such year during which such person will enjoy such benefit 
bears to the total number of months during which such 
person will enjoy such benefit or where the period of such 
benefit is not determinable; such period over which the 
benefit is likely to be enjoyed: 
Provided that the provisions of this section shall not apply--
aa) where all the goods or services are to be supplied or rendered 
within six months after the end of the year of assessment during 
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which the expenditure was incurred, or such person will have the 
full benefit in respect of which the expenditure was incurred 
within such period; or 
bb) where the aggregate of all amounts of expenditure incurred by 
such person, which would otherwise be limited by this section, 
does not exceed R50 000; or 
cc) to any expenditure to which the provisions of section 241, 24J, 
24K or 24L apply; or 
dd) to any expenditure actually paid in respect of any unconditional 
liability to pay an amount imposed by legislation. 
2) If the Commissioner is in any case satisfied that the apportionment of the 
expenditure in accordance with subsection (1) does not reasonably 
represent a fair apportionment of such expenditure in respect of the 
goods, services or benefits to which it relates, he may direct that· such 
apportionment be made in such other manner as to him appears fair and 
reasonable. 
3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (1) and (2), where it is 
during any year of assessment shown by any person that--
a) the goods or services in respect of which the expenditure is 
incurred will never be received by or be rendered to such person; 
or 
b) such person will never enjoy such other benefit m respect of 
which any expenditure is incurred, 
such expenditure shall be allowed in such year, to the extent that 
such expenditure has been actually paid by such person. 
4) The exerCIse by the Commissioner of his discretion contemplated III 
subsection (2) shall be subject to objection and appeal. 
59 
This section which is basically self-explaining limits the deductible amount of eg the advertising 
expenditure to the amount paid for services already received within the year of assessment. So 
it can be the case, that the advertising expenditure which is quite a relevant position within the 
budget of a film production is not totally deductible in the year of assessment in which it was 
paid. It needs mentioning however that the deduction of the advertising expenditure is not 
numerically limited but maybe deferred, at latest to the year of assessment when the last service 
is rendered. The question of whether the advertising expenditure was appropriate to the 
chances of the film in the market is immateriae13 . Nevertheless an inflated marketing budget 
can come into conflict with the provision that the expenditure must be incurred "in the 
production of income" (provided the expenditure is not of a capital nature, see above). As far 
as the film business has a long tradition on an international basis, it should not be a problem for 
the taxpayer to discharge the onus of proving that the amount spent on advertisement is 
reasonable and appropriate to the film in question and thus prove that the money was spend "in 
the production of income"; provided the costs were not inflated to optimise the deductions for 
the investor. 
6. Excursus: VAT included in any of the above mentioned costs 
Where the cost of any asset acquired by the film owner or any expenditure incurred by him in 
respect of the abovementioned costs includes value-added tax, the amount of the latter is to be 
excluded from the cost of the asset or the amount of expenditure for purposes of calculating a 
deduction or allowance permitted in terms of the Income Tax Act214 . The film owner must 
however be a "vendor" as defined in sl of the Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 and be 
entitled, in respect of the current or any previous year of assessment, to claim an input tax 
credit in terms of that Ace15 Where an input tax deduction is allowable in respect of a lease216, 
each lease payment must be reduced by a proportionate amount of the input tax, ie the input 
213 Meyerowitz, §11.133, pll-51; ITC 1524 SATC 299. 
214 s23C(I); effective in respect of years of assessment ending on or after 30 September 1991. 
215 s16(3) of Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991, read with the definition of "input tax" in sl. 
216 A lease for this purpose means a lease as contemplated in para (b) of the definition of "instalment credit 
agreement" in s 1 of the Value-Added tax Act 89 of 1991. 
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tax excluded from the lease payment is the amount which bears to the input tax, the same ratio 
as the lease payment bears to the total lease payment in terms of the lease217 . 
7. The amendment of s24F and s24H of the Act in the Income Tax Amendment Bill 2002 
A planned amendment of s24f and s 24H has to be mentioned here because of its considerable 
effects. 
The amendment reads as follows: 
Amendment of section 24F of Act 58 of 1%2, as inserted by section 17 of Act 
85 of 1987 and amended by section 19 of Act 90 of 1988, section 24 of Act 
101 of 1990, section 26 of Act 129 of 1991 and section 30 of Act 59 of 2000 
25. Section 24F of the Income Tax Act, 1962, is hereby amended-
(a) by the insertion in subsection (1) after the definition of" completion date" of 
the following definition: 
" , export ' , in relation to a film, means sell and consign or sell and deliver 
to any purchaser at any address in any export country, or the exploitation 
of the film by the film owner in an export country and any derivative of 
'export' shall be construed accordingly;" ; 
(b) by the insertion in subsection (1) after the definition of " exported" of the 
following definition: 
" , export country' means any country other than the Republic or a 
neighbouring country;" ; 
( c) by the insertion in subsection (1) after the definition of" production cost" of 
the following definition: 
" , marketing expenditure' means so much of the expenditure incurred by the film 
owner during the year of assessment to market a South African export film and 
allowed to be deducted from his income under section 11 
as is proved to the satisfaction of the Commissioner to have been 
incurred directly-
217 Provision to s23C(1); effective as from 30 September 1991. 
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Thus the expenditure of such kind for domestic films can be deemed to be deductible under the 
general deduction formula. The announced interpretation note will hopefully shed some light 
on this, too. This problem of the deduction of advertising expenses becomes crucial again with 
the annual cap on the mentioned deductions in s24F(7) and the loss carried forward, after the 
losses have reached up to this cap. As held here this cap (and the loss carried forward) only 
applies to the print costs and to the marketing allowance under s24F and s 11 his, the latter 
meanwhile repealed. But there is not only an annual cap to the deductions. The Income Tax 
Act allows the taxpayer to carry forward the losses which go beyond this cap to the next year 
of assessment. This is a compromise an investor can live with. Another two limitations which 
can be deemed to be bearable for the taxpayer are the ones in s24H(3), (4) and s23H. s24H(3) 
more or less limits the deduction in relation to the amount the investor is contributing to the 
fund, ie his share. In subsection (4), s24H again offers a loss carry forward . So the Income Tax 
Act is compromising again. Another gradual deduction of the expenditure deductible under the 
general deduction formula, ie the advertising expenses, is stipulated in s23H(1). Since it refers 
to expenditure for services not already rendered at the time of the payment, this limitation is 
very likely to apply to the advertising expenses. Nevertheless the taxpayer has it in his hands to 
control the expenses to make them be deductible, just by making sure that the services are 
rendered in the time of the payment. Again this limitation is not a serious obstacle to a film 
fund. 
Due to the history of tax avoidance by film schemes in the early 1990s there is still a test 
contained in the general deduction formula which can be located with the "trade requirement" 
of that formula. If the fund shows a "lack of profit motive" it is in danger to loose the loss 
deduction regarding at least the advertising and print costs. But as it was shown above, by a 
well founded film production showing all parameters of a professional financing, such as a 
profound business plan and realistic prognoses of independent experts like sales agents or 
distributors on the recoupment from the film, it should be no problem to prove the trade 
requirement and to gain the trust of the tax authorities. 
A production of the said quality should also not come into conflict with the "at-risk" rules of 
s24F and the "test of normality" under s 1 03 . An investment into a reasonable and professional 
film production can not be deemed a pure investment vehicle and as a consequence such 
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investment can not be deemed as an "abnormal transaction". As the author showed above, 
special insurances like shortfall guarantees and completion bonds can not trigger of the lethal 
effect of the said rules. The announced interpretation note on s24F is most likely dealing with 
this questions to the benefit of the film owner. These rules and tests are historically caused by 
film schemes which contained so called ,,non-recourse loans" by which the investor in such a 
scheme was made not even liable for the loss of the borrowed part of his investment. Despite 
the fact that these rules caused some confusion and insecurity with film investors, the Income 
Tax Act offers still viable incentives. The situation will be even better for the funds when the 
announced practice note is released. Just the fact that the SARS219 is giving such note shows 
that there is no prejudice against the funds anymore on the side of the tax authorities. 
Finally it can be concluded from this examination of the deductions and allowances for film 
funds offered by the South African Income Tax Act that the time when the tax authorities and 
the legislature fought against tax avoidance schemes revolving around film funds is over. The 
present tax incentives to invest into film production for South African funds are lucrative and 
may be even more in the future. The announced interpretation note will most likely bring even 
more legal security. The South African tax system is in this regard on its way to become a 
remarkable instrument of indirect public film promotion. 
ID. Chapter Three: Deductions and allowances for film owners in the Federal Republic 
of Germany (FRG) 
1. The type of company of a film production fund in the FRG 
The objects of the fund, as it is subject to this work, are the production of films, the 
distribution, exploitation and marketing thereof. In this way the fund can generate income from 
trade in the sense of § 15 I Nr. 1220 If it does so or not is part of the tax law considerations 
below. 
219 "South African Revenue Services". 
220 All paragraphs without description or with the one "of the Act" (in headlines) are such sections of the 
Gennan Income Tax Act (Einkommenssteuergesetz) dated 16. April 1997, BStBl. I 1997, 415 amended up to 
and including the Steuerentlastungsgesetz 19991200012002 vom 24.03 .1999, BGBl. I 1999 S. 402 . 
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The Income Tax Act (EStG221) is only applied to natural persons, cf. § 1 1. Thus only 
partnerships not companies Goint-stock companies) are of interest when it comes to the 
taxation of the investor. The proportionate profit or loss of the partnership is allocated to the 
single partner, if he is a co-partner in the sense of § 15 I Nr. 2. Co-partner in the sense of § 15 
I Nr. 2 can only be the partner of a partnership in a civil law meaning and in accordance with § 
1 only a natural person. Considering this, the partnership is the only "type of company" 
suitable for a film fund. 
The question which form of partnership is best for the investor can again only be detennined 
against the background of tax law. In the sense of § 15 III Nr. 2 a partnership is deemed to 
generate income from trade, if its unlimited (personally liable) partner is exclusively a joint-
stock company and. this company, ie its manager, is the only authorized manager of the 
partnership. An en commandite partnership in form of a so called "GmbH222 & Co. KG223" 
provides this legal presumption and the possibility of a sufficient limitation of liabiliif24. The 
"GmbH & Co. KG" is an en commandite partnership with a joint-stock company as an 
unlimited partner. It is - as a juristic person - only liable with the company assets in 
accordance to § 13 II GmbHG, which can be left at an amount of Euro 25 .000,00, see § 5 I 
GmbHG. In this way the non-member liability of the unlimited partner is also factual limited. If, 
as usual with the most funds, the company (GmbH) and limited partners are not identical, one 
221 "Einkommenssteuergeselz". 
222 "Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung". 
223 "Kommanditgesellschaft" 
224 This is the main difference in contrast to the OHG ("open trade partnership") which does not include any 
limitaion of liability of the partners. On the other hand this type of partnership is more attractive from taxation 
point of view, because under § 15a I the loss adjustment is limited to the amount of the share of the partner of 
an en commandite partnership Less attractive than the en commandite partnership is the "atypical partnership 
in commendam" (atypisch stille Gesellschaft) . It's true that the investor is deemed to be a co-partner under 15 I 
Nr. 2 EStG, but the enhanced loss adjustment (erweiterte Verlustausgleich) under § 15a EStG is not available 
for him, cf BFH dated 14.12.1995, BStBl. II 1996, 226. The shared profits are, should the occasion arise, 
taxable under § 15a III if a negative capital account occurs or raises. The withdrawals are treated as taxable 
profit of the limited partner. The advantage of such kind of partnership is however that the investor stays 
anonymous because he needs not to be registered in the Register of Companies (Handelsregister) and in 
addition to that the possibility of an advanced limitation of liability. 
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speaks of a "non-personal identical GmbH & Co. KG" (nicht personengleichen GmbH & Co. 
KG). 
1.1 The fiduciary limited partner (Treuhandkommanditist) 
Owing to their huge financial budget film funds have a large number of investors. To reduce 
the complex administration225 a trustee is often placed between the investor and the fund226 . 
But not only for this reason the role of the fiduciary limited partner needs mentioning here. His 
intervention is also relevant in terms of taxation of the investor, which is dealt with at a later 
stage. 
Trusteeship is not defined by law. Nevertheless characteristics of it has been established in 
daily legal practice227. There are two kinds of trusteeship: the "real" and the "fictitous" 
trusteeship (echte und unechte Treuhand). Either the trustor transfers certain proprietary rights 
to the trustee ("real" trusteeship) or he provides him with a power of disposition over his rights 
("fictitous" trusteeship), which the trustee may only make use of in accordance with a 
contractual agreement228 . 
1.1.1 The "real" trusteeship 
This trusteeship (also called ''fiduciary trusteeship" (fiduziarische Treuhand» is characterized 
by the fact that the trustor transfers the trust property in full to the trustee. The trustee owns 
the rights but is contractually bound to the directions of the trustor; he is in consequence of 
which acting economically on account of the trustor229 . From the perspective of company law 
225 Under § 12 I HGB all limited partners must be registered in the Register of Companies (Handelsregister) in 
a certified form by a notary public which is expensive and complicated. 
226 Von Havel Pense, Filmfonds, ZUM 1111998,890,892. 
227 Gieseke, Besondere Probleme, DB, Heft 18, 1984,970,970. 
228 Machunsky, Immobilienfonds 1997, 7. 
229 Gieseke, ioe.cit., 970; CfBFH dated 23.08.1956, BStBl. III 1956,302. 
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in case of a fund only the trustee is involved in the fund (as a registered fiduciary limited 
) h . 230 partner , not so t e Investor . 
1.1.2 The "fictitious" trusteeship (unechte Treuhand) 
In case of an "fictitous" trusteeship the investor and trustor keeps the full ownership of his 
proprietary rights, becomes unlimited partner himself and, as a consequence of that, he is 
registered in the Register of Companies (Handelsregister). The trustee only exercises the 
trustor's rights In the latter name (also called "power-of-authority trust" 
(Vollmachtstreuhand) )231. The ''fictitous'' trusteeship enables the trustor to have his rights at 
his solely disposal - contractual and in rem. Since it does not make a difference from a tax law 
point of view which form of trusteeship is chosen, the latter form is preferable, because it is the 
safest legal position for the trustor. 
Procedural both trusteeships are treated like sub-partnerships 
(Unterbeteiligungsverhaltnisse)232. For the trusteeship there has to be made a second net 
income determination procedure (Gewinnfeststellungsverfahren) analogue § 179 II S. 3 AD. 
With "undisclosed trusteeships" (offene Treuhandverhaltnisse) both determinations can be 
combined233 . 
As mentioned in the general introduction, basis of this thesis is a fund with the investor as a 
registered limited partner. The trusteeship is only introduced here because it is also often used 
with film funds in Germany. Therefore its effects in connection with other tax law provisions is 
shown below. 
230 CfBFH dated 21.04.1988, BStBl. II 1989,722; BFH BStBl. II 1995,714. The trustor is only mentioned in 
the trustor register, but not in the Register of Companies. Hereby he stays anonymous. In addition to that the 
intervention of a trustee, if he is a specialist, enables the fund to gain further competence for the investors and 
safeguard the investment. 
231 Spindler, Einkiinfteberechnung, WPg, Heft 6, 1995,203-207, 203. 
232 Schmidt/Schmidt, EStG, § 15 Rn. 299. 
m BFH BFHINV 1995, 565. 
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2. The system of German Income Tax and the taxation of the investor 
The income tax is a "personal tax" (personensteuer), which means it takes into consideration 
the personal situation of the taxpayer with the determination of the tax, eg the taxpayer's age, 
marital status, amount of children and state of health. It is also a "direct tax" (direkte Steuer), 
ie taxpayer and tax debtor are identical. It is a withholding tax with the income tax on wages 
and salaries, capital gains tax and interest discount tax. It is levied on seven different types of 
income listed under § 2 1: 
l. from farming and forestry (§ § 13 -14a), 
2. from freelancing (§ 18), 
3. from trade (§§ 15-17), 
4. from employment (§ 19), 
5. from capital stock (§ 20), 
6. from letting and leasing (§21), 
7. from any other income (§§ 22, 23). 
Income tax is assessed tax, ie it is determined by a tax assessment note after the end of an 
assessment period, cf § 25 . It is also a yearly tax (Jahressteuer), § 2 VII sentence 1, and 
covers periodically and gradual the income of each calendar year. Consequently one talks of 
the "periodic principle" (periodizitatsprinzip) or "section principle" (Abschnittsprinzip )234. The 
assessment period is the calendar year, cf. § 25 1235 . 
The tax peculiarity of partnerships is that they are not subject of taxation (only the partners are 
taxed) but subject of the determination of income (Gewinnermittlung). Under the ruling of the 
234 Tipke/Lang, Steuerrecht, § 9 Rn. 44. 
235 One has to distinguish between the income determination period and the profit determination period. The 
former is the one for which the basis of taxation is established. It usually covers the calendar year, § 2 VII 
sentence 2. The domestic income received while submitted to a limited tax liability (beschrankte Steuerpflicht) 
is to be included in the assessment for the unlimited tax liability, § 2 VII sentence 3. The profit determination 
period can differ from the income determination period with regard to income from trade. If the trader is 
registered with his company in the Register of Companies, the financial year complies with the period for 
which annual accounts are made regularly, § 4a I sentence 2 Nr. 2. If the trader is not register with his 
company the financial year is the calendar year, § 4a I sentence 2 Nr. 3. According to § 4a II Nr. 2 with a 
trader it is irrefutably deemed by law that his profit within a financial year which is not the calendar year 
accrues to him in the calendar year in which the financial year ends. 
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Federal Fiscal Court236 a partnership is partially subject of taxation inasmuch as it realizes by 
the entirety of its partners a certain type of income. A partnership is ,,interimistic, ie for 
purposes of determination of the shares of income of the co-partners [ ... ] it is subject of the 
determination of income (Gewinnermittlungssubjekt ),,237 The type of income (of the 
partnership) is again attributable to the partners for purposes of taxation of each partner. The 
determination of the income from trade and the attribution of the shares of profit to each 
partner is carried out in the "procedure of the uniform and individual net income 
determination" (einheitliche und gesonderte Gewinnfeststellung) in the sense of § 180 I Nr. 2a 
A0238. This procedure provides the even taxation of each partner and serves the economy of 
the procedure. Consequently the profit and the losses respectively of the partnership are taxed 
at the partners proportionately. This way of taxation of the investor is another good reason to 
choose the partnership as the corporate fonn of a film fund . 
The legal basis for income tax is the Income Tax Act (EStG) of April 16th, 1997239 including 
later amendments until 2002, the income tax implementing order (EstDV240) of June 18th, 
1997241 including later amendments until 2002, income tax on wages and salaries implementing 
order (LStDV242) and other additional orders. It also includes other acts like the "Foreign 
Investment Act" (Auslandsinvestitionsgesetz) of July 28th, 1969243. In the practice of the tax 
and revenue authorities regulatory provisions (Verwaltungsvorschriften) of the federal 
government with the approval of the Upper House of Parliament (Bundesrat) according to Art. 
108 VII GG play an important role. 
The taxation offilm funds, ie the investors, has become even more interesting by 
two events within the last three years: 
236 BFH BStBl. II 1984, 751. 
237 BFH BStBl. II 1986, 10 as translated by the author. 
238 "Abgabenordnung". 
239 BStBl. I 1997,415. 
240 Einkommenssteuer-Durchfuhrungsverordnung" 
241 BStBl. I 1997, 655 . 
242 "Lohnsteuerverordnung". 
243 BStBl. I 1969, 986. 
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1. The "Tax Relief Act 1999/2000/2002,c244 (Steuerentlastungsgesetz 1999/2000/2002?45 
and 
2. the ,,BMF246-letter dated 02/23/2001" (BMF-Schreiben vom 23.02.2001) to the 
regional tax authorities (Oberst en Finanzbehorden der Lander), the so called ,,media 
decree" (Medienerlass ?47. 
The Tax Relief Act has brought along quite some changes, especially in regard to the "offset of 
losses" (Verlustverrechnung) for the investor in film production funds; in detail see below. 
In the media decree the German ministry of finance has "expressed its view,c248 on the taxation 
of film and TV funds towards the regional tax authorities. A closed fund which is structured as 
a "co-partnership" and as a result generates income from trade forms the basis of this 
release249. Legally dogmatic this release is a regulatory provision (Verwaltungsvorschrift) and 
therefore has its only effect beyond administration in the constitutional principle of equal 
treatment. The release is no source of law and due to that only attributable to the field of legal 
enforcement (Normvollzug)250. It can be understood as a "norm-interpreting provision of 
administration" (norminterpretierende Verwaltungsregelung), which serves the uniform 
interpretation of tax law. The Federal Fiscal Court infers from this that these provisions are not 
binding for the fiscal courts, because the latter are only bound to the la~51. The Federal 
Constitutional Court252 also basically rules that the courts are not bound to these provisions of 
administration when ruling over the administration. But the Constitutional Court also states, 
that the courts are free to join these provisions in their independent power of interpreting the 
244 Special German legal terms are translated directly with the original term following in brackets. Hereafter 
referred to as "Tax Relief Act". 
245 Steuerentlastungsgesetz 19991200012002 vom 24.03.1999, BGBI. I 1999 P 402. 
246 "Bundesfinanzministerium" 
247 BMF-Schreiben dated 23.02.2001, Az. IV A 6 - S 2241 - 8/01 ("Media decree"); hereafter referred to as 
"media decree". 
248 The wording of the media decree, loe cit. 
249 Liidicke/Arndt, Medienerlass, 2001, p 2. 
250 Birk, Steuerrecht I, § 5 Rn. 3. 
251 BFH BStBl. II 1986, 856. 
252 BVerfGE 78, P 214. 
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law253 . For exactly this reason the media decree becomes relevant for the taxation of film funds 
and the investors respectively. 
Even if the court's judgement in a specific case is not binding in general - cf. § 11 0 FG0254 -
however by continuous dispensation of justice the courts can develop legal institutions and 
rules for legal interpretation which are not laid down expressly in any Ace55 . As a consequence 
this work pays more attention to the court rulings and the wording of the Income Tax Act 
(EStG) than to the media decree. Nevertheless the latter plays an important role when dealing 
with the tax and revenue authorities and therefore will be named and discussed at each stage of 
this work. 
3. The determination of the taxable income of the investor 
§ 2 II stipulates the determination of the taxable income in a "dualistic" way: 
1. by determining the profit or 
2. the surplus over "advertising expenses" (Werbungskosten). 
Income is made in form of a profit from income derived from farming and forestry (§§ 13-14a), 
from freelancing (§ 18) and from trade (§ § 15 -17). It is made in form of a surplus over the 
"advertising expenses" according to §§ 8-9a from the other types of income. ''Profit'' is legally 
defined under § 4 I sentence 1 as: 
"the difference between the assets of the company at the end of the financial year 
and the end of the previous financial year, increased by the value of the 
withdrawals and reduced by the value of the deposit." 
The background to this "dual system of the determination of the income" is the historical 
reasoning of the legislator56 . It was held that farmers, traders and self-employees usually 
would not pursue their business without assets dedicated to it. Therefore the assets at the 
253 BVerfG, loc cit. 
254 "Finanzgerichtsordnung". 
255 Birlc, Steuerrecht I, § 5 Rn. 4. A proper example for this judge made case law is the legal institution of the 
"culpa in contrahendo" which just recently found its way into the German civil code by the latest amendment 
of the law of obligations in 2002. 
256 Gesetzesbegriindung zum EStG 1925, RT -Drucksache 3/796. 
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beginning and at the end of the year of assessment are crucial for taxation of them. With the 
other types of income such assets are missing, the change in the value of such assets is not 
crucial respectively, but the proceeds of it. Therefore with this group the income is to be 
determined as the surplus of the receipts over the expenses257. 
As already set out above, a film fund is usually planned as a '<trade minted partnership" 
(gewerblich gepragte Personengesellschaft) in the sense of § 15 III Nr. 2. This again is done in 
order to be able to allocate the proportionate profit or loss of the partnership to the single 
partner (provided he is a co-partner in the meaning of § 15 I Nr. 2) . According to § 15 I Nr. 2 
the income of the partners of such partnership is deemed to be income from trade. As a 
consequence the income of such partnership, ie the partners thereof, is determined under § 5 I 
read with § 4 I (including the crucial exceptions of § 5 II, referred to in details below)258. This 
determination is called a "balance sheet comparison". § 5 I refers in sentence 1 to the '<trade 
law principles of orderly accounting" (handelsrechtliche Grundsatze ordnungsgema13er 
Buchfuhrung). Only an application of the principles not a direct application of trade law 
provisions (§§ of the HGB25~ is meant by this reference26o . Nevertheless the corresponding 
provisions of the HGB are quoted here with the ones of the tax law. 
257 Ibid. 
258 § 5 I stipulates that, if a trader voluntarily submits himself to accounting! bookkeeping, he will be submitted 
to the detennination of income according to § 4 I. Not only for this effect film funds usually do bookkeeping, if 
they are not obliged to do so by § 141 AO. Inferred from § 5 I, the film fund as a partnership as provided here 
can choose, if he wants to detennine its income according to § 4 1. If the taxpayer has established an opening 
balance sheet and a bookkeeping he is deemed to have chosen the determination of his profits according to § 4 I 
(BFH BStBl. II 1982, 593). 
259 "Handelsgesetzbuch". 
260 SchmidtlWeber-Grellet, EStG, § 5 Rn. 26f.. 
75 
The taxable income of the investor under § 2 IV basically consists of 
The total amount of income from all types of income (Summe der Einkiinfte) 
+ "additional amount" (Hinzurechungsbetrag) (§ 2 I 3, II Auslandsinvestitionsgesetz) 
- amount of old age relief (Altersentlastungsbetrag, § 24a) 
- allowance for farmers and foresters (§ 13 III) 
= "income" under § 2 III ffiinkommen) submitted to 
- "loss adjustment" (Verlustausgleich)) 
- "loss relief' (Verlustabzug) (§§ lOd, 2a III 2) 
- extras (Sonderausgaben) (§§ 10, lOa, lOb, lOc) 
- extraordinary burdens (auJ3ergewohnliche Belastungen) (§§ 33-33c) 
- tax concessions (Steuerbegtinstigung) (§§ 10e, 10f, 10h, 10i) 
- tax allowances (§§ 31, 32) 
= "taxable income" ezu versteuerndes Einkommen) 
Income (Einkiinfte) is the profit or the "surplus of the income" over the "expenses of 
occupation" (Erwerbsaufwendungen) (the so called "objective netto-principle" (objektives 
Nettoprinzip)i61 . The latter contains "advertising expenses" (Werbungskosten) or "operating 
expenditure" (Betriebsausgaben) in the sense of § 4 IV262. The total amount of income under § 
2 III consists of the sum of the above mentioned seven possible types of income. Since the 
income (Einkiinfte) can be positive and negative (ie "expenses of occupation"), the income is 
the balance of the t~o figures . If the "expenses of occupation" are higher than the (positive) 
income, losses are arising. Even before positive income is generated, or after the lapse of such 
. . . . 263 Income, negative Income can anse . 
The so called "off-set oflosses" (Verlustverrechnung) basically offers the possibility, to set off 
arising losses against profits from the same assessment period ("loss adjustment" 
261 Schmidt/Seeger, EStG, § 2 Rn. 10. 
262 The term "advertising expenses" is used with the determination of income as a surplus over such costs; the 
term "operating expenditure" is used with income as a profit, cf above. 
263 BFH BStEl. II 82, 495 . 
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(Verlustausgleich» or to set off arising losses against profits of other periods of assessment 
("loss deduction" (Verlustabzug». 
Losses which are arising from sources of income within one type of income can be set off 
against income from the same type of income. This is the so called "horizontal loss 
adjustment" (horizontaler Verlustausgleich). Generally remaining losses from one type of 
income can be set off against income from another type of income. This is the so called 
"vertical loss adjustment" (vertikaler Verlustausgleich). The result from this is the "income". 
This principle can lead to hardship, if the income is subject to strong variation. Therefore the 
Income Tax Act provides not only the "loss adjustment" (Verlustausgleich), but also the "loss 
relief' (Verlustabzug). Are there still losses left after the "loss adjustment" (Verlustausgleich), 
than the "loss relief' (Verlustabzug) under § lOd may appli64. Regarding the "loss relief' 
(Verlustabzug) in the sense of § 10d, there is a distinction between the "loss carryback" 
(Verlustriicktrag) into the previous period of assessment and the loss "carried forward" 
(Verlustvortrag) into the subsequent period of assessment. The procedure of "loss adjustment" 
and "loss deduction" can be summarized under the generic term of the "off-set of losses" 
(Verlustverrechnung) . 
3.1 The "unlimited tax liability" (unbeschrankte Steuerpflicht) under § 1 I 
Subject to German income tax is the income of all seven types arising from any source 
worldwide (the ''world income" ("Welteinkommen"», if the taxpayer is subject to "unlimited 
tax liability" according to § 1 I. This is the case only, if the taxpayer has his "domicile" 
(W ohnsitz) or his "ordinary place of residence" (gewohnlicher Aufenthalt) within Germany, cf 
§ 1 I sentence 1. The taxpayer has his "domicile" where he has a lodging under circumstances 
which allow the conclusion that he uses and keeps that place, cf. § 8 A0265. The courts use the 
period of 6 months given by § 9 AO as an indication for the founding of a domicile266. There is 
264 The legislator has recently unnecessarily complicated this system by the Tax Relief Act 19991200012002 to 
such an extent that unconstitutional circumstances are expected, especially in the field of legal enforcement · 
[Sch/Seeger § 2 Rdnr. 52; and: RisthauslPlenker, Steuerentlastungsgesetz, DB 1999, 605; 
Herzig/Briesemeister, Zusammenwirken, DB 1999, 1470]. 
265 SchrnidtlHeinicke, EStG, § 1 Rn. 20. 
266 BFH BStBl. II 1989, 956. 
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a wide meaning to the term of the lodging, but the taxpayer must have it at his free disposal. 
So a delinquent in a prison can not found a "domicile". But he can found an "ordinary place of 
residence". The latter is established where the person stays under circumstances which show 
that he or she is not only temporarily there. For this an unlawful or compulsory stay is 
enough267 . The difference between "domicile" and "ordinary place of residence" is, that for the 
latter the person does not have to have a fixed lodging. It is possible to have two "domiciles" 
in two countries at the same time. It is also possible to have an "ordinary place of residence" 
besides a "domicile" in two countries or the same country, ie Germany. In the latter case, the 
more difficult test of the founding of a "domicile" can be avoided268 . 
3.2 The "limited tax liability" (beschrinkte Steuerpflicht) under § 1 IV 
Under § 1 IV 
,,natural persons who have neither their domicile nor their ordinary place of 
residence within Germany are [ . .. ] subject to limited tax liability, if they receive 
domestic income in the sense § 49." 
The limited tax liability implies an internationally operating German taxpayer, who is not 
subject to this examination. It just needs mentioning, that § 1 IV read with § 49 interestingly 
leads away from a "personal tax" system closer to a "tax deducted at source" kind of system. 
Thus it is held that the "personal tax" is also determined by "object-tax kind of characteristics" 
(objekt-steuerartige Ziige )269 
3.3 The "extended limited tax liability" under § 2 EStG 
This paradox is nothing more than a legal term with quite some importance. Since 1972, 
Germans who gave up their "domicile" and "ordinary place of residence" in Germany after a 
minimum of 5 years of unlimited tax liability, can be taxed over 10 years after they left with 
income from other sources than the ones listed in § 49. They are getting taxed in Germany with 
267 If he lost the unlimited tax liability in Germany, Jiirgen Harksen can "regain" it, by an imprisonment 
there .. . 
268 E.g. to find the tax and revenue office in charge under § 19 AO; to all above cfSchmidtiHeinicke, EStG, § 1 
Rn. 20f. . 
269 SchmidtiHeinicke, EStG, § 49 Rn.l. 
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all consequences as if they were subject to unlimited liability. Precondition to that is however 
that they are residing in a "low-tax country" and have major economic interests in Germanl70 . 
4. The loss deductions 
4.1 Income from "trade co-partnership" (gewerblicher Mitunternehmerschaft) under § 
15 I Nr. 2 read with ll, m 
A "co-partnership" (Mituntemehmerschaft) in the sense of § 15 I Nr. 2 requires at first a trade 
(gewerbliches Untemehmen) in the sense of § 15 I Nr. 1, II27l. As set out above not only the 
purpose of the fund is generating income from trade, but just the GmbH & Co. KG as such is 
deemed under § 15 III Nr. 2 to generate income from trade. 
Furthermore the "co-partnership" requires as the central constituent fact under § 15 I Nr. 2 
that the investor 
1. can develop an "entrepreneurial initiative" (Untemehmerinitiative) and 
2. and carry an "entrepreneurial risk" (Unternehmerrisiko )272. 
In the opinion of the of the courts the term "co-partnership" is a so called "type-term" 
(Typusbegriff), ie not a strictly defined term. The characteristics of this terms need not be met 
cumulative in each case; the overall picture is decisive273 . Hence in a concrete case a less 
"entrepreneurial risk" can be balanced with a stronger "entrepreneurial initiative and vice 
versa274 . However to meet the requirements of a "co-partnership" both characteristics have to 
be met more or less strong each275 . 
210 SchmidtIHeinicke, EStG § 1, Rn 81; for further details see § 2 AstG ("Aufiensteuergesetz") in: BStBl. I 
1995, SonderNr. 1. 
271 BFH BStBl. II 1996, 264. 
272 BFH GrS BStBl. II 1984, 751. 
273 Tipke/Lang, Steuerrecht, § 5 Rn. 45. 
274 Schmidt/Schmidt, EStG, § 15 Rn. 262f.; Schulze zur Wi esche, Mitunternehmerschaft, DB, Heft 5, 1997, 
244. 
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An "entrepreneurial initiative" can be developed by someone who has the right to influence the 
entrepreneurial decisions in an enterprise. At the same time, it is not decisive that the investor 
in fact develops the initiative276 . Referred to a limited partner of an en commandite partnership 
the following applies: 
Since § 15 I Nr. 2 expressly names the en commandite partnership as the typical form of a "co-
partnership", the participatory rights of a limited partner under § 161 pp. HGB are enough to 
assume a certain and sufficient "entrepreneurial initiative,,277 It is sufficient for that purpose, if 
the partner has the following rights under the partnership agreement278 : 
1. The investor has the right to join any company meeting and is invited in due course. 
2. The investor has the right of inspection of books and the year-end accounts. 
3. The investor has all rights to vote equalling his capital share. 
4. Decisions reaching beyond the ordinary conduct of business or affecting sustainable the 
destiny of the fund require the approval of the investor. 
The media decree also takes a stand on this. It assumes that the investor as a partner has a right 
of information under §§ 118 HGB and 716 BGB, ie as a partner of a partnership in commerce 
(OHG279 -Gesellschafter) and as a partner of a partnership according to the German Civil Code 
(BGB280 -Gesellschafter) respectively 281. As shown above, in most cases the right of 
information of an investor turns out to be ruled by § 166 HGB, because mostly he is a partner 
of an en commandite partnership. These rights of information under § 166 HGB are of lower 
quality than the ones under §§ 118 HGB and 716 BGB. This just results from the wording of § 
166 II HGB which expressly stipulates that the unlimited partner of an en commandite 
partnership is not entitled to the rights under § 118 HGB. This discrepancy between the media 
decree and the courts' opinion provides some insecurity in legal practice. For the reason of the 
stronger authority of the courts, as set out in the introduction, one should orientate towards 
275 BFH GrS, loe cit; BFH BStBl. 111994,282. 
276 BFH BStBl. IT 1987, 54; 1995,241; 1995,714. 
217 BFH GrS, loe.cit.. 
278 Grasses, Kapitalanlagen, 1997, p 42. 
279 "Offene Handelsgesellschaft" 
280 "Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch". 
281 Media decree, loe cit, Rz.22. 
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the judicature. Especially in the face of the fact that the media decree is referring in this aspect 
to the leasing like structured funds282. 
An investor bears an "entrepreneurial risk" every time he is participating in the gains and losses 
of the partnership. This risk is established by the aforementioned parameters and by the 
participation in the hidden reserves including the goodwill of the partnership, ie the share283 . A 
limited partner who rendered his entire share to the partnership is participating in the losses of 
the partnership only up to the amount of his limited partner's share, cf. § 167 TIl HGB. He is 
then also not liable for any obligations of the partnership, cf. § 171 HGB. Nonetheless his 
legal position is one of a "co-partnership,<284. Even a shareholder who is not participating in the 
losses of the partnership and does not hold any share of the hidden reserves or the goodwill 
can be a co-partner, if he makes the typical entrepreneurial decisions in an enterprise and is 
affected by the success or failure of this decision as a result of it285 . As a consequence for the 
investor that means that he has to participate in the chances (eg royalties, sale of the rights, net 
profit sharing) and in the risks (eg a film is not finished or exploitable) of the enterprise286. 
With a film fund the investors have a share in the losses and gains of the partnership and are 
participating considerably in the hidden reserves when it comes to the sale of the film rights. In 
this way even with so called Low-Risk-Funds, the exploitation of which is entirely secured, the 
investor carries an "entrepreneurial risk" in principle287. 
The media decree again takes a stand on this issue of "co-partnership". However it takes only 
in consideration the so called "concealed co-partnership" (verdeckte Mituntemehmerschaft) 
which results from so called ''formal only-in-gains-participating contractual obligation" (formal 
partiarisches Schuldverhaltnis). In case the investor is a limited partner the media decree is 
talking of a 'Joint owner,,288. This chapter of the media decree is for this reason only relevant 
282 LiidickeiAmdt, Medienerlass, 2001, p 14. 
283 BFH BStBl. II 1984, 751 ; 1995,241. 
284 BFH BStBl. II 1975, 818. 
285 BFH BStBl. II 1996,66; SclunidtlSchmidt, EStG, § 15 Rn. 266f .. 
286 Von Havel Pense, Filmfonds, 1998, p 895. 
287 Zur Problematik der Low-Risk-Fonds als Leasingfonds siehe Einleitung. 
288 Media decree, Rz. 26-28. 
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to investors who are not partners of the fund. This could be the case where the investor is only 
participating through a fiduciary limited partner. 
In case of a trusteeship the investor as trustor and the fiduciary limited partner must qualify for 
the "co-partnership", ie the fiduciary limited partner places the trustor with the "co-
partnership,c289. In analogue application of the "trusteeship decree,,290 the investor has to be in a 
position as if he was a direct participating limited partner in order to be also deemed a "co-
partner. To meet this requirement the trusteeship agreement must endow the trustor with the 
right to direct the trustee in a binding commitment. Thereby the investor holds the exclusive 
and definite managerial powers and the trustee acts only in relationship with third parties in his 
own name. Thus the investor can be deemed to be a "co-partner,,291. Where in a fund the 
trustee is the only limited partner and associate, the investors can only qualify as "co-partners", 
if they all have the same influence through their controlling rights irrespective of their direct or 
indirect participation in the fund292 The influence of an indirect participating investor is only 
equal to that of a direct participating partner, if the trustee is capable on the basis of the 
partnership agreement to put every single direction of the trustor to practice293 . Since the 
trustee only holds one integrated share in the partnership, he must be able to exercise his 
voting rights split in accordance with any direction of any trustor in order to meet this 
requirement294. Otherwise it is likely that, if the shares are partly held direct and partly indirect 
by a trustee, a minority imposes its opinion over the majority?95. In such a case it must be 
possible for the trustee to split his voting rights. This however is a suspect matte~96. In the 
face of that the investors should either entirely participate directly or indirectly. In the latter 
289 Spindler, Treuhander, 1995, p 204. 
290 BMF-Schreiben dated 0l.09.1994, BStBl. I 1994,604. This decree is only referring to income from letting 
and leasing. 
291 BFHBStBl. II 1984,751; 1991,691 
292 Fleischmann, Treuhandverhaltnisse, 1994, p 1304; Kapitzka, Treugeber, 1996, p 172f.. 
293 Fleischmann, ibid, p 1304; Soffing, Mituntemehmer, 1994, p 63 . 
294 Ludicke, Mobilienfollds,1996, p 33 . 
295 An example is given by Ludicke, Mobilienfonds, 1996, p 33. 
296 CfBFH BStBl. II 1997,535. 
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case the "co-partner" and in consequence of which the trustor is the subject of accountability 
of the income from trade ofa "co-partnership". This results from § 39 II Nr. 1 S. 2 A0297. 
4.2 The "intent to realize a profit" (Gewinnerzielungsabsicht) 
§ 15 III stipulates that the fund must be in entrepreneurial practice with the "intent to realize a 
profit" (Gewinnerzielungsabsicht). The latter is been received only if the taxpayer has the 
intention to increase his company assets "in the fonn of a total profit" (Totalgewinn)298. The 
"total profit" (Totalgewinn) is - in contrast to the "periodical gain" (periodengewinn) in the 
sense of § § 4 I, 5 - the total outcome of the enterprise from the establishment of it until its sale 
or liquidation. It is sufficient however that the intent of the taxpayer to realize a profit 
(Gewinnerzielungsabsicht) is only an additional or collateral purpose, cf. § 15 II sentence 3299. 
No such intent is given in case the taxpayer only seeks to reduce his income tax burden, cf. § 
15 II sentence 2. Is this intent missing, one speaks of a "charitable activity" or a "hobby". 
A partnership which is in practice without such "intent to realize a profit" and the only aim of 
which is to place losses with its partners, is not trading. The achieved losses of such 
partnership are not relevant to income tax. 
Even if the partnership has the said intent, it can be missing for the partners, eg because of a 
limited duration of the participation in the partnership300 The media decree therefore only 
declares that this intent has to be shown by the partner as well as by the partnership301. 
To proof this intent the external and objective characteristics are cruciaeo2. The law does not 
provide any definition of the "intent to realize a profit". The Federal Fiscal Court303 
understands this criteria as the intention to increase the company's assets in fonn of a ''total 
297 Cf BFH BStBl. II 1993, 538. 
298 BFH GrS BStBi. II 1984,751,766. 
299 Kohlhaas, Gewinnerzielungsabsicht, 1996, P 947. 
300 SchmidUSchmidt, EStG, § 15 Rn. 183. 
301 Media decree, Rz.33. 
302 CfBFH BStBl. 111991, 564. 
303 BFH BStBl. II 1984, 751. 
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profit". In this context the tenn ''total profit" is a positive, the "equity capital" (Eigenkapital) 
exceeding total result of the trade activity from the beginning of the enterprise until its sale or 
liquidation304. This ''total profit" is established by a comparison between the company's assets 
at the beginning and those at the end of entrepreneurial activity305 . Thereby the taxable gain of 
sale or disposal which each partner is realizing is taken into consideration306. This is of 
considerable relevance, because with many funds a ''total profit" is only occurring, if the 
prognosticated proceeds are coming true307. In consequence the ''total profit" of a film fund is 
determined by summing up all tax results during the tenn of the fund. The extenninating 
judgement of the revenue authorities or the fiscal court, that the fund was missing the 
necessary intent to gain a profit, can be avoided by planning the participation structure of the 
fund. Thus a ''total profit" of the fund must be predictable from the all objective circumstances 
at the time of the entry of the investor for the whole period of his participation including 
possible proceeds at the end of the tenn of the fund308. To get there the brochure of the fund 
must present a detailed prognosis calculation of the proceeds and the portfolio of the 
productions and co-productions respectively must be able to legitimate a prognosis of returns 
which shows a ''total profit" in the opinion of an honest businessman of ordinary prudence309. 
This is not at last dependent on the competence and reputation of the management of the 
fund310. An exact prognosis on the returns of a film is not possible due to the unpredictable 
exploitation of it. The latter again depends on the success of the film which is always linked to 
the uncertain acceptance of the audience. But a valid prognosis of an independent and 
acknowledged distributor will help to get over this problem. The courts3II have already 
conceded, that " a minimum sum is not necessary for planned total profit, especially not a 
minimum interest payment on the inserted equity capital. .. ,,312. One gas to bear in mind 
however that the "special property" (Sonderbetriebsvennogen) of the investor is included in 
304 Grob, Gewinnerzielung, 1984, P 2424. 
305 Groh, ibid., P 2425. 
306 Pferdmenges, Totalerfolg, 1990, P 701; cfalso Abschnitt 138 (6) EstR; von HaveIPense, Filmfonds, P 895. 
307 Liidicke, Liebhaberei 1994, PlIO. 
308 Cf Von Havel Pense, Filmfonds, P 895 . 
309 Von Havel Pense, FiImfonds, P 895 ; Liidicke, Mobilienfonds, 1996, P 36. 
310 Von Havel Pense, Filmfonds, P 895. 
311 BFH BStBl. II 1985,549. 
312 BFH, loc cit. 
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the calculation of the «total profit". In the opinion of the courts313 "special property" is a 
commodity which belongs to a partner and is suitable and meant to serve the business of the 
fund or the share of the partner in the fund . Hence investors who finance their share (beyond 
the measures of the prospectus) with borrowed money and consequently show high 
extraordinary operating expenditure (Sonderbetriebsausgaben) are in danger of loosing a «total 
profit". The other investors' "intent to realize a profit" is thereby generally not in danger314 . 
There are also film funds which initially do not show the "intent to realize a profit" but are 
satisfied with any possible future profit315 . The courts316 speak in such case - not only in view 
of film funds - of so called "loss-allocating companies" (Verlustzuweisungsgesellschaften): 
4.3 The "typical" "loss-allocating company" (Verlustzuweisungsgesellschaft) 
The term ,Joss-allocating company" (Verlustzuweisungsgesellschaft) is not legally defined, 
though it has become a common tax law term3l? The courts318 and the tax and revenue 
authorities319 have generated a legal definition of that term as follows320: 
1. The raising of capital is reached by a large number of investors, 
2. the entire capital only consists of a limited scale of own resources, 
3. advertisement is made with the allocation of losses, 
4. the company has a certain company law structure, that guarantees a limited liability of 
the investors321 , 
5. the rendered capital investment can be financed wholly or partly by tax savings, 
313 BFH BStEl. n 1988,667; 1989,890; 1993,328; 1995,452. 
314 On that and the exception to it: Liidicke, Mobilienfonds, 1996, P 36. 
315 Siegwart, Film-Veriustzuweisungsgesellschaften, 1981, P 685f.. 
316 BFH BStEl. II 1991, 564; 1992,328; 1996,219; each judgement in connection with the legal preswnption 
of the missing intent to realize a profit. 
317 Cf BFH BStEl. II 1996, 219, where the Federal Fiscal Court uses the term "typical" loss-allocating company 
(Verlustzuweisungsgesellschaft) . 
318 Supra. 
319 BMF-Schreiben dated 13.07.1992, BStEl. I 1992, 404. 
320 Kohlhaas, § 2b EstG, 1999, P 511f.; ders. Gewinnerzielungsabsicht, 1996, P 947f.. 
321 For this reason the partnership according to the German Civil Code (GbR) and the partnership in commerce 
(OHG) can not be a loss-allocating company, cfKohlhaas, Verlustzuweisungsgesellschaften, 1998, P 403. 
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6. there is no real economical, but only a book keeping burden on the investor by the 
losses of the company. 
Are these prerequisites met, there is a prima facie evidence for a loss-allocating companY22. 
But if the investor, and the fund respectively, can proof an "intent of realizing a profit", in spite 
of advertising with the allocation of losses this prima facie evidence can be fend off. This is 
called a "distress counterevidence" (Erschtitterungsbeweis)323. 
The historical background to the development of this figure (the ,Joss-allocating company") 
was the legal situation until the introduction of § lSa. Before § lSa was introduced, the 
investor could almost only because of tax savings join this now called "loss-allocating 
companies". A definitive loss of his share in the company due to a complete failure of the film 
was overcompensated just by the allocation of losses and the later "rate of relief' 
(tarifermaJ3igte Besteuerung)324. 
Additionally and unnecessarily complicated becomes the understanding of this term by the 
wording of the recently introduced § 2b325. Here the legislator does not refer to the term in its 
meaning given by the judicature, but explains it in § 2b itselr26. The intention of the 
introduction of § 2b was to knock the bottom out of all tax saving schemes which enabled the 
very well-off of taxpayer to get completely away from taxation just by participating in such 
schemes327. The ruling of § 2b was meant to be an alternative to the "minimum taxation 
concept" which is referred to later and which together with § lSa already sets a limit to tax 
advantages of any participation in such schemes328. As a consequence § 2b can only limit 
322 BFH BStBi. II 1996, 219. 
m Kohlhaas, Modellhaftigkeit, 2001, P 1139 . 
. 324 Kohlhaas, Modellhaftigkeit, 2001, P 1138; clers. in FR 1999, 504. 
325 § 2b introduced by the Tax Relief Act (Steuerentlastungsgesetz) 1999/200012002 dated 24.03 .1999, BGBl. I 
1999 P 402; coming into force: 01.01.1999. 
326 CfKohlhaas, § 2b EStG, 1999, 511f.. 
327 Kohlhaas, Modellhaftigkeit, 2001, 1137f., 1138. 
328 Kohlhaas, Modellhaftigkeit, 2001 , P 1138 und P 1143. Only the part of the share which is financed by own 
resources can be covered by tax savings, ibid. 
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temporary tax advantages329. The German ministry of finance takes a stand regarding this in its 
"decree of application" (Anwendungsschreiben) regarding § 2b dated 2.7.200033°: 
4.3.1 § 2b and its interpretation on the basis of the "decree of application" of the BMF 
dated 2.7.2000 
To force back "loss-allocating companies" and similar schemes the legislator has excluded the 
"adjustment of losses" in its "Tax Relief Act 1999/2000/2002,,331 by the new regulation of § 
2b. This provision stipulates that it is not possible to adjust the losses, ie negative income, from 
shares in "loss-allocating companies" or similar schemes with other (positive) income332. 
"Loss-allocating companies" in the sense of § 2b are companies which have an "intent of 
realizing a profit" and income, but their business concept is aligned to tax advantages of their 
partners or shareholders. As a consequence § 2b includes also the "typical" loss-allocating 
schemes, with which the prima facie evidence of the missing "intent of realizing a profit" was 
refuted333 . 
According to this a fund and the investors of which who have an "intent to realize a profit" are 
to be treated as follows: 
4.3.1.1 The "exemplary arrangement" (modellhafte Gestaltung) in the sense of § 2b 
An "exemplary arrangement" in the sense of § 2b is given if there is: 
1. a "prefabricated concept" (vorgefertigtes Konzept), 
2. "contractual relations of similar kind" (gleichgerichtete Leistungsbeziehungen), which 
are substantially identical, 
3. the "provision of a bundle of services" (Bereitstellung des Leistungsbtindels) 
4. a "minimized risk for the investor" (Minimierung des Risikos des Anlegers) and 
5. the "safeguarding ofa tax saving effect" (Sicherung des Steuerspareffekts). 
329 Kohlhaas, Modellhafugkeit, 2001, ibid 
330 BStBl. 12000, 1148; DStR 2000, 1373. 
331 Loc.cit.. 
332 For the temporal scope of the law, see § 52 IV sentence 1. 
333 CfKohlhaas, Modellhaftigkeit, 2001, P 1139. 
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The "prefabricated concept" requires that it has been established by a third party in order to 
offer it to the public. The "contractual relations of similar kind" mean that the tenderer of the 
scheme is offering all potential investors contracts (sale contracts, financing contracts, trusts 
etc.) of the same kind and form. The "prefabricated concept" must include a bundle of main, 
additional and peripheral services, which are inflating the losses or negative income of the 
potential investor. This criteria is also usually met by media funds334. 
Regarding this issue it is held that there has to be made a distinction in analogue application of 
the so called "construction client decree" (Bauherrenerlass) dated 3l. 08 .1990335 between the 
"exemplary arrangement" of the fund and the one of the financing of the share in the fund336. 
The former is only given, if the "provision of the contractual relations of similar kind" 
according to Rz. 19 of the named decree are "minimizing the risk of the investor" and at the 
same time "safeguarding the tax saving effect". This is not possible inasmuch as the investor is 
always carrying the financial risk of his decisions and the tenderer never can guarantee the 
return of the raised outside capital. Only if the return of this raised outside capital is the basis 
of the business concept, a "minimized risk" is given337. 
Regarding the "exemplary arrangement" of the financing of the share it is used as an argument 
in view of the "construction client decree,,338, that the finding of a financing through the 
tenderer is not "exemplary". The reason for that is because every economically reasonable 
thinking investor would prefer this financing due to the favourable conditions. Provided that 
the initiator and tenderer does not raise higher commissions as usual charged, the found 
financing is not "exemplary" in spite of an extra remuneration of the initiator. So the reason 
why the investor enters into this offer is not the tax advantage339. 
334 ZacherlMtiller, Medienfonds, 2001, P 1191; Kohlhaas, Modellhaftigkeit, 2001, 1140. 
335 BMF-Schreiben dated 31.08.1999, BStBi. I 1990, 366. 
336 Kohlhaas, ModelJhaftigkeit, 2001, P 1140. 
337 Kohlhaas, Modellhaftigkeit, 2001, P 1142. 
338 BMF-Schreiben dated 3 l.08. 1990, loe cit. 
339 Kohlhaas, Modellhaftigkeit, 2001, P 114l. 
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This recourse of the tax and revenue authorities to the named decree has not been criticised 
without sound reason340. The objection is made that the named decree with its reference to 
buildings was not applicable to funds producing films . The nature of the objects of the funds 
was not comparable. Films did not show the "necessity of approval" 
(Genehmigungserfordernis) in the contrast to a finished building. They needed planning too, 
but the latter is upset daily even in the phase of the shooting341 . Since the media decree refers 
to the above mentioned decree the former has to be judged by the latter. 
A ,,§ 2b EStG_figure,<342 is also only given, if the investor is not encumbered by the outside 
capital; ie if the tenderer can in fact guarantee the investor the return of such capital on the 
basis of the contractual concept. Then - nota bene - the ''loss offset" (the ''loss adjustment" as 
well as the "loss relief') is absolutely impossible. 
4.3.1.2 The "not pick up limit" (Nichtaufgriffsgrenze) of § 2b 
A "loss-allocating company" or an "exemplary arrangement" under § 2b is regularly not given, 
if after the prognosis of the results the difference between the accumulated losses in the phase 
of losses and the amount of the share and the money to be raised in accordance with the 
business concept does not exceed 50 %, the so called ,,not pick up limit" 
(Nichtaufgriffsgrenze) . 
Due to the already mentioned specifics of media funds these funds are mostly withstanding this 
negative selection so that other criteria have to be examined343 . 
340 Liidicke/Arndt, Medienerlass, 2001, P 8. 
341 Cf Liidickel Arndt, Medienerlass, 2001, ibid The same problem occurs at the determining of the beginning 
and the end of the production of a film and the question, how long the fund can influence the production 
process; regarding this see below. 
342 That is how Stiffing, DB 2000, 234Of., calls the "loss-allocating companies" and the "model-kind of 
arrangements" under § 2b. 
343 Cf ZacherlMilller, Medienfonds, 2001, P1l91. 
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4.3.1.3 The tax advantage as the central motivation under § 2b 
The test has to be made on the basis of two legal examples given by § 2b sentence 3 
(Regelbeispiele) and interpreted in the media decree. 
4.3.1.3.1 The first example of § 2b 
This example is dealing with cases of the company, community of part-owners or the similar 
"exemplary arrangement" in which, according to the business concept, the return on the 
invested capital after tax (= after tax return) exceeds the double amount of this return before 
tax (= pre-tax return) and the management predominantly is based on this fact. Referred to this 
the media decree gives a detailed example for a registered share in a media fund with 100 % 
losses in the beginning and 20 % refinancing of the equity capital. The screening of the after 
tax return in the example leads under the given premises to no application of § 2b. This 
example can be regarded as representative for many of the recently offered media funds . 
Therefore § 2b should not be applied for media funds through this criteria. A planned more 
precise example which is supposed to deal with actual paid capital (not only the number of the 
registered share) could become of a problem for concepts with stretched obligation of 
payrnene44 . It is furthermore not sufficient that a '10tal profit" arises on the mere basis of the 
inclusion of a participation in the surplus of a slim chance345 . Finally a fund which can proof its 
,,intent of realizing a profit" by a realistic and economically comprehensible prognosis of the 
results will always be able to refute the requirement of this example of § 2b the management 
was only based on the tax advantage. 
4.3.1.3.2 The second example of § 2b (zweites Regelbeispiel) 
The achievement of a tax advantage is also deemed to be the predominant motive, if the 
investor is promised such advantage through loss allocation. This is the case, if including the 
duty of information arising from the prospectus liability there is an extra hint, especially of 
advertising nature, that tax relief owed to the participation is possible. The mere naming of 
such tax effects and after tax return is not deemed to be such a hint. 
344 Zacher/ Miiller, loe cit, P 1191. 
345 ZacheriMuller, ibid. 
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This tax relating advertising ban is mainly observed by the tenderers. Problems only can occur 
in view of the examples given by § 2b, if for purposes of tax optimization concepts are offered 
which include the repayment of life insurances or share fund saving plans. Such concepts are 
regularly due to their orientation to tax optimization categorized by the tax and revenue 
authorities as tax injurious346 
4.3.1.3.3 The "collecting" (AufTang-) or "basic" requirements (Grundtatbestand) 
respectively of § 2b 
Closing after the "especially" introduced and therefore priority requirements (the two examples 
given by § 2b), the "basic" requirements of § 2b have to be tested. In the opinion contained in 
the media decree this requirements are met and consequently a loss allocating company is 
assumed, if the accumulated allocation of losses in the beginning are amounting more than 100 
% of the not borrowed equity capital which has to be paid accordingly ' to the concept. In 
practice these prerequisites are presumably only met with funds having a large proportion of 
outside money. Who however optimises the leverage-effect too much to optimise the return of 
the invested own money runs the risk of getting into the range of § 2b in the opinion of the tax 
and revenue authorities347 . It is worth considering to avert such an attack of the tax and 
revenue authorities on the grounds that this interpretation, ie the definition of the basic 
requirements by the given examples of the named authorities, is not covered by the wording of 
§ 2b anymore348 Even though it is not advisable to base a fund on such a risk of litigation it is 
just possible that the Federal Constitutional Court will find § 2b to be unconstitutional and 
therefore null and void. 
4.4 The "generating of losses" (Verlustentstehung) and the deductible costs 
According to § 248 II HGB, § 5 II intangible assets of the fixed assets, which are not acquired 
against payment, are not allowed to be activated in the balance sheet as an asset. This 
prohibited inclusion as assets is based on the idea, that self created intangible objects of an 
investment have not experienced an appropriation of value in the market and in consequence of 
346 ZacherlMUller, loc cit, P 1192. 
341 ZacherIMiiller, ibid. 
348 Soffing, DB 2000, P 2345. 
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which are not allowed to be activated in the balance sheee49. This is of great importance for 
the utilization of film rights as objects of funds . All costs in connection with the production can 
be deducted as operating expenditures, so that losses can be allocated to the investors at 
maximum. The prerequisites for the deductibility of such costs are the following. There must 
be, cf. § 248 II HGB: 
1. intangible assets 
2. of the fixed assets 
3. which are not acquired against payment. 
The fund and the investors respectively must be not only owner of the assets in a civil law 
meaning but also in a tax law meaning. That means they must hold the factual power of 
disposition over the assets in the sense of § 39 II Nr. 1 AO. This requirement however is only 
problematic with leasing funds, which are not subject to this thesis. 
4.4.1 Film rights as intangible assets 
Before the question can be answered whether film rights are intangible assets, it has to be 
asked whether a film right can be activated in the balance sheet at all. This is always the case, if 
a commodity can be assessed independently and can be part of trade350 . A film right is 
independently assessable if made expenditure is attributable to it. With a production fund this 
would be the production costs. A film is part of trade, if it is saleable and disposable 
independently. This criteria is met, if the legal practice has found ways for an economical 
circulation of such rights351 . With the self-created film rights the fund has the ability to transfer 
them, cf. § 94 II UrhG352. In how far the investors are able to reduce their tax burden depends 
on balance-sheet and tax regulations regarding the "generating of losses". 
349 WriedtlWitten, Behandlung von Filmrechten, 1991, P 1293. It is a principle of making up a balance sheet 
that the evaluation of the commodities has to be made carefully, cf § 252 r Nr. 4 HGB. 
350 BaetgelKirsch, Grundsatze,1995, P 163f.. 
351 BFH BStBl. II 1978, 521; 1992,977. 
352 "Urheberrechtsgesetz". If the rights are derivatively acquired by a licence agreement the transferability is 
judged by the said agreement. 
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§§ 240 I, 252 I Nr. 3 HGB and § 6 I are setting out the "principle of single assessment" 
(Grundsatz der Einzelbewertung). According to this each commodity has to be assessed 
separately. The right in a film can be qualified as a bundle of many single rights. It is 
questionable whether all these rights are to be assessed separately. The Federal Fiscal Court353 
has already indicated in a court order which dealt with the question whether a commodity is to 
be assessed separately or together with others within a unified assessment, that the crucial issue 
is, whether the commodity is linked to the use in the business, and its function to the business. 
Usually the single rights (eg the rights in the screenplay or the film music) are transferred to the 
producer only for the making of the film itself and melt together with the latter to one unit, so 
that the producer can only make use of them for the production of the film3s4 . That means, that 
an exploitation of these single rights beyond the screening of the film (eg selling the film music 
on a CD) is not possible35S . The film as a synthesis of arts legally consisting of a bundle of 
single rights evokes the presumption to be one single commodity. However the film producer 
and so the fund is generally striving for an exploitation of the film at any stage of the 
exploitation, ie from cinema to free-TV (1. cinema~ 2. video rental~ 3. video sale~ 4. pay-
TV~ 5. free-TV, not mentioned: internet video on demand, music, merchandising etc.). 
Because each of this exploitation rights creates a source of income for the producer, ie the 
fund, all of these rights must be treated as different commodities and therefore be assessed 
separately. 
The distinction between a tangible and intangible asset is not clear regarding the right to 
produce the film and the one to exploit it, insofar as the film right is linked to a physical object, 
namely the film negative. This linkage is also the precondition for the granting of the rights of 
the film producer under § 94 UrhG. However an intangible asset is still an object, even if it is 
not tangible3s6 . For the classification as a tangible or intangible asset it is crucial which 
component of the asset is representing the actual value of ies7 . In the opinion of the 
353 BFH BStBl. II 1974, 132. 
354 WriedtJFischer, Filmverm6gen,1993, P 1683; Schwarz/Schwarz, Filmherstellungsrecht, 1988, P434. 
355 Of course the filmproducer can acquire further rights on a contractual basis. These are then to be assessed 
independently with the producer, cf WriedtJFischer, Filmvenn6gen, 1993, P 1683 . 
356 CfBaetge, Bilanzen,1996, P 158. 
357 Pfeiffer, Bilanzfahigkeit, 1984, P 334. 
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literature358 and the courts359 films are a matter of intangible assets, because the physicality of 
the film negative plays a quite unimportant role for the added value to the film. As a reason for 
that, it is argued that § 94 UrhG only protects the organisational and economical 
accomplishments of the producer36o. Finally, all intangible assets are not balanced the same. 
Such of the circulating assets are generally to be balanced, while the ones of the fixed assets 
are only allowed to be balanced, if they where acquired against payment. 
4.4.2 Intangible assets of the fixed assets 
According to § 247 II HGB assets as fixed assets are only acknowledgeable, if they are 
deemed to serve the business permanently. For the distinction between fixed and circulating 
assets it has to be determined what the asset is used for. This again is to be determined by the 
nature of the asset and the intention of the merchane61 . So the sole intention of the merchant is 
not decisive. It is rather the legal and economic possibility of use which must be in accordance 
with the merchant's intention362. Besides the named requirements, the requirement of 
"endurance of the asset" has to be met. That means, the asset must not be envisaged to be sold 
or consumed within a short time363 . If this is case, the asset is regarded as belonging to the 
circulating assets364 . The business object of the fund customarily is the development, 
production, exploitation, merchandising and distribution of films. As a consequence of that the 
use of the film right as an asset is determined in accordance with the intention of the merchant, 
ie the fund. So the first requirement is met. For the approval of the criteria of endurance it has 
to be distinguished by the frequency of exploitation of the film. An asset belongs to the fixed 
assets, if a multiple exploitation is planned and legally and economically possible365 . It is held 
that high production costs already indicate that there is a multiple exploitation, because 
358 Depping, Werbespots, 1991, P 2048; Forster, Ansatz, 1988, P 32l. 
359 BFH BStBl. II 1971, 186; 1997,320. 
360 HerziglSoffing, Bilanzierung (Teil I), 1994, P 603. 
361 CfGriiferlSorgenfrei, Rechungslegung, 1997, P 126. 
362 WriedtIFischer, Filmrechte, 1991, P 1293 . 
363 GriiferlSorgenfiei, Rechungslegung, 1997, P 126. 
364 BFH BStBl. II 1977,684. 
365 CfWriedtlFischer, Filmrechte, 1991, P 1293 . 
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otherwise the film would never recoup the costs366. However it is pointed out that a mUltiple 
screening decisively depends on whether film was a success or failure at his premiere367. The 
courts already decided in 1955, that film rights are belonging to the fixed assets, if they are 
deemed to be licensed to a distributor for a limited time and territory368. Hence a film right is 
only belonging to the circulating assets, if at the time of its production the owner has already 
decided to sell it soon or use it only for a single exploitation369. The tax and revenue authorities 
are also coming to this conclusion in the media decree370 with reference to the courts371 . 
4.4.3 "Original" and "derivative" acquisition 
To fall under the prohibition of being balanced, the rights must not be acquired against money, 
ie "derivative". The fund can only acquire the film rights "originally" jf it is a producer in the 
sense of § 94 UrhG372. The courts373, which the media decree374 refers to, equate the term of a 
producer in copyright law with the one in tax law375. According to the courts it is decisive for 
the quality of a producer, that he makes the final and basic decisions in the production process 
and carries the economical responsibility376. What the tax and revenue authorities connect to 
this term with regard to the content is explicitly laid down in the media decree and follows 
partly word-for-word the named court decisions377: 
,,A film- or TV-producer fund is deemed to be the producer of a film, if he 
366 Forster, Ansatz, 1988, P 324. 
367 WriedtlFischer, FiImrechte, 1991, ibid. 
368 BFH BStBl. III 1955,96. 
369 CfHerzig/Soffing, Bilanzierung (Teil I), 1994, P 606. 
370 BMF-Scbreiben, loc cit, Rz. 20. 
371 BFH BStBl. II 1997, 320. 
372 Due to the "creator-principle" (SchOpferprinzips) under § 7 UrhG and its preconditions, the film producer is 
not an originator (Urheber) of a protected work under § 2 I Nr. 6 read with II UrhG. However he is entitled to 
protection of his accomplishments (he is a so called "Leistungsschutzberechtigter") under § 94 I UrhG. 
373 BFH BStBl. II 1997, 320. 
374 Media decree Rz. 7. 
375 To this dogmatic inaccuracy, cfLiidicke/Arndt, Medienerlass, 2001, 2. 
376 BFH BStBi. II 1997, 320. 
317 Media decree, Rz. 9 und 10. 
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1. carries the whole risk of the production as a contractor (''fictitous service 
production" by using service producers (unechte Auftragsproduktion 
durch Einschaltung von Dienstleistem» or 
2. he carries out a flim project by means of co-production on his own (co-
)responsibility and by taking over (partially) the risks and chances resulting 
from the project. 
Has the initiator of the fund (usually a distributor, an investment consultant or 
a leasing firm) developed completely the comprehensive contract of the fund 
(including basic agreements with service producers orland co-producers), the 
design of that is crucial to be deemed a producer, insofar as the fund still must 
have basic means of intervention in the film production and carry the (shared) 
responsibility for the financial consequences of this. This is especially the case, 
when the intervention of the fund directly results in the destiny of the film (eg 
the approval of the over all budget (Gesamtbudgets), the contracting with 
actors and other participators and the implementation of changes in the 
organisation); the means of intervention must not be de facto limited." 
4.4.3.1 Forms of production to acquire the "quality of a producer" 
(Film herstellereigenschaft) 
For the original acquisition of the film rights as intangible assets there are three forms of 
production for the fund: 
1. The "self- made production" (Eigenproduktion), 
2. the "co-production" (Koproduktion) and 
3. the so called "fictitous contractual production" (unechte Auftragsproduktion). 
The first form of production is the one of a ,,native" film producer, ie an indvidual producer378, 
who also could be called an insider of the film business. He has not only the typical know-how 
and necessary film business creativity of a film producer, but also the business connections to 
actors, writers and directors and other participators in a film379. A fund can not show these 
abilities and connections and therefore this form of production is not realizable for it. 
378 To this term, cfLiidickeiArndt, Medienerlass, 2001, P 5. 
379 The "commandatore" as Fellini portraits him in "Otto e mezzo". 
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The second form, also usually called in the trade a ,joint production,.380, serves to shoulder 
mutually the financial risk of expensive productions381 . So there are at least two producers to 
this kind of production, who are producing the film. They also make the decisions together 
and, as a precondition to that, they are sharing all rights in the film and the film negative (so 
called "zero-copy" (Null-Kopie)) of the joint film382 . While doing this it is has to be taken care 
of, that not one of the co-producers becomes the responsible producer or the producer in 
charge, at which the rights of § 94 I UrhG are exclusively arising. As a possible consequence 
the fund would receive only a derivative right under § 94 II UrhG383 . To prevent this, the fund 
needs to be granted in the co-production agreement all rights which allow him de facto to 
intervene in the production in the above mentioned extent. The media decree basically demands 
this, to0384. This form of production is very attractive to funds usually lacking the necessary 
know-how and connections needed for a film production. 
The third form of production which can provide the fund with the producer quality is the 
,,fictitous contractual production" (unechte Auftragsproduktion). Here the fund commissions a 
producer, ie a so called "service producer", to technically produce the film not as an 
independent entrepreneur, but entirely dependent on the fund. This means that all contracts are 
entered into by the service producer are entered into by the name of and on account of the 
fund. Thereby the original rights under § 94 I UrhG arising with the fund . The legal nature of 
the ,,fictitous contractual production" is a service contract and not a contract of work, because 
the service is predominating the obligations385 . 
The "real contractual production" (echte Auftragsproduktion) leads to an intangible asset of 
the circulating capital386. In such case the producer produces the film in his own name and on 
his account. He therefore acquires the film rights originally according to § 94 I UrhG and then 
380 Hartlieb, Filmrecht, 1991, P 250. 
381 Cf Eggers, Filmfinanzierung, 1995, P 55. 
382 Cf Gundelach, Filmfinanzierung, 1994, P 72. 
383 Hertin, § 94 UrhG, 1998, P 630. 
384 Media decree, Rz. 13, 13a-f. 
385 CfHartlieb, Filmrecht, 1991, P254; Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, p 477 Rz. 1087. 
386 BFH BStBl. II 1997,320. 
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transfers them to the fund. The latter acqurres them derivatively and therefore "against 
payment". The fund can never be deemed a producer with such kind of production. 
To be deemed the producer in tax law the fund has to meet certain requirements. These 
demands are basically the ones which the media decree places on the fund to be deemed the 
producer of the film in case of an intervention of a service provider387; here in case of an 
"fictitious contractual production", but also in case of a co-production388 : 
1. The contracts the fund enters into have to provide the fund with all rights needed for 
the production and exploitation of the film (possibly proportional in case of a co-
production). 
2. Are there rights only arising within the phase of production (even abroad!), it has to be 
guaranteed, that they are completely transferred to the fund . 
3. All substantial moves within a film production, especially the choice of the story, the 
screenplay, the casting, the planning of the budget; the shooting plan and the financing 
are in the disposition of the fund . With this it is important to decide on the basis of 
facts of the situation. A contractual right to issue instructions is irrelevant, if the fund 
does de Jacto not make use of it or is de Jacto not able to do so. An example for this is 
the case in which the decisions of the fund are controlled by the service provider or 
any entity connected to the latter, or the fund, its management respectively, is not able 
due to other circumstances to make the said decisions; eg because of insufficient 
know-how of the management or its representatives. 
4. The service producer (within the "fictitious contractual production") should receive a 
flat-rate. He can be reimbursed for expenses beyond this flat-rate if such costs 
occurring with him and are paid on account of the fund . 
5. If the risks of the production are covered by an insurance ( eg a completion bond or 
shortfall guarantee (PLI», which is common nowadays, the fund must be the policy 
holder. 
6. Does the fund take over an already started production (it joins such a production at a 
later stage as a co-producer respectively), he still can become a producer, as long as 
there are remaining basic means of intervention to him. The tax and revenue authorities 
387 CfMedia decree, Rz. 12, 12a-12f. 
388 Zacher/Milller, Medienfonds, 2001, P 1186. 
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shall assume this as long as the shooting has not started. But even later the wording of 
the media decree389 does not exclude the possibility for the fund to become a producer. 
This again mainly depends on its means of intervention. 
7. Is the service provider also a shareholder of the fund, this does not touch the quality of 
a producer of the fund, if the service production agreements for the ,,fictitous 
contractual agreement" (unechte Auftragsproduktion) are entered into at arm's length, 
ie as if they would be entered in between third parties390 . 
To sum it up with regard to the ,,fictitious contractual agreement", it is crucial that the fund has 
the right and de facto the possibility to instruct the service producer in the typical field of a film 
production. It therefore needs not at least of all a sufficiently qualified management. This again 
does not mean, that the management has to take influence or intervene in the creative and 
artistic field, since the right of the producer under § 94 I UrhG arises from a economical and 
organisational accomplishment and not from an artistic performance. In the media decree391 
there is also only mentioning of film-"technical" knowledge. 
The media decree assumes another form of production, which is also a co-production, legally 
however not on a company law, but on a contractual law basis. 
From a tax law point of view nothing else applies to such form of production than to the co-
production on a company law basis. 
4.4.3.2 Interim result regarding the producer quality of the fund 
It applies to all forms of production which provide the producer quality for the fund, that the 
fund must be de facto able to intervene in and influence the production economically and 
389 Rz. 12 e of the media decree reads as follows [as translated by the author]: "In case of a take over of a 
started film project by the fund the quality of a producer can be assumed, if the fund has still basic means of 
influence and intervention. Due to reasons of simplification, this can be assumed, if at the moment of the take 
over the shooting has not yet started. Are there no means of intervention and influence remaining for the fund, 
it is deemed to be a purchaser; all expenses are treated as the purchase price." This means the film is acquired 
derivatively. 
390 Media decree, Rz. 12 f. 
391 Media decree, Rz. 12 b. 
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organizationally, carry a financial risk and the film rights must under § 94 I UrhG are originally 
at least "co-arising" with the fund, ie must not transferred to it. 
The question of the producer quality is only an issue of the fund, ie the "co-partnership". Only 
the fund, the "co-partnership" respectively, is subject to the determination of income and so 
relevant for the application of the accounting ban of § 5 II. The fund places this quality with 
the investor who has to and subsequently does qualify as a producer in the sense of § 94 I 
UrhG, to0392 . 
4.4.3.3 The producer quality of the fund and the investor in connection with the process 
of the film production 
As the last mentioned requirement to reach the quality of a producer indicates, it is of great 
importance from the tax law point of view, that the fund, and even more important the 
investor393, enters into the production at such a time which still allows them to become a (co-
)producer. This is a matter of considerable importance for a film fund, because the fund often 
takes over a production before all investors are recruited. The fund can generally provide the 
investor with the producer quality. It can easily happen however, that the investor obtains the 
"co-partnership" quality from the found, but due to his late entry in the fund he can not be 
placed with the producer quality anymore. The consequence of which is, that the investor as a 
not qualified producer can only derivatively acquire the film rights anymore and therefore the 
expenses of this investor are categorized as a purchase price and not as production costs. 
Correspondingly the immediate "loss relief' does not apply to him anymore. 
The media decree394 differentiates as a consequence of this regarding the producer quality 
between two types of investors: 
1. the ones who joined the fund after the beginning of the shooting but before the finishing 
of the film and 
2. investors who joined the fund after the film was finished. 
392 See above; Liidicke/Arodt, Medienerlass, 2001, P 7. 
393 Regarding the investor, see below. 
394 Media decree Rz. 11, 12 e, 9. 
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At the same time the media decree still assumes the producer quality of the fund395 . The media 
decree considers the conclusion of the contracts by which the rights in the underlying works of 
the film (eg the copyrights in novel to form a screenplay) are acquired to be the beginning of 
the production396 . The courts consider the beginning of the production of a commodity 
generally to be the point of time, when expenses are occurring which are directly and factual 
connected to the commodity397 . It is held however that the beginning of a film production from 
a trade law perspective is only after the finishing of the shooting plan3n The media decree 
further assumes that the next steps of a production (eg contracting with the actors, director 
etc.) following the acquisition of the underlying rights are taking place within the next three 
months after acquiring the first rights. If this is not the case, the beginning of the production is 
deemed to be the point of time of the later act or step of the film production399. Background to 
this is the avoidance of funds which are only stocking up on film rights without producing any 
film 400 . The end of the production is reached when the film negative (Null-Kopie) of which all 
other copies for the distribution of the film are made is produced401 . The media decree is giving 
the following examples in which the beginning of the production is considerably postponed402: 
1. Just before the shooting a new actor or director has to be found. 
2. The screenplay has to be rewritten. 
3. Copyright disputes or legal disputes about personal rights are arising. 
4. One of the co-producers has problems with the financing. 
5. The film subsidies are paid with delay. 
So if an investor joins the fund at a time when the fund can not become a producer anymore, 
the investor also lacks the producer quality. Because of the prohibition of retroactive effects in 
tax law the expenses which incurred before the entry of the investor can not be allocated to 
395 Liidicke/Amdt, Medienerlass, 2001 , P 7. 
396 Media decree, Rz. 11 . 
397 BFH BStBl. II 1978,620. 
398 WriedtIFischer, Filmvennogen, 1993, P 1684. 
399 Media decree, Rz. 11 . 
400 LiidickeiAmdt, Medienerlass, 2001, P 9. 
401 Media decree Rz. 11. 
402 Cf ZacherIMilller, Medienfonds, 2001, P 1188. 
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him with retrospective effect403 . Only future losses can be allocated with an a priori effect to 
such an investor by a so called "equality clause" (Gleichstellungsklausel)404. For this however 
he must have been again a co-producer (besides the other partners and the fund) at the time of 
his entry405. As long as there are still significant steps of production following his entry, the 
accounting ban of § 5 II covers the derivative acquired (fictional) part of the developing 
commodity of the investor at the time of his entry in the supplementary statement. The 
balancing of accounts here is as it was in the case of a derivative acquisition of film rights 
which are not carried as an asset in the balance sheet, if they are taken up in the production 
process following406 . At a stage where the fund can not become a producer anymore, the 
investor would never become one. For this case the media decree provides that the accounting 
ban of § 5 II reaches until the beginning of the shooting407. With an entry at a later stage the 
evidence of the decline of the acquired partial rights has to be provided. Nevertheless the 
media decree can not be interpreted in the way that with an entry after the beginning of the 
shooting the rights are obligatorily to be carried as an asset408 . These decisive points of time 
the media decree borrows from the "construction client decree,,409, as mentioned above under 
3.5.1 .1. The criticism of that was also mentioned above. In practice many film funds move on 
to build so called "blind pools", which means that the films to be produced are not yet chosen 
and defined. On the one hand the investor does not know when entering the fund what film will 
be paid by him. This is somehow obscure from the protection of the investors point of view. 
The latter only can trust the fund's management to find a profitable project. On the other hand 
the fund can safeguard that the investor can play his role as a producer as set out above41o 
403 CfLiidicke/Arndt, Medienerlass, 2001, P 7. 
404 The loss allocation is only of use for the investor, if there are still enough losses after his entry in the fund 
which then can be allocated with him, cf Zacher, Medienfonds, 1999, P 1842. 
405 Media decree, Rz. 11, Satz 6; with reference to H 138 Abs. 3 EStH - Vorabanteile . 
406 Cf Media decree, Rz. 11 und 37. 
407 Media decree, Rz. 11 iVm. 12 e. 
408 LiidickeiArndt, Medienerlass, 2001, P 7. 
409 Loc cit. 
410 Leo Fischer, "Zukunft der Filmfonds liegt im Dunkeln", in: Die Welt am Sonntag- online, Finanzen, 
Finanzen, dated 3rd of August 2002. 
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4.4.3.4 Interim result regarding the producer quality of the investor: 
The fact has to be recorded that the presumption in favour of the co-producer quality of the 
investor is not really laid out in favour of him. However the investor has still the possibility 
(especially on the grounds of a concrete situation of the production of a concrete film) to 
provide evidence that the fund and therefore he himself has considerable influence on the 
production; especially if one considers the court's general definition of the beginning of the 
production of a trade commodity. Given this the investor is not a priori excluded from the tax 
advantages of the loss relietll. 
4.4.4 The scale of the production costs 
With the fund being the producer of the film, and so the film rights arising with the fund, these 
rights are assessed according to § 6 I Nr. 1 read with § 255 II HGB as the production costs. § 
255 II HGB defines the production costs as follows: 
,,Production costs are the expenses which are arising from the consumption of 
goods, the demand of services for the production of an asset its enhancement or 
its improvement beyond its original state. To this it belongs the costs of material, 
the production costs and the special costs of production. The calculation of the 
production costs may include reasonable parts of the overhead material costs, of 
the necessary overhead production costs and of the consumption of the fixed 
assets, insofar as the latter is induced by the production. Costs of the general 
administration as well as expenses for welfare institutions of the company, for 
voluntary welfare payments and for a company pension plan need not to be 
included. Expenses according to sentence 3 and 4 must not be taken into 
consideration, as far as they are allotted to the period of production. Marketing or 
distribution costs must not be included." 
As explicitly stipulated in § 255 II sentence 6 HGB, distribution costs are not included in the 
production costs. Just by the wording of § 255 II sentence 6 HGB one should think that the 
print costs for the production of the copies for the distribution of the film are not included and 
411 The same mechanism applies to the change of partners regarding the new partner, to this, cf media decree, 
Rz. II and LtidickeiArndt, Medienerlass, 2001 , P 8. 
103 
consequently the film right is not assessed as such costs. But even packaging costs can be 
deemed to be production costs, if the packaging is of such nature that it is obligatory to put the 
product on the market, eg the packaging of milk, cigarettes or oi1412. A film on the first film 
negative ( "zero-copy" (Null-Kopie» is as such not a marketable commodity, because it is 
economically inconceivable to sell a film by having one copy. No purchaser would ever be able 
to recoup the purchase price from one copy. In other words: the costs for the copies and the 
launching of the film, so called ''P&A'' (print and advertising costs), borne by the fund are 
deemed "production-related expenditure" and therefore included in the production costs413 . 
Also included in the production costs is the so called "budget exceeding reserve" 
(Budgetuberschreitungsreserve). The purpose thereof is already explained by its name. It is 
subject however to the immediate deduction of operating costs only if it is demanded for sure, 
ie the film production costs are exceeding the budget414 . 
F or the assessment of the production costs it is also necessary to define the period of 
production. Regarding this it can be referred to the chapter above. According to § 255 IT HGB 
all single costs, ie all costs which are attributed to the asset directly or indirectly, have to be 
obligatorily included in the trade law meaning of production costs. For the inclusion of the 
material costs, administration costs as well as production costs the trade law offers the right to 
choose. In tax law this right to choose however only exists according to R 33 EStR415 for the 
administration costs. As a consequence the overheads have to be assessed besides the single 
costs. With a film production there are almost exclusively single costs416 which again melt 
together and become the film. Inferred from this the trade law meaning of production costs and 
the tax law meaning of production costs are matching to the greatest possible extent. The 
actually capitalized costs of the fund are therefore attributed to the prevailing film rights as 
412 Schmidt/Glanegger, EStG, § 6 Rn. 186. 
413 This finding was also confirmed by Dr. Stefan Lii~e, Linklaters & Alliance, Berlin, attorney at law and 
specialist in film funds. 
414 BFH BStBl. II 1989, 830. Therefore it is conunon practice in the service production agreements that this 
reserve is not paid back even if it is not demanded. By doing this no reclaims are to be activated in the balance 
sheet. 
415 "Einkonunenssteuerrichtlinien". 
416 E.g. the expenses for the screenplay, the actors, the director and the music. 
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purchase price, in case of a production fund as production costs respectively, and are as a 
consequence of which not to be activated in the balance sheet. Hence all costs of the fund are 
immediately deductible operating costs417. The fund costs however should not be inflated 
artificially, because saved costs are always more economical than deductible ones418 . These 
costs which are also called "soft", "substance creating" or just "costs of the fund", are 
consisting of: 
1. The "placing-guarantee" (platzierungsgarantie), 
2. the equity capital finding commission (Eigenkapitalvennittlungsprovision), 
3. the outside capital finding commission (Fremdkapitalvennittlungsprovision), 
4. the costs for the concept of the fund (Konzeptionskosten), 
5. the fees for auditing and counselling (pIiifungs- und Beratungshonorare). 
4.4.4.1 The deductibility of the costs of the "placing-guarantee" (Platzierungsgarantie) 
With this guarantee the initiator guarantees the fund that in case of missing equity capital due 
to lacking investors the fund can be placed, if necessary by taking over the rest of the unsold 
shares. Is there equity capital missing and does it has to be replaced by a loan, the return of the 
investor declines, which can possibly lead to a so called "negative Ieverage-effect'.419. The 
costs for such a guarantee with regard to a property fund has already been subject to a 
suspension order and were not accepted as immediately deductible advertising expenses420 . 
With regard to a film fund this would mean that this costs can not be considered as 
immediately deductible production or operating expenditure respectively. 
417 Cf BMF-Schreiben dated 31 .08.1990, BStBi. I 1990, 366. 
418 CfFleischmann, Steuern, 1984, P 33. 
419 Cf Kammed, Leverage-Effekt, 1993, P 1532f.; The leverage-effect ("Financial-Leverage-Effect", "trading 
on the equity", "income gearing") is dealing with the ideal composition of equity capital and outside capital. 
The leverage describes the interdependence between the profitability of the equity capital and the proportion of 
the outside capital. A positive leverage~ffect occurs, if the profitability of the entire capital is higher than the 
interest on the outside capital. By this effect, the profitability of the equity capital increases the profitability of 
the equity capital with increasing debts. At certain disproportion of equity and outside capital, this calculation 
can reverse the effect and the investment ends with a ]oss - which is the so called negative leverage~ffect; cf 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 15, p427. 
420 BFH BStBl. II 1987,212. 
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4.4.4.2 Deductibility of the "equity capital finding commission" 
(Eigenkapitalvermittlungsprovision) 
This commission is owed to a party who recruits the investors who again provide the fund with 
equity capital. This obligation to recruit the investors usually assumes a major bank with the 
corresponding regular clientele. The amount of the commission depends on the amount of the 
recruited capital. According to § 248 I HOB expenses for the finding of equity capital are not 
allowed to be balanced in the balance sheet as assets. With the balance of trade being decisive 
for the tax balance sheet, the entire amount should be completely deductible as operating 
expenditure. This opinion was confirmed by the tax and revenue authorities421 . Nevertheless 
the said authorities were basically keeping their word but limiting the amount deductible in 
analogue application of Rz. 7.1 of the "construction client decree,,422 to 6 % of the found 
equity capital. The question of deductibility of the commission for the finding of capital for the 
fund was already subject to a court order of the IX. Senate of the Federal Fiscal Court. This 
Senate ruled that these costs are not immediately deductible advertising expenses423 . Against 
this the IV. Senate of the Federal Fiscal Court ruled that these commissions are deductible as 
operating expenditure424. Due to this divergent opinions of the two Senates the IV. Senate 
presented the matter according to § 11 II and IV FGO to the Great Senate of the Federal 
Fiscal Court. This order to refer the matter to the Great Senate was annulled by the IV. Senate 
in its decision dated June 28th, 2001 when-this Senate joined the opinion of the IX. Senate42S . 
This Senate also ruled that this commission is not deductible and went on to say that the 6 % 
of the commission which the tax and revenue authorities allowed to be deducted are not in 
accordance with the law426. The German ministry of finance used this judgement as an 
opportunity to release the decree dated 24.10.2001427. According to the decree the tax and 
revenue offices were ordered to not allow any deduction of the said commission. The latter 
decree and the draft of a supplementary decree to the latter received profound criticism: it was 
held that the two mentioned judgments were dealing with unusual cases not suitable for 
421 BMF-Schreiben dated 12.02.1988, BStBl. I 1988, 98. 
422 Loc cit. 
423 BFR BStBl. II 1995, 166; cf Also the BMF-Schreiben dated 24.10.2001, BStBl. 12001, 780. 
424 BFR BStBl. II 1999,828, also already BFH dated 23.11.1993 in NY 1994, 370. 
425 BFR, Urt. v. 28.6.2001 - IVR 40/97. 
426 BFR, Urt. v. 28.6.2001 - IVR 40/97; cf Also the BMF-Schreiben dated 24.10.2001, BStB!. 12001,780. 
427 BMF-Schreiben dated 24.10.2001, BStBl. 12001, 780. 
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generalization, quite apart from the fact that they were referring to closed property funds428 . 
The decree dated 24.10.2001 already contained an interim arrangement for (film) funds selling 
their shares before 1 at of January 2002 and taxpayers joining the fund before 1 at of January 
2003. This interim arrangement was just extended by a latest decree to the 1 sI of September 
2002 and the 1 at of January 2004 respectivell29. Nevertheless the said decree is still in force 
and declared the judgments applicable to all closed funds (including film production funds) 
which started selling shares after the 1 at of September 2002. The courts in the mentioned cases 
were not wrong since the courts decision was not based on § 5 I EStG but on § 42 AO. This 
makes a big difference, because § 42 AO is dealing with the misuse of the legal possibilities of 
tax planning (Missbrauch von rechtlichen Gestaltungsmoglichkeiten) and § 5 I is a special 
provision abstractly setting out the determination of income of traders. These cases are not 
comparable in a sense that a ruling on a case of misuse can be transferred to any case of an 
immediate deduction due to a determination of income by a balance sheet comparison. As a 
result, it is necessary at present to overrule the tax authorities with a decision of the fiscal court 
in order to deduct the costs for the "equity capital finding commission". However, under this 
circumstances a film fund can not find an investor. Thus the "equity capital finding 
commission" can be regarded as not deductible in practice at any rate. This means a loss of tax 
advantages in the amount of 10 %430. Maybe the tax authorities change their opinion in the 
present process of discussions. 
4.4.4.3 The deductibility of the "outside capital finding commission" 
(Fremdkapitalvermittlungsprovision) 
Such a commission arises for the finding of outside capital for the fund in fonn of a bank loan. 
In the opinion of the tax and revenue authorities such commission can be deducted as 
advertising expenses or operating expenditure respectively in the amount of the merchantable 
conditions of such a commission431 . The merchantable conditions are established at 2 % of the 
found bank loan432 . 
428 Statement of the "InstiM der Wirtschaftsprtifer" on the draft of a supplement decree on the BMF decree, 
BMF-Schreiben dated 24.10.2001, BStBl. 12001, 780, under: www.idvi.de/downloadIFondsgesllsch.pdf 
429 BMF-Schreiben dated 29. November 2002, not yet published under BStBl. I. 
430 Leo Fischer, "Endzeitstimroung erfasst Steuer sparende Anlageformen", in: Die Welt am Sonntag - online, 
Finanzen, Finanzen, dated 12th of November 2002. 
431 BMF-Schreiben dated 31.08.1990, BStBl. I 1990. 
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4.4.4.4 The deductibility of the costs for the concept, the fees for auditing and 
counselling (Konzeptionskosten, Priifungs- und Beratungshonorare). 
Usually the fund buys a ready made and complete legal concept from the initiator which 
provides the basis of the fund's commercial activity and includes the drafting of all necessary 
contracts. In the opinion of the tax and revenue authorities433 and the courts434 such costs can 
be activated in the balance sheet as the intangible asset "conception" besides the purchase 
price. These costs are immediately deductible operating expenditure. Single services received 
on the basis of service agreements are only forming a concept and therefore they are not the 
purchase price for the acquisition of a tangible asset43S . 
The costs of external consulting serVICes referred to the care and conception of the 
participation offer, the auditing of the annual account and the fund's prospectus by an 
accountant are also immediately deductible operating expenditure. 
5. The limitations of the "loss deductions" (Verlustabzugsbeschriinkungen) 
As mentioned above, the participation in a fund serves the investor mostly to reduce his tax 
burden with the allocated losses from the fund. As the cherry on top the investor is looking for 
a return on his investment. The regulations limiting this "off-set of losses" are therefore of 
central of the investor. 
5.1 The "minimum tax concept" (Mindestbesteuerungskonzept) 
With the introduction of the "Tax Relief Act 1999/2000/2002" on March 19th, 1999 
(Steuerentlastungsgesetz 19991200012002)436 the legislator has made a major amendment 
regarding the general tax law relevance of losses437. Especially the newly regulated "off-set of 
losses" of §§ 2 III and 10d influences the advantages of a participation of an investor in a film 
432 B.MF -Schreiben ibid. 
433 CfB.MF-Schreiben dated 30.03 .1976, BStBl. I 1976,283. 
434 CfBFH BStBl. II 1993 , 538. 
435 GonderUSchimmelschmidt, Konzeption, 1996, P 1747; Liidicke, Mobilienfonds, 1996, P 52f.. 
436 Loc cit. 
437 CfHerzig/Briesemeister, Verlustnutzung, 1999, P 1377. 
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fund. Until the introduction of this amendment losses could be set off against other positive 
results within the same period of assessment either horizontal, ie within one kind of income, or 
vertical, ie between different kinds of income. The amendment of § 2 III limits the possibility to 
adjust losses between the different kinds of income. The amendment of § 10d takes up the 
amendment of § 2 III and limits the possibility of the vertical loss set off for the loss brought 
forward and the loss carryback438. The minimum tax concept generally looks like this: 
The minimum tax concept 
---------------Loss adjustment Loss relief 
(§ 2 III) (§ lOd) 
/~ / ~ 
Horizontal vertical Loss carryback Loss carried forward 
Unlimited 
in priciple 
limit to the amount In the previous year of Temporally unlimited 
assessement; to future years of 
Limited to a max. of assessment; 
511 .500 Euro No further limits to 
the amount. 
5.2. The limitation of the "loss deduction" under § 2 ill 
After the amendment of the minimum tax concept the "horizontal loss adjustment" between the 
different sources of income within the same kind of income is still admissible without 
limitation, see above. This amendment has therefore no effect on the "domestic trade minted 
partnerships" (inlandische gewerblich gepragte Personengesellschaften) like film funds, because 
they generate income from a commercial enterprise, ie trade, in any case439. 
There is however a limitation to the "vertical loss adjustment". After the amendment this 
adjustment will be made in two steps: 
438 CfStuhnnann, Anderungen, 1999, P 1662. 
439 CfDOtschlPung, Anderungen, 1999, P 935 . 
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1. At the first step losses are only adjustable up to a so called ''bagatelle-limit'' 
(Bagatellgrenze) in the amount of 51.500 Euro 440. 
2. At the second step the loss adjustment is limited to the effect that losses are only 
adjustable up to the half of the remaining amount of the positive income441 . 
The possibly remaining losses after this adjustment can be put away in the loss deduction under 
§ lOd. 
Thus § 2 III sets out the following test442: 
1. The positive and negative income within one kind of income has to be established and 
afterwards set off against each other within the bounds of the "horizontal loss 
adjustment" . 
2. Then the sum of the positive and the negative income from different kinds of income 
has to be established. 
3. If the sum of the negative income and/or the sum of the positive income amounts from 
different kinds of income, it has to be connected at first the negative and/or positive 
balance of the single kind of income to the sum of the positive and/or negative income. 
4. The next step is to check, if the sum of the negative income exceeds the "bagatelle-
limit" (Bagatellgrenze) of 51.500,00 Euro. 
a) If this is not the case, the losses are to be adjusted in total with the sum of the 
positive income. 
b) Does the negative income however exceed this limit, the exceeding amount of 
negative income is only deductible up to the half of the amount of the remaining 
positive income. 
In this way it is to be safeguarded under § 2 II sentence 4, that the vertical loss 
adjustment is made in the amount, in which the positive sums of the income from 
different kinds of income is connected to the total sum of the positive income. Does 
the sum of the negative income exceed the adjustable amount of 51.500,00 Euro, 
440 This step is also called "loss adjustment I" or "minimum loss adjustment" (Mindestverlustausgieich); Cf 
Schneider, Verlustausgieich, 1999, P 328; Grefe, Unternelunenssteuern, 1999, P 164. 
441 This step is also called loss "adjustment II" or "additional loss adjustment". 
442 CfBrandenberg, Steuerentlastungsgesetz, 1999, P 332; RisthausIPlenker, Steuerentlastungsgesetz, 1999, P 
605; Graf/Obermeier, Steuerrecht, 1999, P 94. 
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the sum of the negative income from different kinds of income is to be taken into 
consideration under § 2 III sentence 5 inasmuch as it is connected to the sum of the 
negative income. 
5. Not adjusted negative income is to be put away in the loss deduction under § 10d. 
Thus a vertical loss adjustment is only possible up to the amount of 51 .500,00 Euro plus the 
half of the exceeding amount of the positive income. In this way according to § 2 III a 
minimum taxation is set in the amount of the half of the sum of the positive income exceeding 
51 .500,00 Euro443 . 
This new concept of the "off-set of losses" with the showed differentiation on the basis of the 
source of the positive income (from trade or otherwise) has significant consequences for 
private investors, who generate their positive income as freelancers from self-employed work. 
Such investors must precisely proof their optimum of shares in a film fund in order to have 
admission to the vertical loss adjustment with their 10sses444 . The preference of the taxpayers in 
the loss relief with income from trade is also problematic in relation to constitutional law. The 
dependence of the loss adjustment and deduction under § 2 ill and § 10d from the kind of 
income generated, indicates a violation of the constitutional principle of equality under Art. 3 I 
GG44S . The Federal Constitutional Court446 has already indicated in a decision referring to the 
question of the prohibition of the "set-off of losses" with other income according to § 22 Nr. 3 
that an exclusion of the "set-off of losses" between different kinds of income is contravening 
the principle of equality under Art. 3 I GG447 . 
443 This is a matter of a minimum taxation with a minimum basis of determination 
(Mindestbemessungsgrundlage ). 
444 CfMindermann, Medienfonds, 1999, P 373 . 
445 "Grundgesetz der Bundesrepub1ik: Deutschland" . 
446 BVerfG dated 30.09.1998 in DStR 1998,1743 . 
447 For further criticism on the amendment of § 2 also with reference to its complicated nature, cf Kossow, 
Verlustausgleich, 1999, P 584. 
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5.3 The limitation ofloss deduction (Verlustabzugsbeschriinkungen) under § lOd 
As mentioned above, losses which are not deductible under § 2 TIl are put away to the "loss 
deduction" (Verlustabzug) (ie the generic term for "loss carried forward" (Verlustvortrag) and 
"loss carryback" (Verlustrucktrag» under § 10d448 . The ,Joss carryback" under § 10d was also 
limited by the "Tax Relief Act 1999/2000/2002,,449. Thus it is only possible anymore to carry 
back a loss to the previous year of assessment450 and the maximum amount is limited to 
511.500,00 Euro. The "loss carried forward" is only limited insofar, as it is only possible 
without limitation within the same kind of income. This again is a consequence of the 
interaction of § 2 ill with § 10d. Inferred from that the "loss deduction" has to be made for 
each single year of assessment in connection with each single kind of income45I It is then only 
possible, if the amounts named in § 2 III in the corresponding year of assessment are not 
already consumed by the ''loss adjustment". Otherwise the limits set out in § 2 III would be 
annulled by § 10d452. The maximum ''vertical loss deduction" under § 10d is therefore only 
possible up to half of the amount exceeding the "bagatelle limit" of 5l.500,00 Euro of the 
positive income 453. 
There is no disadvantage for the taxpayer in respect of the loss carryback resulting from the 
priority of the loss deduction under § 10d I sentence 1 from the total sum of the income before 
"extras" (Sonderausgaben), "extraordinary burdens" (auf3ergewohnliche Belastungen) and 
other deductible amounts. He can determine the total amount of the carryback4s4 . 
With the "loss carried forward" it is different. Because the "horizontal loss carried forward" is 
always to be made at a maximum, incurred "extras" or "extraordinary burdens" are not 
deductible anymore and stay without a tax effect. The same is true for the ''vertical loss carried 
forward", inasmuch as the sum of the positive income falls below the "bagatelle limit" 
448 Thus §§ 2 III and lOd are meshing. 
449 Loc cit. 
450 BauerlEggers, Mindestbesteuerung, 1999, P 400. 
451 GiinkellFrentzl, Fragen, 1999, P 659. 
452 Cf Schneider, Verlustausgleich, 1999, P 398. 
453 Cf Ritzer/Stangl, Zweifelsfragen, 1999, P 887. 
454 CfReiff, Verlustabzug, 1998, P 863. 
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(Bagatellgrenze) of 51.500,00 Euro and is not already balanced by way of "loss adjustment" 
under § 2 HI455. 
5.4 The limitation of deduction (Verlustabzugsbeschrankungen) under § 15a 
§ 15a basically limits the "horizontal loss adjustment" (§ 2 Ill) and the loss deduction (§ 10d) 
respectively. The provision stipulates that losses with a limited partner are only deductible in 
the year in which they arise in the amount of the quantum of the capital account (Haftkapital) 
of the limited partner (ie it has to be a positive capital account)456. Background to this is the 
fact that losses beyond the amount of the capital account of the limited partner, ie his liability, 
are generally not encumbering him neither legally, nor economically, in the year in which they 
arise. The burden of such losses is only suspensively conditional, if and insofar as later profits 
are made457. The provision aims at the restriction of ''loss allocating companies,,458. At the 
same time the regulations of § 15a are not only covering ';oss allocating companies", but also 
any en commandite partnership459. Furthermore § 15a regulates the deductibility of losses, 
which are not only consuming the capital in the capital account of a partner, but moreover are 
leading to a negative capital account. Thus the capital account is the central term of § 15a. 
5.4.1 The capital account of the limited partner 
The term is again not defined by the law and its meaning was controversial over a long time. 
For a long time the tax and revenue authorities established the crucial capital account of the 
limited partner by the balance of the capital accounts in the tax balance sheet, in the possible 
455 Herzig/Briesmeister, Verlustnulzung, 1999, P 1381. 
456 Under § 171 HGB the cornmanditarian partners are not directly liable to creditors of the partnership 
anymore after producing their investment to the partnership They are also not participating in the losses of the 
partnership according to § 167 III HGB beyond the amount of their share. According to the courts and the 
majority opinion in the literature § 167 ill HGB does not exclude the establishment of a negative capital 
account, but only defines the limit of the final participating in the losses. Only if on the balance-sheet date it is 
certain that the negative capital account can not be filled up anymore with later profits, the allocation of losses 
is not allowed anymore; BFH BStBl. II 1981, 164; LSch/Sch § 15a Rn. 2 f. - with further quotations. 
457 Schmidt/Schmidt, EStG, § 15a, Rn. 30 (17. Aufl. 1998). 
458 Ibid .. 
459 BFH BStBl. II 1996, 94; this is one reason why slSa was held to be unconstitutional. 
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"special-purpose financial statement" (Sonderbilanz) or in the supplementary statement 
(Erganzungsbilanz). This definition was based on the reasoning of the draft legislation of § 
15a460. In the opinion of the courts461 however the capital account in the sense of § 15a does 
not include the special property of the partner, because the legal intention of § 15a is to adapt 
the loss adjustment to the scale of the partners liability. Since the limited partner is not liable 
with his special property, it can not influence the loss adjustment462. Accordingly, the loss 
adjustment is to be adapted to the extent of liability. On the other hand it is held that it is the 
purpose of § 15a (covered by the wording of § 15a) to include the result from the 
supplementary statement provided for him in the establishing of the capital account in the sense 
of this provision 463. Thus according to the majority opinion in the literature and of the courts 
the loss in the share of the en commandite partnership includes under § 15a only the losses 
which are arising from the field of the joint ownership. Inferred from this the capital account in 
the sense of § 15a comprises the capital account of the partner in the tax balance sheet of the 
partnership and the capital of his supplementary statement464 In sum, an amount beyond the 
liability of the limited partner to a creditor of the partnership is neither adjustable under § 2 III 
to, nor deductible under § 10d from other income from trade or other income from other 
sources inasmuch as a negative capital account is created or increased. 
However if a negative capital account emerges, this losses are allowed to be set off under § 
15a II against later profits out of the same participation without temporallimits465. 
5.4.2 The expanded loss adjustment (erweiterter Verlustausgleich) 
§ 15a I provides the so called "expanded loss adjustment" (erweiterter Verlustausgleich). In 
case a limited partner has not paid or not fully paid the capital he is liable with on the balance 
sheet date and therefore is liable to the creditors of the partnership directly and personal under 
460 Bundesministerium der Finanzen BStBl. I 1981, 308; but also: Biergans, Einkommenssteuer, 1992, P 1219. 
461 BFH BStBl. II 1992, 167; 1993, 706; 1999, 163; LIBIH § 15a Rn. 19a. 
462 Ibid .. 
463 BFH BStBl. II 1993, 706. 
464 BFH BStBl. II 1993, 706 . 
465 CfBohnenblustiMenger, Verlustverrechung, 1991, P 436; one decisive reason why § 15a can be deemed to 
be constitutional. 
114 
§ 171 I HGB466, § 15a I sentence 2 and 3 allows - according to its object - the loss 
adjustment over and above the capital account up to the scale of the personal liability. 
Precondition to that however is that a decrease in the capital is not contractually excluded or 
unlikely due to the nature of the business. Such decrease in the capital is unlikely only if the 
financial situation of the partnership and its present and future financial solvency is so 
extraordinarily positive, that the actual personal liability of the limited partner seems 
unrealistic467 . This is a prognosis which can be deemed difficult with film funds because of the 
unpredictable nature of the financial success of a film. 
Insofar as the taxpayer can influence the amount of the capital account before the balance-
sheet date by raising the share or the liability (since § 15a I focuses on that day), such attempts 
will be stopped by a subsequent taxation. Such taxation will include withdrawals or reductions 
of the liability in later years as taxable profits. At the same time an adjustable loss arises in the 
amount of the fictitious profit. 
466 But not in the case of a liability under § 172 11 HGB, BFH BStBi. 11 1993, 665. 
467 BFH BStBl. II 1992, 164, aber auch BMF-Schreiben dated 20.02.1992, BStBl. I 1992, 123 . 
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5.4.3 Summary of the loss adjustment and loss deduction with limited liability: 
Lower than the capital account 
~ adjustable 
~ deductible under § 10d 
Losses of the limited partner 
higher than the capital account 
~ not adjustable 
~ not deductible under § 10d 
but: 
capable to be set offunder § lSa II 
against profits in later years from 
the same participation 
5.5 The concurrence of laws regarding §§ 2 ill, 10d, 2b, 15a 
As mentioned above, §§ 2 III and 10d are basically meshing, though § 2 TIl has to be tested 
first and then § 10d again limits the sum brought forward. 
With the relationship between § 2 band § 15a it is more difficult. § 15a applies only to limited 
partners with a negative capital account. Therefore it can be looked upon as more specific and 
had to be tested prior to § 2b. On the other hand, § 2b only aims at investors who participate in 
a fund for just one reason: the tax advantage. It was held, that § 15a - interpreted concurrent 
to the constitution - was only applicable to "loss allocating companies",468. However the 
Federal Fiscal Court had no doubt relating to the constitutionality of § 15a469. So in the face of 
the practice an answer to the concurrence of these two provisions has to be found . The latter is 
delivered by the mere wording of § 2b sentence 1 (as translated by the author): 
,,Negative income on the basis of participation in companies or partnerships or 
similar models [''Beteiligungen an Gesellschaften oder Gemeinschaften oder 
468 Jakob, Wolfgang, § 15a EStG, 887f.. 
469 BFH BStBl. II 1988, 5f.. 
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ahnlichen Modellen", - German text supplied] must not be adjusted with other 
income, if with the acquisition or foundation of the source of income the 
realization of a tax advantage is in the centre of attention. It also must not be 
deducted under § 1 Od." 
This wording makes clear that no loss adjustment or loss deduction is meant to be available for 
the taxpayer referred to (positive) income from other sources than such of a "loss allocating 
company". Inferred from this, if there is income from such company, the application of § 15a is 
narrowed down by § 2b to the income from such company. Even if a calculation would show, 
that the taxpayer would stay under the ,,not pick up limit" of § 2b with the application of § 15a 
before the test of § 2b is applied, this would not be a juridicial argument for the priority of § 
15a470 . The wording ofa provision is the strongest, as it is the first and finally limiting guideline 
of its meaning. Moreover, the special provision is always to be tested before the general one471 . 
In the case of § 2b, it is clear that § 2b is more specific than other provisions limiting the 
deductions, like § 15a, § 2 III and § 10d. The latter refers to all kinds of partnerships, as 
mentioned above. Thus § 2b has priority over § 15a and therefore is to be tested first. 
6. Conclusion 
A German film production fund is in most cases formed as an en commandite partnership (in 
form of a GmbH & Co. KG) which offers the possibility of a limited liability of the investor. A 
trustee can be placed between the fund and the investor without loosing tax advantages. The 
intervention of a trustee helps to avoid an obligatory and complex registration of all investors 
as partners of the fund in form of a GmbH & Co. KG. Such fund still provides all 
preconditions to fit into the necessities of the Income Tax Act. 
The determination of income by a balance sheet comparison under § 5 I and the tax law 
balancing of film rights with a "GmbH & Co. KG" under §§ 248 II HGB, § 5 II offers the 
470 Scite: "judex non calculat"! 
471 Within the method of interpretation of a provision, after the wording of a provision, it follows its purpose, 
than its position within the legal system and finally the historical intention of the legislator. The wording is 
always the starting and ending point of the interpretation. There is always a core of the meaning of a word as 
well as a limit of the latter; cf Larenz, Methodenlehre, p 257 f. 
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possibility for the investor to create losses which are deductible immediately at the beginning of 
a film production and can be set-off against income from other sources than the fund. 
The latest introduction of the Tax Relief Act 1999/2000/2002 followed by the German ministry 
of finance's so called "media decree" brought some trouble to the German film funds. The 
introduction of the "minimum tax concept" and the newly regulated "off-set of losses" in §§ 2 
III and 10d strongly influences the advantages of a participation of an investor in a film fund. A 
tax driven fund is not so easy to be constructed as it was before 1999. In Germany the days of 
the 1970s are over when the investor was able to collect 230% and more of his investment by 
an allocation oflosses. Nowadays the individual gearing of the investment for each investor has 
become crucial for his tax savings, ie the deferment of payment. 
Still all necessary prerequisites the investor has to meet under § 15 I Nr. 2 read with II and III 
can be satisfied by contractual terms. Basically it has to be safeguarded that the fund is the 
producer of the film carrying all essential risks and having a fundamental influence on the 
production. As a consequence, only certain forms of production can be chosen to safeguard 
this producer quality of the fund . And in addition to that, it is more important ever since that 
the fund has a qualified management. 
To proof the "intent to realize a profit", stipulated under § 15 III as a constituent fact in tax 
law, the fund has to provide a valid prognosis of the results from the exploitation of the film. 
For purposes of giving evidence, it would be best, if an independent and acknowledged sales 
agent or distributor endows the fund with such prognosis. 
The introduction of § 2b will be less problematic for film production funds as it seems at first 
sight. As long as the tenderer of the fund provides such just mentioned prognosis of the results 
from the exploitation of the film, it will always be able to refute the reproach of § 2b, that the 
entrepreneurship was only based on the tax advantage. The tenderer must also not guarantee in 
fact the return of the outside capital of the investor on the basis of the contractual concept. If 
the investor uses such capital, he must be encumbered by it. Another risk which is also 
avoidable is the utilization of outside money to optimise the so called leverage-effect. The 
media decree draws a line which shows a clear and calculable limit. Since this limit is 
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questionable under aspects of constitutional law, it is just possible that it will be put aside by a 
court in the near future. 
The scale of the deductible production costs ranges quite wide, even though § 255 II HGB 
stipulates that marketing or distribution costs must not be included in the production costs. By 
a certain arrangement however the print costs can take part in the immediate deduction of the 
production costs. Unavoidable however is the fact that the tax and revenue authorities limit the 
amount of the "soft costs", ie the fund costs, in many cases to a certain percentage. But still, 
most of these costs can be deducted with one exemption regarding the "equity capital finding 
commission". In its recent decisions the Federal Fiscal Court found in two cases that these 
costs were not allowed to be deducted at all. It is highly questionable if these court rulings can 
be generalized and applied on film funds as the tax authorities did in the latest decree dated 24th 
of October 2001. A new draft of a supplement decree on this BMF-decree even goes as far as 
to cut off the producer-quality of the fund from the one of the investor. As a consequence of 
this all production costs would not fall under the prohibited inclusion as assets and would not 
be deductible in full in the year in which they were incurred. It is held with good reasons, as 
showed above, that this would lead to an end of film production funds in Germany472. The fact 
that the discussion about this is still going on and a new interim decree just released on the 
homepage of the German ministry of finance extending the exclusion from current funds from 
the application of the criticized decree a second time, shows that the tax authorities are aware 
of the danger of their policies. 
§ 15a was also introduced to curb the so called "loss allocating companies" and shows effect 
by limiting the loss adjustment under § 2 III in case of a taxpayer as a limited partner of an en 
commandite partnership. If the investor is a limited registered partner of a film production 
fund, § 15a limits the possibility of a loss deduction on the basis of the capital account of the 
partner on the one hand, but on the other hand it allows losses to be set off against future 
profits from the same participation in the partnership. By this the legislator again makes clear 
that it does not target an investment in a film fund - as long as it is an economically promising 
enterprise. 
472 Position of the "Institut der Wirtschaftspriifer" (IDW) on the draft of a supplement decree on the BMF-
decree, BMF-Schreiben dated 24.10.2001, BStBl. 12001, 780 under w\vw.idw.de. 
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All in all the film production funds as set out here can still offer attractive deductions to 
investors. These deductions live on the prohibited inclusion as assets under §§ 248 II HGB 
read with 5 II. This again shows that the tax advantage from an investment in a film production 
fund is not arising from a timely or politically related basis even it is affected by a recent 
commitment of the German government to fill tax loopholes. It is based on general and regular 
provisions of tax lax and balance sheet law. The attempts of the legislator to stop 
uneconomical investments just for the sake of a tax advantage by legislation such as the latest 
"Tax Relief Act 1999/2000/2002" with its "minimum tax concept", the amendment of § 10d 
and the introduction of § 2b are not really endangering the launching of a film production fund; 
not just because of the doubtful constitutionality of § 2b. The provisions as such are still 
providing enough space for a profitable private investment with a proper gearing. Hopefully it 
becomes true what Hans Eichel, the German minister of finance, promises: the repeal of 20.000 
tax laws of70.000 existing in Germany473 . This again only can help the situation. 
IV. Chapter Four: Comparison and final conclusion 
The relating law to film production funds is surprisingly similar in both countries. The legal 
construct of an en commandite partnership is used in both countries to provide for limited 
liability of investors and open up tax deductions. In Germany it is common for there to be a 
trustee operating between the fund and the investor. This however does not make any 
difference to the tax law treatment of the investor. 
There are substantial differences relating to the legal possibility of funds to furnish their 
partners with ownership rights of the film. In both countries the funds themselves have to hold 
the rights in the films which they produce in order to be able to allocate the losses arising from 
the production to the investors. It is at this point that fundamental differences between the 
Anglo-American copyright law system and the German intellectual property law coming to 
light. As copies are at the centre of copyright law the latter protects the economic 
investment474 . The fact that copyright is transferable under South African law and not under 
473 Cf "Der Spiegel", No. 49, dated 2nd of December 2002, p 40. 
474 Cf Breyer, Harvard L.Rev. 84, (1970) P 285f., who states that also with other workers the remuneration does 
not represent the full value of their work. 
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German law (with the exception of a disposition mortis causa,cf. § 29 UrhG) clearly illustrates 
this point. But not only the South African copyright law but also the demands of the tax 
authorities on the funds make it much easier for a South African fund to secure the position of 
a film owner. In Germany under the "Copyright Act" (Urheberrechtsgesetz) the author of a 
work has the work exclusively at his disposal . In film the director is the author of the work. 
The film producer has no "copyright" in the film but only a "right of protection of an industrial 
property" (Leistungsschutzrecht)475 which allows him to make use of the film in certain ways 
and protects him against the interference by the author of the film or by the one of the 
underlying works. Nevertheless the film producer has to make sure that he contractually 
acquires all the rights in the film and in the underlying works. The German law only assists him 
with a certain rule of interpretation of such contracts. Only then does the film producer unite 
all usufiuctuary rights within his person. The demands on the funds are not only more onerous 
under German Copyright law. The tax authorities strictly observe whether the fund really has 
the factual influence on the production in all its aspects . To be on the save side the German 
fund has to provide someone who can prove at least some expertise in the field of film 
production to supervise and direct a commissioned producer or deal at eye level with a co-
producer. This requirement only applies to South African funds in so far as it is necessary to 
prove that they are not acting merely as an investment vehicle for the purpose of tax 
avoidance. 
The actual tax incentives for investors are provided in South Africa for the most part by s24F, 
a special section dealing with film owners in the Income Tax Act. In contrast to that, German 
income tax law is open for deductions and allowances for film owners just on a balance sheet 
law basis, which allows immediate deductions of losses in connexion with intangible assets like 
any copyrights (as long as they vest directly in the investor which is happening when the 
investor is deemed the producer of the film) . Following from this in Germany each expenditure 
has to be approved under the general provision of § 255 HGB, which only talks about 
production costs and excludes marketing and distribution costs expressis verbis. The fact that 
the '<P&A" (print and advertising expenditure) of a film can be deducted as "production-related 
expenditure" seems to be contra legem, but is still possible due to the special nature of a film 
as a commodity. South African law deals easier with this issue, since all "soft-costs" are listed 
475 In Austria for instance a cessio legis transfers the rights in the film to the producer. 
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in a catalogue of the said section. Nevertheless, the distinction in the treatment of a "domestic" 
and an "export" film also raises problems regarding the question under which section the 
marketing expenditure can be deducted. The author sought to find an answer to this by 
distinguishing with regard to the types of films between two different commodities - "export 
films" and films for domestic release. 
With regard to limitations of deductible amounts, the amount of the share of the investor is the 
numerical limiting factor in both countries. In this regard s24H(3) in South African law has its 
counterpart in § 15a I in German law. Only if the investor has not paid his share (in full) and 
therefore is directly and personally liable to the creditors of the partnership, he is allowed under 
German law to deduct an amount beyond his capital account up to the amount of his personal 
liability. Otherwise both statutes allow the investor to carry forward the loss not deductible 
because of the said limitation to the next year of assessment, s24H(4) and § 15a II respectively. 
What used to be the attitude in the early 1990s in South Africa is now to be noticed in 
Germany: due to dubious tax schemes the German Inland Revenue is over-reacting against film 
funds. However, it would be too simple to blame only the funds for this. The present German 
government tries with all kinds of instruments to raise taxes because of the poor national 
budget. Under the pretext to close loopholes in the German Income Tax Act and to fight tax 
avoidance, the government has created a situation in the last two years in which all funds are 
struggling to find investors, not only the dubious ones. The intervention of the German tax 
authorities by their practice notes has created a hostile climate for film funds in Germany, even 
though the court rulings and the law itself still provides tax incentives to the funds . 
With the two due practice notes, the one by the South African and the other by the German tax 
authorities, the Inland Revenue in both countries can still show its intention to promote well-
founded film production as an economic factor and provide an indirect promotion of the 
cultural asset "film". The regional tax authorities in both countries hold the key position at 
present when it comes to the point of passing on the investments to the producers476. How they 
476 As Ms. Dr. Hendricks, a representative of the Federal Ministry of Finance, explained on occasion of the 
First Annual Film Finance Forum in Berlin: there was no tax law planned concerning deductions for film 
funds . The federal government tried to reach an agreement with the regional governments (and their tax 
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implement the practice notes or "Anwendungserlasse" respectively is crucial for the domestic 
film production. This again shows how much tax law is ruled by politics. The over-sceptic 
attitude of South African Inland Revenue towards film funds seems to be a matter of the past. 
In Germany the film funds and producers are still waiting for a "happy end" in this tax law 
"thriller" .. . 
authorities) on a unified interpretation of the media decree. This was unavoidable to curb competition between 
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